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This thesis is about decision-making by a corporation’s board of directors - 
the core function of corporate governance.  
Under UK corporate governance control frameworks, corporate boards 
accept collective responsibility for the quality of decision-making processes and 
the consequences.  
This thesis develops a conceptual framework that provides a nuanced 
definition and typology of the functions of corporate governance, and an inter-
related typology of the information used in corporate governance decision-making.  
Using this conceptual framework and typology, this thesis explores the use 
of information in its role as the key resource for corporate board decision-making.  
Through quantitative and qualitative research, it is demonstrated that the 
purpose and quality of a director’s information, and its use in decision-making and 
consequential risk-taking, is individual and variable to each director, despite the 
assumption of collective endeavours inherent in contemporary control frameworks.  
This thesis also demonstrates that, in general, non-executive directors 
accept and utilise lower quality information than the information accepted and 
utilised by executive directors. Therefore non-executive directors make lower 
quality, riskier decisions which are not sufficiently mitigated by the corporation. 
 Based on the research undertaken, this thesis introduces a new theory of 
how corporate executive director agency works in practice. 
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P.1  Introduction  
Corporate governance is about decision-making (Bezemer, Nicholson, and 
Pugliese, 2018). Decision-making is excluding or including options for a course of 
action based on an assessment of available information about such options, and 
their potential consequences (March, 1994). The decision-makers select an option 
they believe best suits their needs and their contingent environment (Crow, 
Lockhart and Lewis, 2013). Decision-making is most appropriately viewed as a 
process, not an event. 
Information is the key variable resource used by decision-makers (March, 
1994). When used in complex contingent environments such as those 
experienced within corporate governance, information is very unlikely to be perfect 
in its qualities indeed it is rarely so (Lima, Costa, Cruz, Cruz and Nevis, 2011). At 
the outset, these information qualities are broadly characterised in this thesis as;  
Presentation – the look, feel, format, and structure of the information 
Accessibility – the ease of which users obtain, store, and re-access the 
information  
Scope – the extent to which the information covers the factors relevant to the 
information   
Accuracy – the factual quality of the information    
Timeliness – the extent to which the information reflects the current status of the 
factors to which it relates  
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Other definitions of information qualities will be explored further in Chapter 
Two. It is reasonable to assume that the more commercial and entrepreneurial the 
situation in which a decision is being made, the less perfect the information 
becomes as the variability of the inputs, processes, and potential consequences 
increases. This is particularly the case when potential consequences play out far 
into the future, or when significant market uncertainty is a feature. 
In the context of a corporation’s board, information is typically asymmetrical 
in that it is not fully and evenly distributed amongst the directors of the corporation. 
The starting point of this asymmetry is the variability in individual director’s 
experience, skills, knowledge, and cognitive abilities, amongst other factors. Add 
in an individual director’s availability of time, proximity, character, and 
professionalism, and there are fertile conditions for information asymmetries.   
As individuals, and as actors in decision-making, directors are likely to 
expect, tolerate, exploit, and at times, create information asymmetries (Lightfoot 
and Wisniewski, 2014). When a director is on the right side of an information 
asymmetry, believing their information to have higher qualities, it works in their 
favour since, provided they effectively exploit the asymmetry, they will have an 
opportunity to better promote their preferences or negotiate better terms for a 
transaction involving a counter-party they perceive to have inferior quality 
information. This may well include other directors on the same corporate board.  
As well as measurable information qualities, (defined previously here as 
presentation, accessibility, scope, accuracy, and timeliness), that directors have 
available to them, other differences between information users emerge, including 
their motivations. Here, timely recognition and actions to fully and rationally exploit 
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information quality, including where an information asymmetry exists, cannot be 
assumed since the decision process and individual directors’ motivations can vary 
because they are not typically rewarded in the same way, at the same time, or to 
the same personal extent. In addition to this market-based view of information and 
its exploitation, information asymmetry can exist through a lack of compatibility 
between the decision process participants. These incompatibilities can be derived 
from culture, gender, comparative or absolute economic strength or weakness, 
and status. As a consequence of both motivation and compatibility, when decision 
process participants believe their information qualities are less than those of a 
counter-party or other participant, they may act to lessen the information 
asymmetry by; increasing the qualities of their information, minimising the adverse 
impact of the information asymmetry by adopting tactics such as those that 
disguise the information asymmetry, seeking alternative options, or by withdrawing 
from the decision-making partially or entirely (Akerloff, 1970). 
What an individual does within a corporate governance environment will 
vary but may depend on both their contemporary internal motivations relating to 
the decision-making in-hand and also their more deep-rooted personal motivations 
derived from their character and culture. The extent to which an individual acts as 
part of a group, the corporation’s board in this context, is dependent on the 
group’s dynamics and the effectiveness of the prevailing control frameworks in 
counteracting, and moderating a director’s personal motivations. These 
frameworks formulate and regulate the roles of the board chairperson and other 
officers of the corporation (Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2008, Bezemer et al., 
2018). Consequently, at the outset, the quality of corporate governance would 
seem to be an interaction between individual and group motivations and 
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behaviours, with information quality being a central influencing factor in the 
process and outcome.     
 
P.2  Motivations for undertaking this thesis – question 
marks over corporate governance   
In many ways, it could be argued that corporate governance, as a distinct 
practice and role, is failing across multiple corporate measures and against wider 
external social criteria. As explored in greater detail in Chapter Two, these 
apparent failings could be expressed through the lack of a clear and sustained link 
between generalised views of corporate governance and corporate performance 
(Le Blanc and Gillies, 2005; McNulty, Florackis and Ormrod, 2012;  Mueller, 
2014). It could be expressed through the lack of data to associate a preferred 
defined configuration of corporate board structure, composition, and leadership 
model to board and corporate performance (Elsayed, 2011; McNulty et al., 2012). 
Overall, corporate governance failure can be expressed through the association of 
the failure and underperformance of corporations that did conform to proscribed 
“best practice” as defined and championed by various corporate governance 
control frameworks, (a recent example of which is Carillion plc).  
Given the question marks over the form, structure, and intended benefit of 
corporate boards, the highest level general question being inferred in this thesis is, 
in some ways, what are corporate boards for if they are not reliably able to point to 
a compelling and sustained evidence base for their role in minimising corporate 
risk and in maximising corporate reward?. This is a very broad question to ask in a 
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thesis because it is one with significant complexity crossing multiple areas of 
research and academic disciplines. Therefore, in this thesis, signifying questions 
and answers are sought to act in the role of adding to the understanding of the 
topic, and to use to reliably point towards credible conclusions.  Figure 1 illustrates 
the process of abstraction of the specific questions and problems that were 
researched for this thesis. The process of abstraction started with a conventional 
view of corporate governance and then contrasted this with the evidence base to 
demonstrate its effectiveness. As noted previously, the evidence base of corporate 
board effectiveness is limited. Therefore a deviation from conventional thinking on 
corporate governance quickly arises and leads to the thesis research questions 
and outputs. 
 
P.3  A specific problem worth looking at 
Information asymmetry is an omnipresent factor in decision-making. In our 
personal lives, the impacts and outcomes of our management of information 
asymmetries are largely borne individually over time, or carried by a limited family 
unit. In the context of a corporate board, the impacts and outcomes of information 
asymmetries are borne by the corporation at multiple levels, including specific 
implications for the board of directors. In most instances, including theoretically all 
those that occur within the legal operation of a corporation, the board of directors 
has collective responsibility for the impacts and outcome of the decisions the 
corporate board makes. The corporation’s current board also adopts the impacts 
and outcomes for the previous decisions made by preceding boards and directors. 
This implies that individuals on a corporation’s board of directors take 
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responsibility for how other individuals - their fellow directors, (current and past) – 
carry out their duties, including decision-making in contexts where information 
asymmetries exist.  
Figure 1. Process of thesis topic abstraction (author’s own 
model)  
 
Where boards of directors are equipped with information to meet their 
known requirements, using familiar information, such as management accounts 
and pre-formatted governance reports, information asymmetries are more readily 
recognised and subsequently minimised in terms of their dimensions and scope 
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and in their impacts and outcomes. Where boards of directors are exposed to new 
information which is acquired, processed, and presented for newly emerged, 
emerging, or ad hoc purposes, the situation seems different. Here, information 
asymmetries are more common but harder to recognise and subsequently 
manage because participants are less familiar with the extent and complexity of 
the situation the information applies to and so are less able to assess any gaps. 
Where boards of directors use existing information they have accumulated outside 
the board decision-making process, information asymmetries are further obscured 
so their mitigation and management are a greater challenge still. In complex 
corporate board decision-making, all three information configurations are likely to 
co-exist and be mixed to a lesser or greater extent within each decision-making 
process. Information is embedded in a complex but imperfect description of 
decision-making (Lima et al, 2011).    
It is often assumed in typical discourse that a corporation’s directors 
collectively rely on each other to diligently mitigate and manage their own 
information asymmetries because they are aware of the scope and impact of such 
information asymmetries and of the collective benefits of resolving information 
asymmetries. This assumption is a cornerstone of the prevailing corporate 
governance control frameworks which feature joint and several liabilities for all 
directors. The extent to which this diligence is practiced is a research focus of this 
thesis. The degree of trust a corporation director places in other directors and on 
the corporation’s control frameworks would seem to be significant given the 
collective responsibility for decision outcomes, and the apparent risk of adverse 
outcomes. Even if all corporate directors do indeed diligently mitigate and manage 
their own information asymmetries, it would on the face of it seem unlikely that all 
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directors would fully mitigate and manage all information asymmetries to a point 
where any potential impact and outcome is negligible. This would require 
corporate directors to be aware of all of the information asymmetries in a particular 
context, including the “unknown unknowns” and those that are for some reason, 
kept from them – intentionally or otherwise. It may, in the extreme, require some 
form of certification or testing to ensure that a corporation director’s knowledge of 
a particular context is sufficient in its scope and quality. This seems unlikely.  
As a consequence, a dynamic arises where a group of corporate directors 
are making decisions with consequences that are borne collectively but do so 
knowing that as individuals they have information that differs in its qualities. This 
implies that they are making different assessments of the risks involved, or that 
they assess the risk to be limited in impact to themselves personally.    
 
P.4  What are the aims of this thesis? 
The aims of this thesis are described in detail in Chapter One - Introduction. 
However, an overarching aim is to crack open a corner of the “black box” (Le 
Blanc and Gillies, 2005; Aguilera, Judge and Terjesen, 2018; Bezemer et al., 
2018) of corporate governance as practiced in the boardrooms of large UK 
corporations. Although such corporations are the primary focus group, the thesis 
aims to be useful for a wide range of participants in the general field of corporate 
governance, and also where executive / non-executive board and similar 
leadership structures exist, such as in major projects and programmes, major 




P.5  Why does the “black box” of corporate governance 
exist? 
P.5.1  Unwillingness of participants to discuss information 
asymmetries 
In the context of corporations used in this thesis, corporate directors 
become corporate directors by being professionally successful as managers and 
then raising up through the ranks. Within most corporate hierarchies, the “director” 
designation and status is the highest within the corporation and, consequently, 
typically provides the highest rewards for post-holders performing a management 
role. The tangible rewards and benefits for being a director include enhanced 
remuneration and better terms and conditions including job security through longer 
notice of contract termination periods. Intangible rewards and benefits include an 
enhanced professional and social status, greater public profile, and improved 
career opportunities. Performing an executive director role can also be a gateway 
to non-executive director positions, either whilst working as an executive director 
within another company, after retirement, or as part of a portfolio career. The 
benefits of a particular director position will typically vary depending on the 
market’s valuation of an individual’s skills and experience, and the scale of the 
corporation. Consequently, there is a benefit to corporate directors in minimising 
factors that would reduce the value of their skills and experience, (as there is in 
the general working population). If a director admitted to being ill-equipped to 
perform their duties, such as being on the wrong side of information asymmetries, 
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or at least being perceived to have been, this would have the effect of reducing 
their value in the market for the corporate director services they could provide. In 
addition, to avoid being seen to be on the wrong side of an information 
asymmetry, it would seem likely that a director would also act to preserve the 
market value of being on the right side of an information asymmetry by avoiding 
reducing the amount of information they held over others in the same market, 
including fellow directors on the same corporate boards. This dynamic is played 
out in adverts for the recruitment of both executive and non-executive directors 
where the desirability of “networks” is noted. A director that actively spread their 
“network” would level information and so diminish their comparative value in the 
market for directors. So for individuals at least, networks of directors are fine, as 
long as they create opportunities to exploit beneficial information asymmetries.    
P.5.2  Confidentiality – real or otherwise 
Within corporate board meetings, there is an assumption and practice of 
confidentiality, particularly when disclosing board meeting actions to external 
parties. This arises from legal restrictions on, for example, the discussion of 
market sensitive information. Confidentiality issues may also arise from 
contractual and ethical restrictions, such as those preventing the disclosure of 
commercially sensitive information. There is no legal requirement to minute 
everything that is said in a board meeting, although arguably, this could be good 
practice. There is a legal requirement to minute “all proceedings at meetings of its 
directors” as stated in the Companies Act 2006, Section 248 (House of Commons, 
2006). The act uses the term proceedings – i.e. the actions and events – not the 
deliberations that surrounded the proceeding or the processes that led to the 
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actions and events. There is a legal requirement to record technical details about 
a board meeting, such as when, where, the attendance, and whether a quorum 
requirement was met. There is also a legal requirement to record decisions taken 
at board meetings as part of the record of the proceedings of the meeting. This 
leaves a significant void in the record as there is no requirement to record the 
contribution made by each director or attendee, or the deliberations of the board. 
Whilst a narrative could be constructed from supporting documents, this is a 
secondary evidence trail. For example, familiar information, which is typically pre-
formatted, could be submitted on a regular basis by the finance director. This 
could safely be described as a person specific contribution in that it contains 
information that the finance director has validated and provides to the board as 
part of the finance director’s contracted executive role. However, this is not the 
case with a non-executive director’s contribution to a board meeting which are 
often very limited because non-executive directors have no operational or 
managerial role. Moreover, non-executive director contributions are unlikely to be 
proactive in nature. Instead, these contributions are likely to be reactive, made 
after a non-executive director has reviewed and questioned information, be it in a 
familiar or new format. Consequently, contributions made to board discussions are 
often ad hoc and so problematic to record, abridge, code, classify, and research. 
In any case, it is not possible to record the existence of an unknown thing, in this 
case the lack of information leading to an information asymmetry, which may only 
be apparent if declared by a participant or uncovered subsequently, for example in 
the event of a significant adverse outcome prompting an enquiry. It has been 
claimed that these adverse conditions could be unfixable (Tian, 2014). Moreover 
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many aspects and mechanisms of information asymmetry in practice appear hard 
to research and explain (Abdel-Rahim and Stevens, 2018).  
We are therefore left with a commonplace scenario where information 
asymmetries exist in a regulatory environment that facilitates the information 
asymmetry by not requiring full disclosure. Furthermore, despite the potential 
benefits to the board of directors and the corporation, it is not in the interest of the 
directors to admit to adverse information asymmetries as it may expose the 
corporation and individuals to stakeholder actions to compensate stakeholders for 
poor performance that is arguably the outcome of unmitigated or undiscovered 
information asymmetries.     
It should be noted at this point that, due to the dominance of the “black box” 
view of corporate governance research, a subjectivist viewpoint was adopted in 
the early stages of this research (Hatch, 1997). This viewpoint created the need to 
design research that allowed research participants to discuss aspects of their 
behaviour as corporate directors that was not typically researched but would give 
two outcomes – quantitative data that clearly indicated information quality 
variances across boards of directors that could be associated with distinct reasons 
for such a variance, and specific next stage questions for qualitative research to 
enrich the quantitative data. This two stage research process was intended to 
deliver both a statistical foundation and nuanced insight.   
 
P.6  Who might benefit from a solution to this problem? 
P.6.1  Practitioners  
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The objective of this thesis is to explore conditions that promote better 
decision-making. This implies that the primary beneficiaries will be those that 
make decisions using an improved process, i.e. directors. However, as recognised 
in the thesis title, the decision-making processes in the context being researched 
relate to the board and so are collective across the board of directors and the 
corporation.  
P.6.2  Owners and investors  
A secondary group of beneficiaries could be formed around investors and 
providers of debt and other providers of at risk resources to corporations. This 
group of beneficiaries presently relies on lagging indicators to price the resources 
they provide to a corporation. These lagging indicators include; historic profits, 
historic top-line margins, historic returns on capital, dividends, growth, and 
dividend cover. The decisions made by the board, which led to executive actions, 
are manifest by their consequences, not by the processes that were undertaken 
during the decision’s making. This means that the decision and its consequences 
are often disassociated from one another. The quality of the implementation by 
executive directors and managers plays a part; the external market place and 
competitor actions will also have complex effects. Other calls on the corporation’s 
resources, which emerge after the board decision, will also influence the 
consequences. These factors relate to risk and risk assessments undertaken, or 
not, during the decision-making process. These factors are obscured from timely 
scrutiny by investors and providers of credit. For investors, particularly equity 
investors in public companies, these indicators are very often external in that they 
reference publicly available information.      
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P.6.3  Regulators  
As will be explored later in greater detail in Chapter Two, it is not 
unreasonable to note that corporate governance, in the UK at least, is having a 
difficult period. Indeed, to some extent it is presently soul searching. The 2018 
examination by the House of Commons Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy 
and Work and Pensions Committees in to the demise of Carillion plc has placed a 
wide range of corporate governance actors, processes, and frameworks under a 
spotlight. Alarmingly the report into Carillion plc noted that the UK’s corporate 
governance control frameworks -  the  
“internal and external checks and balances”……“these all failed” 
These control frameworks included the threat of legal action against the 
directors personally as well as against the corporation. Given the level of oversight 
into its activities, it could reasonably be concluded that with the right conditions 
and participants, if it can happen at Carillion plc, it could happen anywhere.    
Therefore, a third group of beneficiaries could be formed around regulators 
of corporations and their boards of directors. A recent example of such a regulator 
would be The Pension Regulator during its dealings relating to the BHS plc 
corporate failure. At present, actions taken by regulators appear to be reactive or 
even culturally reflexive (Veldmen and Willmot, 2016). In many respects this is 
appropriate as markets, risks, and structures that require some form of regulation, 
emerge as commercial environments change over time. This is reflected in a time 
line of events and corresponding regulation which is explored later in this thesis in 
Chapter Two. The role of regulators is not always to be proactive. It is to be 
informed, contemporary, and timely in whatever actions they do take. Centred 
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around the role of information quality, this thesis could form the basis for a view of 
regulatory frameworks that relate to the way corporate boards select members, 
induct members, manage information, discuss and process decisions, manage 
implementation, and monitor consequences. Indeed research indicates that 
variable information quality as externally disclosed is a feature of corporations 
(Xing and Yan, 2019).  
As previously mentioned, corporate governance is enduring a difficult 
period in the UK. When tested by the stresses of competitive forces or poor 
corporate management, or both, corporate governance, as specified by external 
control frameworks, is often found wanting. This has led to a situation where the 
whole topic and practice is starting to be pushed away by those charged with its 
theoretical conceptualisation and its practical proscription. As each high-profile 
corporate governance failure plays out in the press and in enquiries, the reaction 
is collective head-scratching as to how socially and financially impactful failures go 
on occurring. Outright criminality is typically not the issue. What is the issue, is an 
amalgam of laxness, grey areas of roles and responsibilities, weaknesses in 




CHAPTER ONE – THESIS FOUNDATION 
 
1.1  Chapter introduction 
This thesis explores the nature and effects of information quality on 
decision-making and risk-taking by corporate boards of directors. In this 
exploration, this thesis concentrates on imbalances and differences in the quality 
of information experienced and utilised by members of groups where the 
consequences, and associated risks inherent in the group’s actions, including 
decision-making, are shared equally amongst the members. This is the case with 
the shared liabilities experienced by directors of corporations. The context of study 
is primarily the boards of directors of mid to large UK corporations with unitary 
boards of directors comprised of executive and non-executive directors. Therefore, 
a broad topic of this thesis is that of corporate governance.  
Although the legal entity of a corporation is common to businesses of a 
much smaller scale, corporations are viewed commonly as a specific model of 
organization; typically a large, profit-seeking business constituted using 
recognised, common control frameworks which are both internally and externally 
regulated. This typical organizational model creates a requirement, on the part of 
the corporation, to control its activities, manage its assets, and maintain its 
relationships in ways specifically relevant to this organizational model. The 
corporation’s control frameworks include an expectation that a corporation has a 
board of directors which is constituted, structured, and empowered in a certain 
way (although, it should be noted, there is no legal requirement to do so within the 
UK). Consequently, in this thesis and in the operating context it discusses, 
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“corporation” is not a general descriptor interchangeable with “firm” or “business”. 
As will be explored in further detail in Chapter Two – Literature Review Defining 
Corporations section, in most cases, corporations are the steady-state, legally 
defined entity at or towards the end of a maturation and institutionalisation process 
with development stages that may include; an entrepreneurial idea, a formal 
constitution, an operational start-up, growth phases, external capital raising 
events, perhaps acquiring other businesses or divesting of operating assets, 
diversifying the shareholder base, perhaps becoming a public company, and 
inevitably gaining, as it matures, an increasingly wide set of stakeholders, 
including statutory regulators. Since these stages of the corporation’s 
development bring with them increasing complexity, diversity, and risk, they shape 
the corporation’s governance. 
 
1.2  Overall aim of this thesis 
The overall aim of this thesis is to increase the understanding of the 
conditions, processes, actions, and resources that influence decision-making by 
corporate boards of directors. Following a review of the extant literature, this 
overall aim has been achieved through: 
o hypothesis development, 
o mixed method research to validate the hypothesis, 
o development of a new theory to explain how decision-making in the context of 
this thesis happens in a way that increases the agency of executive directors 
and general risk to the corporation.      
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1.3  Objectives of this thesis – moving on from the “what” 
to the “how” 
In order to achieve the overall aim of this thesis, it was necessary to reliably 
demonstrate specific features of conditions, processes, actions, and resources at 
work within the boardroom. This specificity was needed in order to avoid the thesis 
adding to the general research on boards which, as will be explored further, is 
often inconclusive, difficult to replicate, and oversimplified in order to make up for 
the lack of granularity. 
Therefore, the objectives of this thesis are to isolate a universal factor in 
decision-making – information – and to explore its use and influence in decision-
making. As information is ubiquitous in decision-making and is used by all 
decision-makers in all decisions, the research undertaken for this thesis has been 
able to move forward from generalisations and on to specific and reliable research 
outputs. Having isolated information and its role, this thesis uses this factor to 
achieve a further objective in pursuit of the overall thesis aim by exploring in 
greater detail, the control, use and misuse of information by decision participants. 
This objective is achieved within the context of a new way of explaining the 
functions of corporate governance developed for this thesis which is explored in 
the section 1.6 of this chapter.     
 
1.4  Research questions – the “how” 
The generalised research questions ask broad questions: 
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o Do asymmetries of information exist amongst participants within corporate 
boards and, if so, what are their prevalence, cause, and nature? 
o What is the influence of asymmetrical information’s on risk-taking behaviour 
by individuals within corporate boards? 




In order to provide the granularity needed, specific research questions are 
shown in summary Figure 2 as a transition from the “what” to the “how” to the 
added knowledge encapsulated in the thesis title. This transition is explored 
further in both the literature review in Chapter Two and in Chapter Four on 
research design and methodology.  
This thesis has a central hypothesis with two supporting hypothesis 
condition assumptions. The central hypothesis is that the two main conditional 
typologies (relating to corporate governance type and information type) provide 
the conditions for increasingly impactful information asymmetries that benefit 
executive directors and create conditions of greater risk for the corporation. 
This thesis has two hypotheses condition assumptions that are tested 
through the research undertaken. The first hypothesis condition assumption is that 
corporate boards of directors do not act as single coordinated group when making 
decisions. The second hypothesis condition assumption is that corporate 
governance control frameworks do not adequately control the actions of directors. 
This thesis aims to provide specific rather than generalised outputs. As a 
consequence, the first hypothesis condition assumption is demonstrated by 
contrasting two the conditions and behaviours of two distinct populations within 
corporate boards of directors. The first hypothesis condition assumption provided 
the scope to establish descriptions of propositions of the prevalent conditions and 
behaviours. The second hypothesis condition assumption is demonstrated by 
exploring the conditions and behaviours of the two populations in relation to the 
intended influence of the conditions and behaviours implied or stated by corporate 
governance control frameworks. The second hypothesis condition assumption 
provided the scope for the specific research outputs.  
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1.5  Research background 
In many respects, corporate governance is a straightforward activity with an 
established definition in law. The UK’s Companies Act 2006, Section 172 (House 
of Commons, 2006), states that: 
“A director of a company must act in the way he considers, in good 
faith, would be most likely to promote the success of the company for 
the benefit of its members (shareholders) as a whole, and in doing so 
have regard (amongst other matters) to: the likely consequences of any 
decision in the long term; the interests of the company’s employees; the 
need to foster the company’s business relationships with suppliers, 
customers and others; the impact of the company’s operations on the 
community and the environment; the desirability of the company 
maintaining a reputation for high standards of business conduct, and 
the need to act fairly as between members of the company.” 
To simplify the legal definition, a director of a corporation is required to act in 
a fair and balanced way with regard to the broad interests of the shareholders and 
the corporation’s wider stakeholders, and in relation to a span of time-frames 
including the long-term. What this means in practice depends upon the prevailing 
and anticipated circumstances, not just within the corporation but also within wide 
and complex commercial and social contexts. Because of the application of the 
law in practice, very quickly, the waters get muddied. The UK Corporate 
Governance Code 2016 (Financial Reporting Council, 2016) states that: 
“The purpose of corporate governance is to facilitate effective, 
entrepreneurial and prudent management that can deliver the long-term 
success of the company.” 
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Already, there is an apparent dilution of aspiration from “must act” in the 
Companies Act 2006 to the softer, vaguer and altogether more accommodating 
“can deliver” in the UK Corporate Governance Code. In practice, there is a drifting 
apart of the fulfilment of the legal requirements of being a director of a corporation 
and adherence or conformity to a code that is intended to foster good governance 
of the corporation.   
Basic administrative corporate governance is, in the main, legally defined 
within generic control frameworks external to the corporation. Essentially this 
means ensuring that the corporation conforms to the legal requirements of being 
legally incorporated, paying tax, selling safe and legal products, and employing 
people on statutory terms and conditions amongst many other functions. Beyond 
that, corporate governance which aims to promote the corporation’s commercial 
success alongside legal compliance is much less well defined, as will be explored 
in Chapter Two.  
Good corporate governance, well performed, relies upon directors doing the 
right thing all the time, both individually and collectively. The “right thing” is 
complex, multifaceted, and of variable construction built with reference to internal, 
external, regulatory, societal, institutional, and numerous other frameworks 
broadly forming “welfare capitalism” (Chizema and Buck, 2006). Inevitably, these 
frameworks require those employed to perform corporate governance that 
encompasses and balances the needs of multiple constituencies. In highly 
matured markets such as the U.K., it is no longer practical that corporations are 
run as old-school profit maximisers as defined by “stockholder capitalism” 
(Chizema and Buck, 2006). By default, technical corporate governance control 
frameworks move the corporation towards welfare capitalist model. For example, 
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corporations have, by law, to pay the minimum wage and auto-enrol eligible 
employees in to a pension scheme. Many corporations go further with living wage 
commitments and higher levels of pensions and other non-statutory benefits as 
they are required to by non-legal external control frameworks such as societal 
pressure and the job market. 
Depending on the location, history, scale, scope, ownership, and capital 
structure of a corporation, a long and seemingly ever-growing roster of 
stakeholders will have an interest in the processes and consequences of 
corporate governance. These stakeholders may range from the obvious and 
visible, such as shareholders and employees, through customers, creditors, 
pensioners, and suppliers, to regulators and de facto underwriters of corporate 
outcomes, such as pension safety nets, the state, and ultimately the tax payer. 
To this point, we accept a functional and linear view of corporate 
governance, (largely undertaken through a succession of decision-making 
processes), as a collective action taken by the corporation’s board of directors with 
corporate preferences, derived from the corporation’s aspirations, resources, and 
needs as the dominant guide. This is also the conditions under which we expect 
that group behaviours amongst directors are engendered (Fama and Jensen, 
1983). This functional and linear view is shown in Figure 3. In Figure 3, the 
“frameworks” are set externally and are known, or are at least openly available to 
all participants. The function and form of “corporate governance” is taken as a 
uniform action with no distinction as to the type of corporate governance action 
being undertaken. The “decision” is viewed as being predominantly objective and 
therefore market based, (Stagner, 1969; Dixon, 2003). As a component of the 
functional and linear view, “information” is assumed to be of the same qualities in 
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depth, content, and accessibility to all participants. The functional and linear view 
of corporate governance is challenged in this thesis. 
Figure 3.  Functional and linear view of corporate governance 




1.6  A conceptual framework exploring two sub-sets of 
corporate governance 
As explored in the previous chapter section, the prevailing view of corporate 
governance is questionable. This is because the main activity of corporate 
governance, that of decision-making, is presently typically regarded as being a 
functional and linear process which is illustrated in Figure 3. Consequently, it is 
argued in this thesis that in popular discourse, technical analysis, and in academic 
study, corporate governance tends to be conglomerated into one broad action 
which, it is hypothesised here, acts to overly simplify the process. Despite 
corporations being long-standing, stable entities central to the success of western 
developed economies, academics are still able to state that little is known about 
how they really work at the highest decision-making level (Le Blanc and Gillies, 
2005). As will be explored in this thesis, it is argued that the oversimplification of 
what corporate governance is in practice has led many theorists, commentators, 
and regulators to a standstill in terms of how to improve stakeholder outcomes. 
There is an enduring gap in the extant literature (Stevenson and Radin, 2015).   
To move on from this oversimplification it is argued in this thesis that, in 
practice, corporate governance can be broken down in to two distinct types of 
activity. The first type is, broadly, ensuring that the corporation being governed 
“complies”. This means that the corporation complies with its legal obligations, its 
societal obligations, that it systematically protects itself from the risk of non-
commercial harm, such as accidents and fraud, and that it minimises the impacts 
of negative consequences of known commercial risks where the timescale and 
consequence of the impacts are quantifiable. Commercial risk mitigation could 
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include, for example, the hedging of significant input costs or ensuring the 
availability of working capital. These actions can be described in this thesis as a 
subset of corporate governance as a whole and are labelled here as “technical 
corporate governance”. Technical corporate governance is, in the main, controlled 
within a set of external frameworks set by regulators, legislators, and society, with 
proscribed actions, timetables, and outputs with defined parameters, contents, 
and formats. If adhered to, the corporation may operate under the radar of many 
stakeholders year-in-year-out. Routine scrutiny may take place, for example, in 
relation to the submission of corporate accounts, statements, and tax returns. For 
corporations, routine scrutiny is matched closely to the known technical 
requirements of the relevant frameworks. Unless the corporation is engaged in 
high risk activities, limited proactive scrutiny will take place without the stimulus of 
an adverse event. In undertaking technical corporate governance, the corporation 
is subservient and, in the main, passive in relation to the formation of the external 
frameworks.   
Another set of actions are those undertaken to enhance the business 
performance of the corporation. These actions include those to: facilitate the 
design and development of new products, allocate resources to invest in capacity, 
open new channels to market, form strategic commercial partnerships, and market 
the brands and products of the corporation. At the same time, actions could 
include those taken to reduce activities and capital allocation when market forces 
act against the corporation, or on occasions when actions taken with the 
expectation of a projected positive consequence have not delivered the intended 
consequences. This second subset of corporate governance is labelled in this 
thesis as “commercial corporate governance”. This governance subset has been 
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touched on before in general terms and identified as the main area of persistent 
risk to corporations (Cutting, 2000). Institutional governance (Kakabadse, Khan, 
N., and Kakabadse, N., 2016) is akin to technical corporate governance whilst 
commercial corporate governance is akin to pursuing investor value. This thesis 
treats the two types of corporate governance as functionally distinct).    
In contrast to technical corporate governance, commercial corporate 
governance is, in both theory and practice, a self-regulating activity - at least at the 
point at which it is carried out. Ultimately, the market mechanism regulates 
commercial corporate governance through rewards and penalties for the various 
outcomes that relate to commercial corporate governance actions. This would hold 
true for corporations of any size. For the vast majority of corporations – i.e. those 
without external and or public shareholders - there is limited oversight of 
commercial corporate governance. Within such corporations, which span a wide 
range of corporation sizes, there is a close and continuous process of commercial 
corporate governance occurring, occasionally without the use of the overt 
organizational structures and frameworks found in publically owned corporations. 
It is simply the owners, or their appointed agents, undertaking business 
management actions.  
Occasionally, events may occur that require a corporation to act 
proactively. These events could include a change in a control framework, or the 
introduction of a new control framework.  Events could require a corporation to 
react to a failure or omission in their compliance regimes, such as an industrial 
accident, an occurrence of corruption, or other criminal activity within the 
corporation, by the corporation, on an external party, or perpetrated against the 
corporation. When these events occur, the external frameworks may require the 
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corporation to handover, normally temporarily, some functions of technical 
corporate governance as proscribed courses of action are followed. This may 
include criminal prosecution, civil lawsuits, ad hoc oversight by regulators, and 
interventions by stakeholders including shareholders. Overall, the objectives of 
these actions are to stabilise the situation and return the corporation to a 
compliant state as specified by the external control framework. 
For public corporations and large corporations, (the focus of this thesis), 
whilst many outputs and actions of commercial corporate governance are visible 
and measurable, insight to the processes that took place to deliver the actions is 
limited, particularly during the period that the processes of commercial corporate 
governance were undertaken. What insight there is, often significantly lags the 
events because the timescales required to report on commercial corporate 
governance activities, such that they are, are often significantly after the events 
they relate to. There are exceptions to this for example where disclosure is 
required concerning actions and events that may require stakeholder approval. 
Such events could include mergers, acquisitions, disposals, business unit 
closures, and other actions and events that materially risk stakeholder interests. 
Increasingly, new product launches that feature technologies and business 
practices require new, amended, or updated legislation so are signalled to the 
markets whilst the commercial corporate governance is being enacted. An 
example of this is the development and testing of autonomous vehicles for use on 
public roads. Commercial corporate governance in relation to these types of new 
product category is played out in public because legislation, part of the external 




Whilst executives of public and large corporations often attempt to create 
positive narratives about commercial corporate governance actions to portray their 
corporations in a positive way, there is no legal requirement to do so, unlike 
technical corporate governance actions. Where executives seek to associate 
commercial corporate governance actions with positive commercial outcomes, 
they do so in a pool of broad environmental factors such as the markets, economic 
conditions, and competitor actions. The result is that, for many corporations, there 
is often a limited provable connection between commercial corporate governance 
and corporate long-term performance, (Le Blanc and Gillies, 2005; McNulty et al., 
2012; Mueller, 2014). 
Whilst in post, it is in the interest of a board of directors to champion 
positive outcomes and to closely associate their own actions with these positive 
outcomes by creating a narrative of causation. At other times, the same boards of 
directors will minimize their role in negative outcomes through the disassociation 
of their commercial corporate governance from such negative outcomes. In these 
instances, cause is no longer inferred - it is now correlation, coincidence, bad 
timing, or some other ill fortune. Where insight is provided, for example, through 
statutory reporting requirements or listed stock exchange filings, the cause-to-
correlation-to-coincidence continuum may still feature. This is the circumstance 
that creates and maintains the “black box” of corporate governance, particularly as 
it relates to commercial corporate governance. There is no requirement to explain 
either what happened, or the process involved of the soft governance of board 
processes (Veldsman, 2012).   
The lack of insight, particularly timely insight that goes a long way in 
forming the “black box”, is legitimate in many instances. Corporations have a right 
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to exploit some secrecy to create and then maintain competitive advantages. The 
corporation’s plans, inventions, objectives, strategies, weaknesses, and many 
other features, should be protected from scrutiny as the corporate board seeks to 
configure resources and formulate actions that best protect the corporation from 
commercial risks, and to maximise its commercial rewards. Provided this secrecy 
is not unduly exploited and that, in particularly, one set of stakeholders’ interests 
are not illegitimately positioned above another, then there is limited downside that 
could be corrected by the corporation being forced to “open up”.     
Those directly active in corporate governance, the directors, place 
themselves at risk, or rather have had risk placed upon them by successive 
external control frameworks. Where action-to-outcome cause can be established, 
they are exposed to being penalised for performance failure. Additionally, 
technical corporate governance failure can also be established by the absence of 
effective actions relating to specific areas of responsibility such as health and 
safety, bribery and corruption, and reporting in line with statutory requirements.  
Directors can act to protect the corporations they govern and, in turn 
themselves, by exploiting control measures aimed at minimising the risks inherent 
within the technical corporate governance function. They may contract out some 
functions to professional service providers, such as auditors. Indeed, for 
corporations, contracting out some functions is a requirement of the external 
control framework. They may attempt to distance themselves by instituting internal 
policies and controls that push risks down into the corporation. They may create 
organizational structures that attempt to ring-fence risk in lower level entities 
therefore limiting exposure to higher level entities. They may create ownership 
structures in jurisdictions that afford more protection to, often, a limited number of 
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stakeholders. The extent to which actions undertaken to limit risk to the 
corporation and its directors endure is limited by those who instigate and maintain 
external control frameworks.  
As will be examined in Chapter Two, the evolution of corporations as 
distinct entities, and the external control frameworks that allow their existence, 
(particularly as they relate to technical corporate governance), variously play 
leapfrog and cat-and-mouse with each other. In general, control frameworks in the 
UK can be regarded as permissive in that they tend to allow actions until they are 
shown to be generally detrimental. This type of control framework development 
requires an evidence base that is acceptable to, or at least tolerated by, the 
dominant stakeholders. Dominance amongst a group of stakeholders may change 
over time and will often reflect wider prevailing political and social cultures. As 
examples, the tonality and conduct of the various and numerous parliamentary 
hearings into the Royal Bank of Scotland taxpayer bailout (House of Commons, 
2012)  and the BHS plc collapse (House of Commons, 2016) which saw previously 
feted corporate directors dragged low by enquirers often exploiting popular anger 
rather than actual infringements of an external control framework. Consequently, 
UK control frameworks relating to corporate governance mainly focus on technical 
corporate governance actions as these pertain to decisions and outcomes that are 
directly supported by a near-to-objective evidence base. Typically, the evidence 
base is built up over time and results in a technical requirement that is recognised 
and agreed as being appropriate. For example, frameworks that relate to a 
corporation’s formation as a legally entity and the corporations subsequent 
administration including frameworks relating to corporate administration, 
ownership, debts, and tax affairs. These frameworks are ubiquitous, proven to be 
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effective, and when they require updating, limited opposition is present as the 
evidence-base is accepted. Other frameworks may depend on the complexity of 
the business, its scale, and its ownership structure. A large, publically owned 
corporation will have regulated audits and high levels of statutory reporting, 
amongst other regulated functions.  
Often, these regulations can be viewed as a rolling, evolving reaction to 
series of negative events played out over time – typically high-profile corporate 
governance failures. When a corporation is seen to be failing, stakeholders 
legitimately seek to protect their interests - typically, the larger the corporation, the 
longer the list of substantial stakeholders. The more abrupt the failure process, the 
deeper the exposure of stakeholders, caught out by their inability to manage down 
their risk and exposure before the failure crystallizes in a negative form beyond 
their direct control. This spiral often creates a political impetus to act. Regulators, 
often prompted by the media or instructed by politicians, act to regulate more 
vigorously using the frameworks they already have or may request new or 
amended frameworks.  
The challenge legislators and regulators face lies in pinning down clear 
reasons to act that are supported by an evidence base. Absent clear and well 
documented insights into commercial corporate governance actions or inactions 
that may have led to heightened risks and ultimately to a corporate failure, 
legislators and regulators often turn to increased technical corporate governance 
measures. Regulators seem to conclude that more technical corporate 
governance will reduce risk irrespective of the origins of the risk event that caused 
the corporate failure. Through this process, and over time, adherence to technical 
corporate governance requirements becomes de facto good corporate 
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governance overall. As a result, diligent and effective technical corporate 
governance is assumed to be the prerequisite for good commercial corporate 
governance. Culturally, this could be the case. It would seem unlikely that an 
organisation that dutifully adhered to all the requirements for its commercial 
corporate governance would play fast-and-loose with its technical corporate 
governance. However, the same cannot be said of the reverse position. At the 
death, the technical corporate governance of BHS plc was questionable. However, 
prior to this it was by and large a well run corporation when measured against 
technical corporate governance criteria. The commercial corporate governance 
failures of BHS plc would seem to go back years. These were not the focus of the 
HMG Parliamentary enquiry which instead positioned evidence of technical 
corporate governance failing as being largely representative of all aspects of 
corporate governance failure.   
As previously discussed, the processes of corporate board decision-making 
have been under-research in general. This is largely because the environment in 
which decisions are made, a board meeting in a board room, is shielded from view 
by the aforementioned legitimate privacy that corporations enjoy, and by the lack 
of any legal requirements to document or publish much of the decision-making 
process. These core reasons can be added to by; internal corporate rules, the real 
and perceived needs for commercial secrecy, and, absent any requirement to do 
so, a general unwillingness by participants to voluntarily expose themselves, and 
their actions to external scrutiny. This leaves stakeholders and other interested 
parties such as academics with a blind spot when seeking to assess the 
consequences of corporate board decision-making because specific outcomes are 
not clearly associated to specific decision-making processes that may have led to 
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them (Tian, 2014). Stakeholders and other interested parties are often left to place 
decisions to consequences within a coincidence / correlation / causation and 
outcome matrix with one axis variously being elapsed time / changing conditions / 
competitor actions, plus many more, and another axis of corporate actions as the 
result of proactive / reactive decisions and inaction. 
 
1.7  The role and nature of information 
Central to the process of decision-making is the information used by 
directors (Floridi, 2013). Information can be visualised as a wide array spread 
around the director. Some of the information array is designed to meet the needs 
of a regular governance function, for example, to monitor the performance of on-
going activities or to approve an audit function. This type of information is typically 
provided by the corporation to its board of directors in a format designed by the 
corporation to meet known requirements often controlled by external frameworks. 
Occasionally, new situations will emerge from the contingent environment that 
requires new information to be provided by the corporation to its board of 
directors. Other elements of the information array are information sets derived 
from previous experiences a director may have had or has obtained from sources 
other than the corporation. Such elements of information can be ad hoc, selective, 
and variable. Across these three information types is a range of inputs, 
computations, and formats whose compilers will attempt to balance the needs of 
the users against their ability to produce information of acceptable quality within a 
suitable timeframe. The way in which a director processes information may vary, 
as will the ways in which each director triangulates, supplements, and discusses 
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information (Dixon, 2003). The ways in which directors share and exchange 
information may also vary (Malenko, 2014). For many reasons explored in this 
thesis, the variability of information, information cognition, and information 
distribution are problematic across a set of measures which result in greater risk.  
 
1.8  Research design and methodology - summary 
This thesis adopted a mixed method research design as explored in detail 
in Chapter Four.  
A significant challenge in expanding the understanding of decision-making 
and risk-taking in the context of corporate board of directors is the lack of a 
general requirement to record and disclose much of the information and 
participant behaviours that frame and support decision-making and consequential 
risk-taking. In other words, the behavioural dynamics of the board, and of 
individual directors, are not easily observable. A characteristic that gives rise to 
the “black box” of corporate governance (Le Blanc and Gillies, 2005)  
Given this stubborn challenge, this thesis sought solutions to this issue by 
isolating circumstances and behaviours that reliably indicate the existence of 
relevant variability amongst directors on corporation boards. These variables 
relate to the quality of information used by directors, and their behaviours when 
utilising information in decision-making including how directors responded to and 
coped with information asymmetries. To achieve this aim, discrete and obscured 
circumstances, conditions, and behaviours needed to be associated with specific 
types of participants. Whereas a corporate board of directors is legally a single 
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unit, participants are readily classified as being either an “executive director” (one 
who has an operational role within the corporations) or a “non-executive director” 
(one who does not have an operational role within the corporation). This 
distinction goes beyond an operational role description of directors. It indicates 
membership of sub-groups, networks, view points, and also reflects other distinct 
characteristics that are potentially influential in the decision-making process, 
including information quality. Once demonstrated, the variability in information 
quality indicates that one group of directors, non-executive directors, takes more 
risks in their decision-making which undermines the overall quality of the 
corporation boards decision-making.  
A quantitative survey was used to explore characteristics of two groups of 
directors participating in the survey, (executive and non-executive directors). The 
survey explored their actions, inactions, and attitudes to aspects of the information 
they used when decision-making whilst being a member of a corporate board of 
directors. For example, the survey explored the actions the directors undertook or 
did not undertake to rectify perceived deficiencies with the quality of their 
information, and the channels and resources they had available to them to do so. 
In addition, the survey explored their experiences of decision-making and 
consequential risk-taking when they suspected information was sub-optimal. 
Following on from the survey, the research used semi-structured interviews with 
practitioners to explore some of the survey themes in order to provide rich 
contextualization and to provide a further basis for the thesis conclusions, initial 




1.9  The structure of this thesis 
Following on from the introduction in this chapter, the chapters and content 
of this thesis are organised as follows. Chapters typically starts with a chapter 
introduction which outlines the topics and content of the chapter and concludes 
with a chapter summary which highlights key chapter contents and describes links 
to the next chapter.          
Chapter Two – Literature review 
This chapter provides a summary of the literature relating to the 
corporations as the specific environment of this thesis. The chapter goes on to 
explore corporate governance in the UK as the control framework for corporations 
in doing so describing the intended specific behaviours of corporation boards of 
directors. Their decision-making is then explored with a focus on information as 
the main resource used.   
Chapter Three – Development of propositions and hypothesis  
This chapter explores information asymmetry and then goes on to 
develop propositions.    
Chapter Four - Research design and methodology 
This chapter describes the research employed in this thesis to close the gaps in 
the knowledge and to build towards a theoretical basis to move from the “what” to 
the “how” of the research topic.  
Chapter Five – Stage 1 Quantitative survey results 
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This chapter covers the quantitative research undertaken in this thesis. In 
this stage of the thesis is it established that there are significant differences in the 
information qualities utilised by executive and non-executive directors. In addition, 
it is established that non-executive directors will make decisions based on 
information they consider as being of lower quality than they would choose. This, 
in turn, increases the risk to corporations. This chapter is summarised with interim 
conclusions which were taken forward as the focus of development in the 
qualitative analysis research described in Chapter Six. 
Chapter Six – Stage 2 Qualitative research results   
This chapter covers the qualitative research undertaken in this thesis. 
Conclusions and themes from the quantitative stage formed the basis for semi-
structured interviews with practitioners. The interviewees provided colour, context, 
and nuance to the research in particular in relation to the specific types of 
governance and information used.  
Chapter Seven – Quantitative and qualitative research conclusions 
This chapter provides a consolidated summary of the quantitative and 
qualitative research.   
Chapter Eight – Theory Building - How executive agency works in practice   
Building on the research undertaken in the thesis and wider literature, this 
chapter presents a new theory of how executive agency may work in practice 
within corporations with executive and non-executive directors. 
Chapter Nine – Discussion, conclusions, and reflections  
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This chapter reviews the main research findings and conclusion and goes 
on to explore limitations, further research prompted by the research conclusions, 
initial suggestions for new corporate governance control frameworks, and an 
engagement strategy overview. This final section encompasses some reflections 
on the thesis research and personal reflections on the topic. In addition, a post 




CHAPTER TWO – LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1  Chapter introduction 
This chapter explores the extant literature, background, and other salient 
aspects and commentary of the thesis aims, research objectives, propositions, 
research questions and hypothesis. In doing so, this chapter explores a broad 
range of cultural and historic conditions in order to provide a critical basis for the 
development of this thesis’ perspectives on the act of corporate governance, and 
for an explanation as to why there is a limited extant literature on the detailed 
processes of corporate governance. Each chapter section ends with a review of 
relevant gaps in the extant literature and a review of the sections direct relevance 
to the aims of this thesis. This chapter is structure as follows: 
Defining Corporations.  This section explores the history and specific 
characteristics of UK corporations which goes beyond generic descriptions of 
businesses in general. This is regarded as important as this thesis is ethnographic 
in nature and so explores specific behaviours in specific environments. Therefore, 
a detailed explanation of the specific environment is required.  
Corporate Governance. This section explores the evolution of UK corporate 
governance framework including the philosophy of corporate governance. This 
section centres of the conditions that temper specific behaviours by corporate 
governance actors.  
Corporation Boards of Directors. This section focuses on the purpose, 
structure and social characteristics that corporate governance is undertaken 
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within. Aspects such as groups, rewards, social position and identity are explored 
in order to fully detail both the environment and the behavioural influences 
relevant to this thesis. 
 Decision-making.  This section explores the literature as it relates to the 
role and processes of decision-making in general and also in the specific 
environment of corporate governance. Decision-making is regarded as the primary 
function of boards of directors. However, the extant literature is in many ways 
limited to the “what” not the “how” of corporate governance and consequently to 
decision-making also.  
Information.  This section describes the limited extant literature relating to 
the key resource used in decision-making – information.  
Summary. 
Figure 4 summarises the main gaps in the literature in relation to the 
research objectives and research questions. This summary section highlights that 
overall the literature relating to this thesis is generalised and very often theoretical. 
This means that there are many recognised gaps in the literature. It is beyond the 
scope of this thesis to fill all the gaps instead the thesis addresses a specific 







Figure 4. Gaps in the literature in relation to the research objectives and 
research questions 
 
   
2.2.1  Defining Corporations – section introduction 
This chapter section is the starting point of the narrative of this thesis since 
it explores the “host” environment of the behaviours, actions, outcomes, and 
issues that are the broad scope of this thesis. Corporations are explored at two 
levels. The first level of exploration is that of a set of simple core characteristics of 
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entities where, it is argued, corporation-like entities have existed for thousands of 
years. The relevance, which will be expanded upon, is that these core 
characteristics give rise to powerful and deep-rooted cultural and social control 
frameworks within which contemporary corporations act. The second level of 
exploration is specific to the characteristics of modern corporations within the UK 
because these characteristics engender control frameworks and operating 
conditions relevant to this thesis.  
 
2.2.2  A History of UK Corporations 
It is not the purpose of this section to explore, in detail, the history of 
corporations prior to the evolution and setting of the characteristics and 
frameworks that relate to corporations as we see them today. However, it is 
worthwhile exploring some of the general conditions that apply to corporations in 
order to establish an understanding of the cultural and social environment that 
influences views on, and the operation of, modern corporations. 
The literature typically focuses on profit seeking businesses as we 
popularly recognise them today. Whilst this can be a useful focusing approach, 
this viewpoint can act to compress and constrain consideration of the cultural and 
social history of the corporation and therefore excludes the development of 
important aspects of the control frameworks that are applicable to this thesis. 
Consequently, this thesis takes an approach that focuses on a wave of regulatory 
activity in the mid nineteenth century that established, by and large, modern 
corporations. The literature often focuses on public corporations as these are both 
more easily researchable and higher profile allowing large but private corporations 
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to avoid being encompassed by much of the discussion on contemporary 
corporate governance (Meager, 2017).     
A corporate entity can be understood as an artificial construct that has 
influence and control independent of those that manage it and/or own it. This 
influence and control is created because the entity has assets and rights ascribed 
to it by state institutions expressed as laws. The institutionalised ownership of 
assets and rights, whether by an individual or any other entity, requires two 
conditions that prevail for periods of time greater than the typical lifespan of the 
individuals that own the entity. The first prevailing condition is that the owning 
entity can prove and defend its ownership of its assets and rights through civil 
means as opposed to martial means. Martial ownership is merely grasping, which 
is proven, time and time again, to be unsustainable. If necessary, civil rights are 
sued for within a recognised and controlled state supported framework which 
allows for; laws and those that practice the law, courts and other venues in which 
to practice the law, and an effective mechanism for enforcing the outcome of any 
legal process. The second prevailing condition is that if one entity owns an asset 
or right, another cannot own the same asset or right. This means scarcity which, 
assuming a functioning market for the asset type exists, leads to excess value. 
These two prevailing conditions have existed for thousands of years and have 
evolved into many functioning variants in diverse economies and states. Today, as 
it always has, where these prevailing conditions are undermined through weak 
control frameworks, any excess value soon ebbs away within the market, or the 
assets are moved to markets where their value can be maintained and then 
realised.   
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Independent assets and rights could have been inherited by the present 
owner, such as through a family estate, noble title, or guild membership. They 
could be the lands, buildings, and rights of a religious organization. To sustain 
their assets and rights over time the entity, and therefore its owner, has a task to 
produce enough surplus of income over outgoings to maintain the productivity and 
market relevance of the assets and rights.  Again, as with ownership, producing a 
surplus has to be civilly achieved since to do so uncivilly eventually becomes 
unsustainable, (as with monopolies or “price gouging”). The ability of the entity to 
produce a surplus is governed by complex cultural and social interplays as will be 
explored further in Section 3 – Corporate Governance). Over time, these cultural 
and social interplays crystallise into recognisable frameworks that facilitate, and 
then balance, civil ownership of assets and rights and the legitimate production of 
a surplus from that ownership - the origin of corporate governance.   
This thesis focuses on larger corporations domiciled in the UK. This section 
defines these corporations using relevant characteristics and features in order to 
distinguish them from other business and commercial structures. This process of 
defining corporations relates directly to the control frameworks corporations 
operate within and, consequently, their governance.    
2.2.3  The purpose of corporations 
This thesis is focused on corporate governance in the UK where a 
shareholder-oriented system of control frameworks and culture prevails.  In this 
context, corporations are typically formed with a specific commercial, profit-
seeking purpose in mind which is formally agreed between high level stakeholders 
internally at the outset of the corporation’s formation, and then moderated 
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externally as the corporation brings products and services to its target markets. 
This commercial purpose is reflected in the corporation’s internal rules and 
regulations, which are framed within statutory limitations. The corporation’s 
commercial purpose acts as a guide to managers to pursue enabling actions, form 
asset allocation strategies, and to chart appropriate operational courses. The 
corporation’s rules, and other control frameworks, such as employment and 
service contracts, limit the scope of managers in doing what they please once they 
have secured capital and the authority to deploy it. Over time, the purpose of the 
corporation may change or become diversified as the corporation grows and / or 
the market forces change upon it. As this happens, the rules of the corporation 
would be amended and updated accordingly.  
Where a vacuum or vagueness of stated commercial purpose occurs, or a 
dispute amongst stakeholders arises, implicitly, the overriding purpose of the 
corporation is to seek a cash surplus from its activities. After taxes are paid, an 
appropriate part of the cash surplus is passed out of the corporation, typically as 
dividends, to become new wealth for the shareholders. Absent any other forms of 
compensation or benefit, ownership of corporations, in whole or in part, is 
generally considered to be an investment since the inflation adjusted value of 
accumulated dividends plus the eventual sale value of the share of the corporation 
is intended to be greater than the shareholder’s investment. Consequently, the 
commercial, profit seeking purpose of the corporation and the investment aims of 
its shareholders are aligned by default.      
 
2.2.4  Ownership of corporations 
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The ownership of corporations is established and demonstrated through the 
ownership of shares in the corporation. In essence, when first issued, sold, and 
purchased, shares are a receipt that proves a defined portion of a corporation has 
been acquired by a commensurate subscription having been paid to the 
corporation. The share’s owner is recorded in a register maintained by the 
corporation. The share is a defined portion of the corporation as a whole, not a 
share in any specific asset or liability of the corporation. Typically, the subscription 
paid is an equity investment that comes with primary rights to rewards and 
influences over the corporation, but with commensurate risks. The number of 
shares in a corporation is limited by internal agreement which acts to protect 
investors, absent any agreement to the contrary, from having their portion of the 
corporation sold again, and therefore diluted, (for example, by more shares being 
issued and sold). Consequently, the value of the shares is the value of the 
corporation, real and perceived, divided by the number of shares allowed under 
the corporation’s rules. Typically, the value of a shareholder’s investment, and 
therefore their risk, is the number of shares they own multiplied by the value per 
share. Each share of a given share type is of the same value and has the same 
rights. Consequently, actions that influence the value of a share influence all 
shareholders of the same share, in the same way, in proportion to the number of 
shares they own. 
This form of corporate ownership, and its method for calculating per share 
value, facilitates liquidity to be introduced in the ownership of corporations 
because the owners of shares can buy and sell shares in corporations rather than 
whole corporations or specific assets or liabilities of a corporation. This liquidity 
first creates, and then opens up, a market for shares to the benefit of a wide range 
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of people seeking investment funds and returns on funds invested. Markets such 
as these require timely, accessible, and accurate information with which to assess 
values and risks. Where there are public exchanges for shares with liquidity, such 
corporations allow for the pricing of risk in a market for investments as 
shareholders can exit or enter an investment with limited transactional costs.  
 
2.2.5  Control of corporations 
As well as being receipts representing ownership of a portion of a 
corporation and a right to some economic benefits that go with that ownership, 
shares carry rights that their owners can exercise to give them a portion of control 
of the corporation. These rights vary and are typically internally agreed control 
frameworks stated in a corporation’s rules. Although controlling powers to act for 
the corporation may be passed on to managers, ownership of shares allows 
shareholders to recall or amend controlling powers. Absent any other rights or 
shareholder agreement, control is typically exercised on a majority basis. 
Consequently, the more shares a shareholder owns, the more control they have. 
Some corporations issue shares with limited or no control rights. In this context 
and thesis, these shares are regarded as investments because shareholders 
knowingly give up control normally in return for an improved return or preferential 
treatment, often in the form of priority access to distributable profits, over ordinary 
shareholders.  
 
2.2.6  The corporation as a standalone entity 
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A corporation is legally distinct from its owners. It is owned by its 
shareholders at arm’s length through the issuing and buying of shares. It has its 
own assets and liabilities, which are not mixed with those of its owners. It has a 
distinct purpose separate from that of its owners, although they may share 
common objectives, such as making a profit. Although limited by the law, the 
market, its resources, and by what shareholders who control the corporation 
instruct its managers to do, a corporation is a mature and standalone entity.  
 
2.2.7  The directorate function of the corporation 
To manage this mature and standalone entity, shareholders appoint 
directors. The primary role of the director is to manage the corporate entity by 
making decisions that relate to the use of the corporation’s resources in order to 
achieve its agreed commercial purpose. Directors may have a secondary role as 
an executive of the corporation. In this role, they act as managers to carry out 
specific instructions from the board of directors or, in general, to manage the 
business within agreed boundaries. In performing the director function, all 
directors, whether they are executives of the corporation or not, legally take on 
responsibility for the actions and behaviours of the corporation including its 
adherence to laws. The corporation’s assets and liabilities are ring-fenced from 
those of its directors.  Directors are typically rewarded as employees of, or as 




2.2.8  Separation of corporation ownership and corporation 
control 
An important feature of the corporation as defined here, is the separation of 
ownership and control. As a consequence of growth, scale, age, and capital 
requirements, at some point many corporations seek to raise capital, create 
ownership liquidity, or share risk. In doing so the original owners sell shares which 
introduces multiple new owners who are often diversified from the original owners. 
A corporation which starts with one or a small numbers of owners, over time, may 
have dozens, hundreds, or many more. In turn, these owners may own shares in 
more than one corporation. The corporation will at some point want or need 
managers, appointed as directors, who are not owners, (at least not to any 
significant extent). In doing so, ownership and control are separated from each 
other functionally, physically, and temporally. In addition, rewards and outcomes 
for owners and directors diverge and risk becoming misaligned, for example, 
capital growth over time through the retention of profits versus the payment of 
wages and bonuses to directors and other staff now. The distancing of ownership 
from control has been a significant feature within UK corporations since the 1930s 
and became fully established in the 1950s (Cheffins, 2001). At this point the risk of 
agency (Akerloff, 1970) occurs where directors are able, through their formalised 
control of corporate resources and the delegation of executive power to them, to 
configure their roles to best suit themselves and to steer the corporation towards 
selecting the director’s decision preferences. The separation of ownership and 
control and the risk of agency has been a feature of many of the corporate 
governance failures that have acted to shape the controlling frameworks for 
corporations as they stand today. As previously mentioned, these frameworks are 
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typically reactive with regulators seemingly ignoring the predictions of agency 
theorists as to the probable outcome of giving directors too much control 
particularly when they do not have meaningful investments directly at risk if the 
corporation fails. The challenge of agency is present across large organizations 
with diverse ownership (Benz and Frey, 2007) suggesting it is an outcome of core 
human behaviour as much corporate environments. Agency can be carried out in 
open if the agent can deflect disparate owners from the risk by substituting 
another form of control framework in place of direct shareholder control 
(Okhmatovskiy and David, 2012). With many large corporations, there is a 
temptation and increasingly the methods to disperse functions of the organization 
to locations where the control framework best suits the organization (Chizema and 
Buck, 2006).   
 The converse argument may also be true. If directors are significant 
shareholders, they may act with too little agency and not take risks or other 
actions that are necessary so avoiding conflict and short-term pain (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983; Paniagua, Rivelles and Sapena, 2018).           
 
2.2.9  Limited liability for owners of shares in corporations  
Having established purpose, ownership, control, self-determination, 
maturity, and a directorate function, owners of shares in corporations have a 
benefit which compensates them for what they give up when letting go of direct 
control and, in most cases, full ownership of their investment. Owners of shares in 
corporations are protected from the liabilities of the corporation, in the event of 
business failure or other economic risks, up to the value of their equity investment. 
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This is the case for all shareholders and extends to shareholding directors of the 
corporation, provided they perform their duties as directors within the control 
frameworks, particularly the law. Non-shareholding directors enjoy the same 
protections.    
The limiting of the risk of loss to the value of the shares owned is balanced 
by the tempering of the reward. Corporations are taxed as standalone entities. 
Therefore, owners pay two forms of income tax on the profits their corporation’s 
make – once, (indirectly), within the corporation, and again, directly, if the profits 
are paid out as dividends. Paying dividends acts to convert corporate assets into 
personal assets, on which personal income taxation is typically levied. Absent any 
other agreement, unencumbered assets of the corporation can be seized to pay 
any corporate debt.  
In many respects, the existence of the limited liability corporation, and its 
inherent ability to shield shareholders from personal responsibility for the debts 
and liabilities of the corporation, is the first and most powerful dilution of the 
potential influence of any corporate governance framework in that it gets 
shareholders off the hook for poor commercial performance, or worse, beyond the 
loss of the shareholders’ equity at least.  
Directors take on the risk of the loss of limited liability. In serious cases of 
poor corporate governance, so poor they become demonstrably negligent, UK 
law, and that of many other jurisdictions, can act to limit the ability of directors to 
shield themselves from the liabilities of the corporations they govern. In practice, 
this is hard to prove and rarely done.      
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Entities with the characteristics outlined in the this section – owned through 
shares, with limited liability, with clear separation of ownership and control, 
professionally managed by directors, mature, and standalone - have existed in the 
UK since 1856 with the advent of the Joint Stock Companies Act of 1856. This 
was the keystone parliamentary act in a series of acts that formed the control 
framework that specifies the characteristics corporations take today. Prior to this 
time, business owners were not able to reliably create mechanisms to ring-fence 
their personal assets and activities from their business assets and activities. Until 
the Joint Stock Companies Act of 1844, the ownership of businesses entities had 
been largely by means of association. Corporations could have hundreds of 
members which, without limited liability at that time, made the management of 
liabilities and the resolution of disputes cumbersome as claimants and litigants 
would need to sue each member as an individual.  The Joint Stock Companies Act 
of 1844 was introduced to regulate the membership, by way of a register of the 
company share ownership. The members still had unlimited liability. Those most 
able to pay, and to be brought to court, bore more risk than others. However, the 
act established a process whereby the first call on the capital of the company was 
backed by the company calling upon its shareholders for any unpaid portion of the 
share subscription cost. This is part of the control framework in place today. 
Hansard’s LXXV (1844) records Mr Gladstone stating a general benefit to 
companies and society of the act in;  
“subjecting them to general inspection, and providing 
for their constitution and regulation”. 
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The Limited Liability Act of 1855 capped the liability of shareholders to the 
amount they had agreed to subscribe. However, shareholders could be held 
directly liable to creditors for this amount. This broke the process whereby an 
individual shareholder could be held liable for the liabilities of the whole 
corporation. The act restricted this benefit to companies with 25 or more members. 
Hansard’s CXXXIX (1855) records that the matter of a limited liability act had been 
debated in Parliament for over 20 years. The parliamentary debate pointed out 
that £ 320 million, (c. £ 24 billion at 2018 values), of global infrastructure 
investment had been made with limited liability for the shareholders via the route 
of using a private member’s bill or “Board of Trade” granted exemption. Both 
methods of creating limited liability were “objectionable”, (Hansard CXXXIX, 1855), 
in that they created unnecessary steps and barriers for most enterprises. The 
parliamentary debate also claimed that unlimited liability, in the extreme, was 
impractical to enforce by most creditors against most debtors. 
The Joint Stock Companies Act of 1856 establishes the format of 
corporations largely as we see them today. For groups of seven or more 
members, it became an administratively simple process to register and 
subsequently administer a company. Limited liability is enjoyed by shareholders 
up to the subscription amount of the shares they owned. The substantial 
difference today is that the number of members is reduced to one as a minimum 
and is without limit. According to Hansard CXLI (1856), the act moved quickly 
through parliamentary stages due to the widespread public support for the 
unfettering of commercial activities to repair and stimulate the economy at the end 
of the Crimean War.  
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The period 1844 – 1856 shows rapid development and maturation after a 
period of recovery from earlier experiences of impersonal capitalism including 
asset bubbles and “wild commercial enterprise” (Hansard CXLI, 1856). Social 
development occurred through the extension of privileges long-held by the Crown 
and Crown sponsored agencies to common, self-appointed people. Until this time, 
Parliament, or rather the social class that populated it, often sought to control the 
benefits of commerce for national and personal benefit. Cultural development 
occurred through the use of corporate debt, credit, and associated acceptance of 
risk. Legal development occurred through the consolidation of the existence of 
entities which had rights and responsibilities of their own. As an early adopter of 
the modern form of the corporation, as a capital intensive, industrialised economy, 
and as a trading nation, the UK’s century and half of stable control frameworks 
has resulted in a robust supporting mechanism of corporate governance 
stakeholders with vested interests in its wellbeing.    
The debates and reasoning behind this period of rapid change exist because 
of a number of factors. The United Kingdom was at war in the Crimea. Proponents 
of the Limited Liability Act of 1855 and Joint Stock Companies Act of 1856 argued 
that reducing restrictions on commerce was in the nation’s interest. Another factor 
was a natural unwinding of the Bubble Act of 1720 which sought to more tightly 
control the participation of the general population in commercial investment by 
restricting the formation of unchartered joint stock companies, i.e. those beyond 
the control of Parliament. A feature of the events surrounding share “bubbles” of 
the early eighteenth century was widespread corruption and malpractice within 
Parliament, the state apparatus, and by directors of companies. This included the 
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misuse of capital raised from shareholders for one purpose being used for another 
distinctly different purpose.   
 
2.2.10 The impact of corporations 
Although legally no different to “companies” as defined in law, corporations 
as defined here for the purposes of this thesis are a specific type of commercial 
entity. Typically, corporations configure, and subsequently manage, their 
resources to facilitate scale - both operationally and as controllers of assets. 
Consequently, in developed markets, limited liability corporations, with multiple 
shares, with exercisable control rights attached to each share, are the dominant 
entity type for commercial profit seeking entities of scale. They have directors who 
often have a proportionately small or no shareholding. The corporation’s existence 
often outlives those who originally set it up. A corporation’s dominant shareholders 
can come and go because, often, they can buy and sell all or part of their 
shareholding.  
Corporations are the focus of media and political attention when things go 
wrong. They are a major constituent of the stored wealth of pension investors and 
so also attract added scrutiny. Consequently, corporations as defined here, are 
the entity type that has become the focus of much of the development of control 
frameworks. This is recognised in many of the control frameworks that ratchet up 





2.2.11 Section summary 
Corporations balance the needs of society, and owners, and potentially, the 
agency of directors within control frameworks that, in the UK, can be viewed as 
being broadly shareholder-oriented as share-holder value is entrenched in the 
societal view of corporations (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Society needs owners 
to have access to risk capital through regulated channels with the capital and risk 
controlled within a regulated control framework. Owners need to generate returns 
on their capital with suitable risks, rewards, security, and flexibility. Owners need 
access to resources to bring products and services to market, on which they can 
charge a margin leading to profits, on which tax is paid. Directors need to be both 
protected and controlled to achieve outcomes acceptable to society and owners. 
Whilst generic companies can do these things, it is argued here that only 
“corporations” can reliably do it at scale and over time.  
 
2.2.12 Defining corporations - gaps in the extant literature 
The literature relating to the history and evolution of corporations is 
generally well balanced. The gap in the literature is one of focus in that the 
literature tends to treat corporations as general profit seeking businesses 
(resulting in a lack of specificity). Although businesses mostly have profit as their 
primary purpose, this chapter section has described how corporations are distinct 
from the general population of businesses in the way they are formed and 




2.2.13 Defining corporations - relevance to the aims of this 
thesis 
The section has detailed how the evolution of the typical corporation, their 
ownership through shares, their longevity, and their scale mean that corporations 
are typically managed by professional managers, i.e. are agents of the owners,   
with a clear separation between corporate ownership and corporate control.   
Moving on from the description of corporations given in this section, the 
next section explores the governance of modern corporations in the UK from a 
theoretical and practical point of view and describes how corporate governance 
can be described as encompassing two distinct type of governance activity aimed 
at achieving technical or commercial objectives.  
 
2.3.1  Corporate governance section introduction 
This chapter section intended to position corporate governance within the 
context of this thesis and so relates the topic to larger, UK entities which typically 
have a commercial purpose, i.e. “corporations”. This section takes the definition of 
the corporation established in the previous section as its reference point. In 
summary, the corporation is defined here by its characteristics as: 
o a commercial, profit seeking business,  
o formally constituted,  
o with shareholders, 
o who have their liability limited to the value of the shares they have bought,  
o that is controlled by ordinary shareholder’s votes,  
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o and is managed by a board of directors, 
o who instruct executive directors to enact specific board decisions,  
o and who authorise executive directors to carry out other non-specific 
management tasks within agreed boundaries. 
As described in the previous section, these general characteristics have been 
stable features of large UK corporations since the mid-nineteenth century when a 
series of acts of the UK parliament formalised and enabled the formation and 
operation of corporations within a comprehensive and enduring legal framework. 
Consequently, these core characteristics guide the contents of this section on the 
governance of such corporations. However, as with defining corporations, it is 
worthwhile exploring the cultural and social history of corporate governance as, by 
and large, it is cultural and social aspects that define the end result, even where 
shareholder-oriented control frameworks prevail, as they do in the UK.     
Corporate governance is an artificial construct with a real purpose. It reflects 
the broad needs and rights of the corporation as a standalone entity, and the 
needs and rights of a wide range of stakeholders in that corporation and in the 
corporation’s actions. Corporate governance is a set of behaviours, mores, roles, 
and rules – a framework – intended to act as a control mechanism to regulate the 
often-conflicting forces influencing the actions of stakeholders (Du Plessis, 
Hargovan and Harris, 2018). Of particular relevance in this thesis is the role 
corporate governance is intended to play in regulating the actions of dominant 
directors. In common with most social control frameworks, corporate governance 
frameworks vary depending on their host societies because they tend to reflect, 
emulate, and enhance wider underlying characteristics and personalities of their 
host (Chizema and Buck, 2006). In common with the development of the legal 
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framework of the corporation, corporate governance frameworks often trace trends 
and cycles of prevailing political sentiment in their implementation, and the verve 
of the regulators. A commonly held view of the UK corporate governance 
framework is one of stepped progression towards the broad position we 
experience today (Arcot, Bruno and Faure-Grimaud, 2010). The narrative is that a 
succession of social events, market events, scandals, and other factors have led 
us to a higher ground where stakeholders are proportionately protected in relation 
to their risk. In fact, the multiple balances of power in the corporate governance 
frameworks have waxed and waned in their influence over the centuries. 
Consequently, although the base characteristics of corporations have been stable, 
corporate governance control frameworks have evolved and changed in their 
focus, sometimes significantly because of high-profile negative events such the 
Robert Maxwell scandal (Hansard 537, 1992) and, more recently, the collapse of 
BHS plc (House of Commons, 2016) and Carillion plc (House of Commons, 2018). 
This waxing and waning has a multinational dimension reflecting the global 
competition for capital and the attractiveness of permissive jurisdictions. Elements 
of the US corporate governance framework contained in the 2010 Dodd–Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act brought in after the financial 
crisis are now under scrutiny for being too restrictive and so hampering small 
banks (Bloomberg, 2018). Although only directly applicable to US banks, any 
relaxation will, after time, likely be extended to larger US banks and will then 
influence UK frameworks that relate to comparable UK banks.       
As previously discussed, corporate governance frameworks are viewed as 
being an element of a wider set of controls which also conform to wider societal 
characteristics.  Some of these controls are rooted in specific legislation, such as 
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laws that relate to health and safety at work, equality, employee welfare, and 
product quality. These frameworks straddle the internal to external interactions of 
the corporation through to the actions and behaviours of markets and end-
customers. Other elements and controls are social in nature, such as gender 
balance, where social pressures exert influences on corporations over and above 
relevant legislation, and ethical investing in sectors such as armament 
manufacturing and tobacco, where the product is legal but a social framework may 
exert an influence over some corporate actions. The framework is not black and 
white – far from it in fact. It is nuanced and variable.  
For the most part, corporate governance related behaviours and mores prevail 
irrespective of enterprise size, scope and purpose. A director’s good behaviour is 
good behaviour irrespective of the size of the organization just as poor risk 
management is poor risk management. Where variances in corporate governance 
frameworks exist, these variances often relate to roles and rules that are typically 
influenced by ownership structures, organizational and business scale, operational 
and market scope, and the degree to which a corporation has external 
stakeholders with formal direct or indirect powers. An example is the additional 
oversight and reporting requirements experienced by corporations with listings on 
public stock exchanges which are in addition to the core set of oversight and 
reporting frameworks.  
Corporate governance frameworks are shaped by the need to balance societal 
expectations with the requirements of entrepreneurs, managers, and investors. An 
ongoing example of this balance is the regulation of so-called “challenger” banks 
attempting to break into the market for retail financial services in the UK. The 
societal requirement for prudence and propriety creates an extended corporate 
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governance control framework that is counter-productive and may result in few 
start-up “challenger” businesses being formed due to the cost and time to become 
compliant.  
The composite UK corporate governance framework (though not the high 
profile Financial Reporting Council Code), in the main applies to all corporations, 
both private and public. Much extant literature applies to listed companies and so 
describes and categorizes corporate governance features threw this lens. Buck 
and Shahrim, (2005) describe a market oriented corporate governance system, 
where an active market for corporate control acts as a mechanism for non-
managing shareholders to influence managerial decision-making. This system 
does not apply to businesses in general since most businesses do not have 
independent shareholders however this thesis focuses of entities that often do, or 
who could is they chose to. For all corporations, the market oriented view seems 
to it simplify the control force equation by ignoring other factors that relate to the 
value of owning shares. For example, non-managing shareholders may tolerate 
poor corporate governance if the investment returns are better than alternatives 
with good corporate governance. The “market oriented” system also assumes that 
shareholders, particularly non-managing ones, have access to information with 
which to value corporate governance in practice, as opposed to merely in principal 
or by using lagging indicators such as annual accounts. It is therefore argued that 
the “market oriented” system of corporate governance is likely to be inefficient in 




2.3.2  The evolution of the UK corporate governance 
framework 
The societal requirement to perform contracts, trade fairly, honour debts, 
maintain records for taxation purposes, and to record assets in general - all 
features and objectives of modern corporate governance frameworks – have long 
existed in written law. Kings, countries, and common people became bankrupt if 
their current liabilities became greater than their current assets. Dying didn’t help 
you because your liabilities often became your beneficiary’s problem. Weights and 
measures were formalised in English law in the Acts of the Witenagemot in the 
10th Century. Amongst the stated purposes of the Doomsday Book of 1086 A.D 
was a tally of who owned what, what it was worth, and the potential for these 
newly assessed, catalogued, and valued assets to produce revenue through 
taxation. The main driver of this was to rein in the agency being displayed by the 
Norman barons who had only recently become the owners of the assets in 
questions. This is corporate governance, as we recognise it today, since it is both 
a form of control to counter act the agency of a group of managers, the barons, 
and a clear recognition of a corporate entity over and above the individual, in this 
case, the inheritable titles and estates of the nobility. Indeed, members of the 
nobility could and would be executed or otherwise punished for treason and other 
offences against the crown but their family titles and estates would live on. The 
Magna Carta of 1215 A.D. is, in effect, a corporate governance framework since it 
seeks to limit the executive power of a dominant executive – in this case King 
John. Interestingly, the Magna Carta also covers weights and measures.   
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"There shall be one measure of wine throughout our whole realm, and 
one measure of ale and one measure of corn—namely, the London 
quart” 
  In the 14th – 16th Centuries, at times the Crown abused its power to create 
monopolies through letters of patent which were granted in return for money and 
other privately held returns. Eventually, those excluded from these benefits, such 
as competing entrepreneurs, and those who paid the price, such as consumers of 
the commodities covered by the monopoly, would protest to a point where the 
monopoly was relaxed or broken up entirely. Eventually, the granting of such 
institutionalised abuses of power was restricted by parliament through the Statute 
of Monopolies Act of 1624. At the same time a balance occurs within the cultural 
and social framework because the Crown acted to restrict and break the powers of 
guilds and super-guilds. For example, Queen Elizabeth 1st acted against the 
Hanseatic League by expelling it from London in 1597.    
 
The evolution of the UK corporate governance framework significantly 
predates the corporation as we typically recognise it today and as described in the 
previous section of this chapter. This pre-dating is not an arcane, incidental oddity. 
Much of this wider set of controls, of which specific corporate governance is an 
element, are dominant over, are more widely used, and are more powerful in law, 
than specific control frameworks that are aimed at those governing UK 
corporations. When a corporation fails to govern itself adequately, more powerful 
laws step in to rectify the issues, provide relief to the victims, and punish the 
transgressors than those typically regarded as being part of the corporate 
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governance framework. In the UK, for the most part, these frameworks are 
effective and rapid in getting technical corporate governance back on track. These 
frameworks include the ability of anyone, including those with access to limited 
legal resources, to quickly force corporations to perform contracts by using, 
amongst other channels, Trading Standards Offices, Citizens Advice Bureaus, and 
the “small claims” court system. Employment tribunals are powerful courts that 
give wide-ranging relief to employees, and occasionally employers, who have not 
been treated fairly. The Health and Safety Executive, Food Standards Agency and 
many others agencies, including Companies House, provide frameworks for 
proactive and reactive corporate governance functions. Many of these agencies 
and bodies have pioneered activities that we now take for granted as being part of 
good corporate governance, such as industrial safety and emissions control. The 
Equality Act 2010, which corporations often failed to fully act upon, is coming to 
the fore at present.  
In jurisdictions where such control mechanisms do not exist, are weak, are 
inefficient, or are only available to those with significant resources and or political 
influence, societal frameworks, including corporate governance, are weak in 
comparison to jurisdictions where control mechanisms are strong. In short, the 
frameworks of effective corporate governance are symptomatic of effective wider 
societal frameworks.    
On a continuum of mature, democratic jurisdiction’s corporate governance 
frameworks with a capitalist / shareholder pole at one end and communitarianist / 
stakeholder pole at the other, the corporate governance framework in the United 
Kingdom is often placed with that of the USA being biased in culture and practice 
towards the benefits of the corporation landing with the capitalist / shareholder.  In 
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comparison to other dominant European economy frameworks, this is in some 
ways still true today. However, it is argued that the core of the UK corporate 
governance framework is the product of a pioneering, long-held and strongly 
communitarian ethos. Exemplars of this are “co-operatives” as overtly commercial 
and expansive endeavours, which first gained critical mass in the United Kingdom 
in the late 18th and 19th centuries. At the commercial end of the range of corporate 
governance actions, the U.K. likes to perceive itself as being akin to the strongly 
shareholder model of the USA. In reality, now it's more like the communitarian 
(Kakabadse and Kakadabse, 2008) model of continental Europe. 
Significantly, the UK is a consciously mercantile nation and has been so for 
centuries. This builds a general awareness of corporate governance as a 
framework and subject of political and social focus. An example is the works of 
Charles Dickens, who, above all, was a commercial writer aiming at a wide 
audience, and whose references and frameworks were distinctly populist. In 
“Bleak House”, 1852-1853, Dickens satirised the workings of the Court of 
Chancery, through the civil case of “Jarndyce and Jarndyce”. Dickens could only 
use such themes because they were commonly recognised by the reader of 
popular literature. 
Workers rights to association, worker and general education, health and 
safety, the provision of holidays, control of working hours, and many other 
progressive frameworks were not only adopted in the UK, but done so with 
widespread support, including by capitalists, often as the champions. The 
characterisation of the UK’s corporate governance framework as having a 
capitalist / shareholder bias is possible because we take its communitarian 
foundation as a given (Kakababse and Kakabadse, 2009). This may explain why 
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overly laissez faire corporate governance framework proposals find stony ground 
in the United Kingdom. It is argued that this condition is distinct from being stifling 
and overly intrusive even if it is at times when taken to the point of ridicule as in 
“Little Dorrit”, 1855 – 1857. Dickens uses the seeming perversity of debtors’ 
prisons as the central theme and creates the institution of the “Circumlocution 
Office” to symbolise sclerotic administration processes that seem stacked against 
the little man. UK corporate governance is “pedantic” but is also comprehensive 
and very well established, as least as far as technical corporate governance is 
concerned.  
 
2.3.3  Specific, recognisable, corporate governance 
frameworks, in the UK and elsewhere, are late to the party.  
There is a remarkably long gap between the emergence of the modern 
corporation, as defined in this section, and the development of associated and 
recognisable corporate governance frameworks whose specific purpose it is to 
promote the corporation, rather than to curtail any wayward behaviour by the 
directors of corporations. This is not because all was well with corporate 
governance in the period 1856 to around 1990, when action on corporate 
governance frameworks gathered wider public recognition with the commissioning 
of work such as the Cadbury Report which was published in 1992 (Committee on 
the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, 1992). The committee’s 
chairman, Adrian Cadbury, noted in the report’s introduction;  
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“….the continuing concern about standards of financial reporting 
and accountability, heightened by BCCI, Maxwell and the controversy 
over directors’ pay, which has kept corporate governance in the public 
eye. 
Unexpected though this attention may have been, it reflects a 
climate of opinion which accepts that changes are needed and it 
presents an opportunity to raise standards of which we should take full 
advantage”. 
Nor was it because the risk of poor corporate governance has only recently 
emerged. During the period 1856 to date, there has been a succession of acts of 
parliament, as well as formal and informal social frameworks that have intended to 
improve corporate governance as their primary or secondary objective.  
Although outside the timeframe for modern corporations as defined in this 
thesis, the Reform Act of 1832 sought to improve representation of stakeholders 
and to curb institutionalised abuses of power which were widespread at the time. 
This act came in the midst of a succession of acts and social movements relating 
to corporate governance covering the employment of children, apprentices, “truck” 
wage systems, working hours amongst many others. These acts of parliament 
sought to extend statutory rights and obligations into employment contracts, 
largely for the benefit of employees. These statutory frameworks also acted to 
bring technical corporate governance up to the same level of the rights enjoyed by 
owners of businesses, such as property rights and the enforceability of contracts. 
A glance at the contents page of almost any volume of Hansard published in the 
nineteenth century shows the ongoing work undertaken to improve wide-ranging 
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aspects of technical corporate governance. This is the bedrock of corporate 
governance in the UK. This is, in the main, what occupies the time of directors of 
corporations.   
The debate carries on, adapts and evolves. So called “platform” business 
models, such as “Deliveroo” and “Uber”, are going through truncated maturation 
processes as social frameworks, employment laws, and other frameworks adjust 
and update themselves to new business models. In some cases, platform 
businesses are now finding out that societal frameworks have local limits. What is 
acceptable in one jurisdiction is not in another. The use of “zero hours” contracts is 
another current example. The Finance Act of 2015 introduced a diverted profits tax 
to curtail abusive actions by corporations. These acts of parliament and societal 
frameworks are not typical viewed as “corporate governance”. However, they are 
emblematic of the control that is needed to counteract the excesses of 
entrepreneurs in their pursuit of profits for shareholders, and to ensure that tax 
and other social contributions are as fairly spread as is practical.  
It should be noted that the workload of corporate governance frameworks is 
heavily skewed towards aspects of technical corporate governance. It would seem 
from the lack of legislation relating specifically to commercial corporate 
governance that one of three scenarios has evolved. The first scenario is that all is 
well with commercial corporate governance. This is not the case because 
businesses can and do fail and investors and other stakeholders can and do 
experience long-term underperformance. The second scenario is that it is simply 
harder to indentify behaviours and characteristics that engender better commercial 
performance and to then codify these behaviours and characteristics within control 
frameworks that deliver the intended outcome. By definition, in mature markets 
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with low growth, not all corporations can do well all the time. When one 
corporation achieves above average growth, another gives up some growth or 
even shrinks. However, despite an apparent inability to isolate commercial 
corporate governance and then control it, the closeness of the actions of technical 
corporate governance and commercial corporate governance are evident when 
there is a failure in one or the other. Technical corporate governance failures by 
BP PLC in managing the process risk at their operations in the Macondo Prospect 
and at Volkwagen Group AG in relation to the “Dieselgate” scandal will have 
lasting impacts on the options and outcomes for commercial corporate 
governance performance for decades. Equally, poor commercial corporate 
governance at BHS plc is manifest in later technical corporate governance 
failures. The third scenario is that corporations and their boards actively avoid 
attempts to expose their behaviours and actions to the constraints of more 
stringent control frameworks. 
The general stance and approach taken by regulators over the centuries 
that the UK technical corporate governance framework has been recognisable is 
largely reactionary. This is a context common to much UK regulation. The UK 
technical corporate governance framework is predominantly “civil” in nature in that 
it relies mainly on civil controls as if transgressions are essentially contractual 
performance issues.  Consequently, penalties for more serious transgressions 
start at a low base and are rarely significant in comparison to other “white collar” 
offences. Occasionally, the reactionary nature of UK technical corporate 
governance allows for a significant degree of flexibility and, on occasion, too much 
latitude on the part of corporations. Corporations can defer or stretch the 
timeframe for the implementation of many technical corporate governance 
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compliance actions on the basis that the penalty is low or that society at large is 
not demanding action.   
 
2.3.4 Corporate governance philosophy 
The previous sections of this chapter have described the practitioner’s 
environment that overarches corporate governance in the UK, and dictates the 
internal and external control frameworks that boards of directors, regulators, and 
other stakeholders operate within. This chapter’s next section provides a 
philosophical viewpoint to explore how the UK and other similar jurisdictions 
arrived at this point and explores reasons as to why the current control 
frameworks have endured when they seem, in many ways, to not work efficiently 
or have fallen behind moves to rebalance the focus of corporate endeavours 
towards more balanced and socially minded outcomes. In keeping with the 
general viewpoint of this thesis, the practical over-rides the philosophical.    
Shareholder value is entrenched as the dominant principle of corporate 
governance (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This dominance has its roots in a 
dogmatic viewpoint that assumes, with some justification, that it is inevitable that 
anyone who has control over resources that belong to someone else will, in some 
way, and to a lesser or greater extent, use those resources in a way that is not 
fully to the benefit of the owner (Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). In short, no “hired-help” director or manager can be entirely trusted. This 
viewpoint does not mean that misuse of resources is always deliberate. It can 
stem from incompetence, complacency, risk aversion or risk acceptance, poor 
contracts, poor timing, or misfortune not to mention poor engagement, oversight, 
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and misaligned expectations by the owners. The longer resources are entrusted to 
someone other than the owner, the greater the chance of some of all of these 
outcomes happening. These conditions are typically bundled up into “agency 
theory”, (Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Of course, over 
time, these outcomes will likely befall owners who directly manage their own 
assets as exposure to any market for a long period of time incurs risks any 
corporation, no matter how it is managed, is exposed to.  
In Section 1 on defining corporations, this thesis argued that the modern 
UK corporation became recognisable in its current, largely stable form in the mid-
nineteenth century. Enabling legislation was in place, and, by this time, a socially 
driven movement towards control frameworks that balance capitalistic instincts 
with societal requirements was firmly established. Prior to this time social 
conditions in the UK were marked by very clear class distinctions which were 
manifest, amongst many other ways, by the retention of capital by a limited 
number of people and a lack of structural routes to social mobility. This utilized the 
long established convention and control mechanism of “stewardship” whereby an 
owner would empower someone else to manage assets in their absence but which 
ignored or prevented the steward ever aspiring or achieving ownership 
themselves.  
By the mid-nineteenth century, in the UK at least, two growing forces were 
already changing the way that stewardship worked. The Industrial Revolution and 
the growth of the British Empire resulted in the UK economy producing excess 
savings which were increasingly held by a growing middle class. These excess 
savings needed somewhere to be stored that would retain their value and produce 
an income and so often found their way to a stock market or other speculative 
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investments. The result was a larger, more diverse, indirect and so less well 
informed shareholder base (Tett, 2019; Harris and Raviv, 2010). Inevitably, many 
investments including some in joint stock companies failed entirely or left investors 
exposed to being diluted, pushed down the creditor list, or simply defrauded. To 
counter these outcomes, the market moved towards better governance including 
the advent of professionalised “chartered accountants” which occurred in Scotland 
in the 1850s - a feature of technical corporate governance that rapidly spread 
globally across similar jurisdictions.     
Corporate governance by “stewardship” became the dominant principal for 
the next century. Stewardship has two default settings for the destinations of 
excess capital derived from making profits. These are firstly, to “retain” the capital 
in the corporation without passing it back to shareholders as dividends. On the 
face of it, this makes sense since the stewards who managed the corporation that 
made the profit in the first place seem best placed to look after the profits. The 
second default setting is to “invest” the retained capital by converting it from cash 
or cash equivalents into assets which are used by the corporation. In most cases 
where major corporate mishaps were avoided, stewardship had two outcomes. 
Firstly, the retention meant that, all things being equal, corporations got bigger and 
more complex (Clarke, 2004). The second outcome was that, without going 
further-a-field in some way, the ever-growing corporation runs out of opportunities 
of maintaining its cost base and profit margins from its original products and 
markets. This means that although the absolute profit amount may have gotten 
bigger, the returns for shareholders diminished in relative terms as the capital 
employed grew, and, at the same time, external market risk is increased as new 
competitors eyed the profits.   
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Despite coming into their own during the industrial up-scaling in the first and 
second world wars, problems with corporate governance by stewardship were 
starting to be highlighted.  “Retain and invest” meant that many corporations were 
too big and too complex (Clarke, 2004). In addition, by the mid-twentieth century, 
lower-cost, better managed mass-market competition was entering home markets. 
Many bulky and cumbersome retain and invest industries were caught flat-footed 
and paid the price through large-scale restructuring and, in many cases, long-term 
decline and collapse. An additional factor is the influence over corporations in 
some markets by organised labour (Clarke, 2004).  
From the ranks of institutional investors (pension companies, investment 
trusts, and investment banks), up stepped the new philosophy of “shareholder 
value”. Set against the apparent struggles of stewarded corporations, shareholder 
value sought to bring vigilance and energy through greater commercial focus, 
particularly in relation to shareholders’ resource efficiency. The purpose of 
shareholder value was to return as much to shareholders, as quickly as possible in 
order to both reinvest elsewhere and to avoid risk. This is achieved through growth 
in the value of shares, and, ideally, a liquid market for such shares, and dividends 
paid out to shareholders as a matter of priority. From an investor’s point of view, if 
all corporations in a given market were managed under the influence of a 
shareholder value philosophy, (theoretically resource and capital agile and 
efficiently allocated), the market could value corporations in a transparent way. An 
extension of the ability to value corporations easily was to value their managers 
the same way. One control lever in the market for managers became the function 
of corporate take-overs when stronger corporations would predate poorly 
performing corporations and then push out the managers responsible (Clarke, 
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2004). The failure of this as a market control mechanism is that most large 
corporations are privately held and therefore not overtly for sale the way a 
publically listed corporation is. A second failure of this argument is that stock 
shorting and other mechanisms used to agitate for change without buying into a 
corporation at a premium is not always possible. 
As institutional investors grew in importance, their solution - one that 
logically seemed to suit all businesses - that of a focus on the owner’s rate of 
return - became the creed of corporate governance (Reberioux, 2007).  
The ongoing problem seems to be that the emergence, and then 
dominance of shareholder value is that it brings with it the need for ever greater 
involvement by professional managers. This is because corporations become 
more actively and aggressively managed to, firstly, reconfigure their capital base 
and investor proposition in order to improve investment returns, and then to 
pursue ever greater resource agility and allocation efficiency to avoid the 
appearance of having capital locked in. In many cases the result is stripped out, 
light weight and shallow corporations in regards to human and real capital 
resulting in what Clarke (2004), summarises as a “lowest price today not 
innovation for tomorrow" outcome. 
From a practical governance point of view as well as a philosophical one, 
the dominance of shareholder value means ever more agency, a condition that 
acts today to cement agency theory as the default lens through which research on 
corporate governance is undertaken. Indeed this theoretical perspective was 
further entrenched during the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 / 2009. Agency 
theory explains the firm as a "nexus" of contracts amongst factors of production, 
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(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The description of corporations in this way is 
increasingly apt description because corporations are becoming increasing 
tangible asset light and intangible asset heavy. This trend, it seems, is an outcome 
of shareholder value focus and the growth of intellectual property and financial 
services as drivers of corporate efforts as both these types of activity require 
multiple and complex layers of contracts.  
With the growth of agency comes the commensurate growth of agency 
costs such as monitoring. Corporations seek to mitigate such costs with the 
adoption of overt high-quality corporate governance mechanisms (Mouselli and 
Hussainey, 2014). Corporations that operate in a public markets for either their 
shares, for capital or both, benefit as such high-quality corporate governance 
mechanisms are highly valued by investors who view them as being effective 
governance mechanisms (Mouselli and Hussainey, 2014). This acts to reduce 
capital cost and / or increase share valuations. UK corporate governance is 
regarded as world class and comparatively low cost (Mouselli and Hussainey, 
2014). Even so, it cannot be ignored that the conditions that promote agency are 
then mitigated at cost to the corporation to appease the investors that wanted the 
conditions. Mueller, 2014, notes that in large corporations agency remains a 
theory as there is as much to demonstrate its existence as there is to disprove it - 
other than headlines in the event of a major corporate failure, no reliable method 
of defining it can be agreed upon. 
To conclude on the philosophical viewpoint, it may be valid to argue that we 
are now entering a post-agency regime as far as some aspects of corporate 
governance are concerned it least. Leech, 1987, noted that although agency is a 
factor, with dispersed shareholders, for many large corporations, there is no single 
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shareholder interest so there is no obvious point of conflict. Consequently, this 
may be more about degree of focus, sensitivity, and incentive rather than conflict, 
or just simple disinterest or apathy (Stout, 2007). Whilst there is a strong and 
obvious need to maintain a uniform approach to technical corporate governance 
between shareholders and managers, most large corporations now operate within 
such well defined external control frameworks that “agency” has little free room to 
move. This is not the case for commercial corporate governance. However, as 
previously mentioned, absent a clear commercial course being set by 
shareholders, agency as far as commercial corporate governance is concerned is 
really just managers doing the job they are paid for hence the the dominant grip of 
agency theory in much of the literature (Roberts, McNulty, and Stiles, 2005). 
Agency and commercial corporate governance is revisited in detail in Chapter 
Three – Development of propositions and hypothesis and Chapter Eight – Theory 
Building - How executive agency works in practice. 
 
2.3.5  Contemporary corporate governance in the UK  
As previously described, the attention paid and the actions taken on 
corporate governance are skewed towards technical corporate governance. A 
review of two high profile constituent parts of the corporate governance framework 
indicates this to be the case.  Firstly, the Financial Reporting Council’s 2016 UK 
Corporate Governance Code (Financial Reporting Council, 2016), talks in general 
terms about a wide range of topics which seek to minimise risk through curtailing 
negative influences, and by promoting balanced processes. The Institute of 
Director’s The 2017 Good Governance Report, (IoD, 2017), scores a set of 
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indicators that build upon the Financial Reporting Council’s 2016 criteria. Whilst 
laudable, these frameworks are essentially common sense and self-referencing. In 
March 2018, the UK Government (BEIS, 2018) launched a consultation process 
championing:      
“New powers to give greater protection to staff and small suppliers 
 in insolvent businesses. 
Government plans to improve the UK's corporate governance 
framework to ensure the UK remains one of the best places to start and 
grow a business”. 
Again, media and popular attention is focused on risk mitigation through technical 
corporate governance and in influencing the behaviour of boards of directors in 
focusing on this aspect of corporate governance despite the lack of a long-term 
and established evidence base for such actions (Roberts et al 2005; Le Blanc and 
Gillies, 2005), a condition which persists today.  
 
2.3.6 Section summary  
This section has reviewed the evolution of corporate governance in the UK 
illustrating that the overriding features and influences are defined by two distinct 
sets of factors. The first is the wider set of societal frameworks, including many 
that predate the definition of the modern corporation. In the main, these 
frameworks influence aspects of technical corporate governance and cover wide-
ranging activities from ensuring health and safety at work to curbing monopolistic 
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behaviours. For the most part, these frameworks apply to all organizations, which, 
at the basic level, employ people or sell goods and services. The second set of 
factors relate to the nature of the corporation as a specifically structured entity for 
acquiring resources to undertake profit-seeking activities and the subsequent 
management of that entity towards the aims of making profits on its shareholders’ 
investment.  
What existing corporate governance control frameworks do not do is 
provide an evidence-based approach to commercial corporate governance. As 
stated in Chapter One – Thesis Foundation, it can be argued that technical 
corporate governance has become the face of corporate governance as a whole. 
Legislators, direct stakeholders, and the media, amongst other contributors, have 
acted when technical corporate governance has failed. Consequently, the 
narrative is one of risk aversion and mitigation rather than one of reward 
maximisation. The result is that we can catalogue in detail the events that led up to 
myriad failures of a technical nature, but the literature sheds little light on the 
factors and processes of board led commercial success or failure.  
 
2.3.7  Corporate governance - gaps in the extant literature 
The literature relating to the corporate governance is generalised and lacks 
the depth and nuance required to adequately describe the specific environment in 
which corporate governance takes place. This weakness is generally well 
acknowledged. Extant literature also tends to focus its attention on the period from 
1990 onwards, a time when the practice of corporate governance gained a higher 




2.3.8  Corporate governance - relevance to the aims of this 
thesis 
This section has detailed how the focus of corporate governance research 
is centred on either technical aspects of corporate governance or high level 
generalised corporate governance. Filling this gap in the literature is the overriding 
aim of this thesis.  
In this section, the frameworks of corporate governance have been isolated 
from the actors to illustrate the distinction between technical corporate governance 
and commercial corporate governance despite, these two distinct activities being 
conglomerated in the eyes of most commentators. The structure of board of 
directors of corporations and their intended role of directors is explored in the next 
section. 
 
2.4.1  Corporation boards of directors section introduction 
In Section 2 Defining Corporations this thesis explored and described the 
entity of the modern corporation in its UK configuration and, in Section 3 
Corporate Governance, has introduced broad governance typologies, these being 
technical corporate governance and commercial corporate governance, that are 
undertaken by modern corporations. As the corporation is clearly defined and 
confined within well recognised, stable external control frameworks, so too are 
corporate governance frameworks where they relate to technical corporate 
governance since these frameworks have been intertwined with wider cultural and 
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social frameworks, often over long periods of time. Consequently, many features 
of technical corporate governance control frameworks greatly predate the 
corporations that they apply to. These governance actions are primarily for the 
benefit of external stakeholders as opposed to being focused on the needs and 
benefits of shareholders. There are two main reasons for this condition. Firstly, 
modern corporations exist in their present state with the permission of society with 
the needs of societal stakeholders coming ahead of the needs of shareholders. 
Secondly, for most corporations, it is argued that the needs of stakeholders are 
indirectly represented through directors and so the control frameworks need to be 
robust enough to overcome the agency of directors.   
Less well defined are the control frameworks that typically apply to 
commercial corporate governance actions. These corporate governance actions 
are intended to deliver better commercial performance, primarily for the direct 
economic benefit of shareholders. This lack of definition and confination relating to 
commercial corporate governance comes about as the control frameworks are 
formed around the needs of the corporation, various general and specific codes of 
practice, and other general and specific guidelines as opposed to being legal 
requirements. This is in contrast to much of the technical corporate governance 
framework. Commercial corporate governance control frameworks often require 
corporations to “comply or explain”, and openly state that the contents of the code 
“is not a rigid set of rules” (Financial Reporting Council, 2016). Clearly, it is hard to 
legislate, design, and promote corporate governance structures or other 
conditions that would result in market leading products and services being 
developed by a board of directors. Although this is attempted though the 
encouragement of “strategy days”. Moreover, if this was possible, attempts to 
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systematically bring about beneficial commercial outcomes would be self-
defeating as efforts by competing corporations in the same markets would cancel 
each other out. 
At its core, governance requires someone to govern – an action that goes 
beyond administration. This chapter section explores the role of a corporation’s 
directors and the board of directors. In their corporate governance functions, 
directors are appointed on the basis that they act as a board – a unified group 
intended to agree actions to be carried out through the corporation’s executive 
directors, where they act largely as managers separate from their roles as 
directors. Boards are the most senior governance actors within a corporation and 
so the buck stops with directors who can not either delegate or contract out their 
responsibilities or liabilities. Boards are legally, ethically, and operationally 
responsible to stakeholders not only for their actions, but also for the actions of the 
corporation in whatever way such actions play out. This responsibility extends to 
omissions in their actions relating to technical corporate governance, with a 
creeping scope of responsibility for omissions after the Global Financial Crisis 
(Bloomberg, 2018). Again this increased focus on technical corporate governance 
reinforces the de facto delivery of corporate governance through technical 
channels.  
In this thesis the role of a director is limited to that of a statutory director, 
this being a person with a formalised, contracted and normally permanent position 
as a voting member of the corporation’s board. Since directors are the principal 
actors in corporations, their role is defined individually and collectively within both 
internal control frameworks, those set by the rules of the corporation, and external 
control frameworks, those set by legislation in the main. In mature environments 
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such as the UK, internal control frameworks are limited in their flexibility, diversity, 
and structure by more powerful over-riding external control frameworks. Some 
internal framework elements will cross-over and / or incorporate external 
frameworks. An example of this internal to external crossover is a director’s 
employment or service contract which, although it is intended to facilitate internal 
corporate objectives, is dominated by statutory requirements and limitations.  
Corporate boards will typically be made up of executive and non-executive 
directors. There are a number of variations on the description of directors, 
particularly for non-executive director roles. These include independent non-
executive directors – typically those with no additional relationship with the 
corporation. In this thesis, these additional distinctions are not used to differentiate 
roles in the research stages for three reasons. Firstly, the distinctions only apply to 
a significant extent to public corporations which make up a small proportion of the 
total number of corporations. Secondly, the distinctions are not considered to be 
operationally influential in the context of the thesis topic. Thirdly, participants in the 
research stages of the thesis easily and clearly identified themselves as either an 
executive or non-executive director so making their responses consistent.   
 Within the corporation’s board, the description of a director as an executive 
director or non-executive director is not a legal one and does not differentiate the 
roles within the board, nor does it limit a director’s participation or risk. There is no 
requirement for a set number of directors (above one), or a required proportion or 
balance of executive and non-executive directors. Consequently, discussion about 
the “right” size and composition of a corporation’s board is largely both a matter of 
opinion (Stevenson and Radin, 2015), and, in theory and practice, specific to the 
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corporation is question - a point reflected in the Financial Reporting Council’s 
Code (Financial Reporting Council, 2016) which states that:  
“Main Principle 
The board and its committees should have the appropriate balance of 
skills, experience, independence and knowledge of the company to 
enable them to discharge their respective duties and responsibilities 
effectively. 
Supporting Principles 
The board should be of sufficient size that the requirements of the 
business can be met and that changes to the board’s composition and 
that of its committees can be managed without undue disruption, and 
should not be so large as to be unwieldy. 
The board should include an appropriate combination of executive and 
non-executive directors (and, in particular, independent non-executive 
directors) such that no individual or small group of individuals can 
dominate the board’s decision taking.” 
      
Executive directors will typically be given role titles that indicate particular 
functions and implied responsibilities as executives of the corporation. Legally, 
within the context of the board, such titles are nominal as, absent any other factors 
that are permissible in law, responsibility for outcomes is collectively borne by all 
members of the board. For example, the “Chief Financial Officer” will typically 
spend their working life overseeing the production of the accounts of the 
corporation. Legally, the veracity of the accounts is borne equally by all directors 
including the Chief Financial Officer and a non-executive director who may have 
attended a corporation board meeting having read a summary overview.  Equally, 
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non-executive directors are given legally nominal titles such a “Senior 
Independent Director”. Whilst such titles indicate additional functions and roles, 
these do not acquire addition statutory status. Nor does the lack of any title 
distance a non-titled director from their legal responsibilities. The position and 
function of a senior independent director is to act as a totem for stakeholders in 
general, including other directors, senior management, and shareholders. This 
role would seem to increase personal reputational risk without increased 
protection. Outside formal directorships there sits a set of conditions where actors 
exert influence over the corporation to the extent that the influence acts to direct 
the corporation and a “shadow” directorship is formed. Although clearly 
undesirable from a governance perspective, such conditions have long been 
accepted in practice when, for example, large shareholders are consulted before 
specific board actions are taken. Directors may be seeking an opportunity to 
explain a proposed action but are also seeking tacit approval.  
 
2.4.2  Defining board structures 
Given the collective responsibility of boards, their typical structures could be 
viewed as somewhat contradiction. Whilst democratic in their intended operation 
and ethos, which leads, theoretically at least, to a “matrix” design (Hatch, 1997), 
boards are typically culturally hierarchical (Wilson and Rosenfeld, 1990). They 
often adopt a semi-functional structure carried upwards from the role specific titles 
of the executive directors. Typically, there is a chairperson who manages the 
board (usually a part-time and / or non-executive role). There is typically a chief 
executive officer or managing director who is the manager of the actions of the 
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corporation as a full-time executive carrying out both the direct instructions of the 
board and actions made permissible by delegated authorities and the allocation of 
resources, but with the board retaining all responsibility for the outcomes. A chief 
executive officer is above the chief financial officer in the corporate structure so is 
likely to extend this authority, which is external the board, in to the boardroom.    
Functional structures are efficient whereas matrix structures tend towards 
effectiveness when seeking to produce a widely considered decision (Hatch. 
1997). Given the purpose of the board and its requirement to match its actions 
with both the needs of the corporation and the pressures of the contingent 
environment, corporations would seem to operate with inbuilt structural, cultural, 
and social compromises when balancing the needs for efficiency and the needs 
for effectiveness in its actions. This compromise is potentially problematic as it 
creates ambiguities relating to relationships and expectations. For example, there 
is a potential conflict between the dual lines of authority (Hatch 1997; Wilson and 
Rosenfeld, 1990), with hierarchical executive structures outside the board, such as 
the chief executive officer over the chief financial officer, and the same two 
participants inside the board environment where one person, one vote reigns. This 
can have benefits where competent actors can simultaneously attend to the needs 
of the matrix and the hierarchy (Hatch, 1997). However, in doing so it should be 
noted that the benefits of an executive ability to attend to two or more needs will 
mainly accrue to the executive as far as influence is concerned. Moreover, it can 
be selective in that an executive can vary their attentiveness to suit their needs 
and biases. In corporate board decision-making, this variable attentiveness is 
accommodated and institutionalised through board committees, and other 
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structures such as the use of external expertise that promote focus in one area, 
but may well result in neglect of another. 
 
2.4.3  A core understanding of group behaviour and social 
cohesion as applied to corporate boards 
As will be explored in this chapter section, the literature indicates and 
implies that the behaviours of directors on corporate boards are likely to 
undermine, inhibit and diminish the intended purposes and function of corporate 
boards in making collective decisions. It is argued here that this is because of 
three prevalent conditions, summarised and explored in further detail later in this 
section. The first condition is that the contingent environment in which corporate 
boards operate is likely to pre-seed and promote sub-cultures and sub-groups 
within the corporate board. The second condition is that the control frameworks 
that corporate boards typically operate under are likely to require and/or promote 
physical, contractual and other divisions that will reinforce sub-cultures and sub-
groups. The third condition is the strong attraction to positively valued 
distinctiveness of corporate board participation, particularly on the part of non-
executive directors, which may act to modify behaviours to the detriment of their 
performance as corporate directors. In this thesis, these prevalent dynamics 
stimulate a theoretical foundation where corporate boards consist of “in-groups” 
and “out-groups” (Hogg, 1992) that act to create cultural and social divisions in the 
board with negative outcomes, including conditions that allow and then promote 
information asymmetries. In breaches of governance and trust terms, such cultural 
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and social divisions are likely to overcome formalised governance frameworks 
(Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2008).  
It is noted that the specific group psychologies of corporate boards are not 
widely discussed in the literature nor are the actual processes that corporate 
boards undertake in their decision-making. Given this absence in the literature, it 
is valid to assume that corporate boards are like groups in general as they have 
the same general characteristics as most other groups. To assess the proposition 
that corporate boards are like other groups, their characteristics have been 
described in Table 1 which was developed for this thesis by the author. 
Table 1 describes types of general groups as being: 
“Coincidental” – where a groups form because of external circumstances or an 
event rather than circumstances internal to the members. As an example, 
passengers on a train that has been involved in an accident. The passengers only 
coalesce into a group because of the accident, not because they are train users. It 
is argued that coincidental groups are rarely purely coincidental because, for 
example, passengers involved in a train accident were already train passengers, 
many would have come from, and be going to, similar places along the train’s 
route. In this regard, many of the issues relating to commonalities acting to bind 
groups together are diminished. Coincidental groups can coalesce, fragment, 
reform, or break-down completely as the original circumstances change or abate.  
“Informal” – where a group forms because of internal circumstances such as a 
common interest or location.  Their no formal barriers to entry or rules, only norms 
of behaviour derived from societal and other control frameworks. Examples of this 
type of group could be informal sports participation where anyone can join in but 
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the rules of the game are generally understood and accepted without formal 
reiteration. These groups may be illegitimate in some regards as membership and 
control is limited by understanding and acceptance of social distortions and 
biases. Informal groups exist and operate within corporations (Wilson and 
Rosenfeld, 1990).   
“Formal” - where a group is constituted with rules and frameworks specific to it 
that define its purpose and methods of governance and participation. With this 
type of group there are barriers to entry, rules, and limitations which operate under 
external, often statutory control frameworks. Formal groups exist and operate 
within corporations and span corporations potentially creating conflict. For 
example, for a chief financial officer who is a member of a professional 
accountancy body and a corporation’s board.      
 Coincidental groups could evolve into informal groups or formal groups 
given an impactful external event with enduring consequences. The membership 
may change as members’ motivations and rewards change. Informal groups could 
be constituted into formal groups if enough members perceive there to be 
sufficient benefit in doing so. Again group membership may change with some 
members deciding against the cultural change, new criteria for membership they 
are exposed, or lack of reward for having to conform to formalised control 
frameworks. Informal groups could fragment with some members formalising their 









2.4.4  Group membership selection  
The membership selection processes and participant rewards and penalties 
are illustrated within Table 1 across two characteristics. The first characteristic is 
the way that participants are selected for group membership. The second 
characteristic is the degree to which members conform to the profile of member for 
the group in question. 
In coincidental groups, within the boundary of the contingent environment, 
membership of coincidental groups can be very broad within the greater 
conditionality. For example, the aforementioned train passengers involved in an 
accident could have caught an earlier or later train, but were still train passengers 
on a particular line which will condition their conformity to what may be expected 
of them and their behaviours in a group although given their very wide 
membership of the group, their behaviours could differ widely.  
Informal group members can be characterised as being semi self-selecting. 
They may be members of a group because of location, interest, or convenience, 
as well as being self-selecting by being a member purely by choice. In these 
conditions, there will be some conformity to what may be expected of them and 
their behaviours in a group as they are largely members voluntarily. 
With formal groups, membership is mainly by self-selection because 
participants choose membership. In doing so they give up significant freedom 
within the group’s context and therefore there is likely to be significant and 
proactive conformity to expectations as to their behaviour within the group. It could 
be argued that their behaviour outside the group will conform to similar 
expectations because people tend to not strictly compartmentalise their 
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behaviours (Stevenson and Radin, 2015). Both executive and non-executive 
directors are similar to formal groups across the membership selection and 
conformity to expectations characteristics.  
 
2.4.5  Rewards and penalties for membership 
A key determinant of group membership is that of “positively valued 
distinctiveness” (Hogg, 1992). Broadly, this is the real and implied rewards for 
group membership recognising that these rewards will vary depending on the 
personal valuation placed upon the rewards by individuals within the same group. 
Participant behaviours and control regimes are illustrated in Table 1 also.  
It is illustrated that there are clear similarities between formal groups in 
general and corporate boards with significantly common features of self-selection, 
significant positively and negatively valued distinctiveness, and similar behaviour 
modifiers and controls. These similarities justify the assumption that corporate 
board behavioural dynamics are theoretically similar to group behaviour in 
general, including social cohesion.  
 
2.4.6  Culture and sub-culture within corporate boards  
The previous chapter section drew together characteristics of groups in 
general and corporate boards and described the significant commonality of 
“formal” groups and corporate boards across their member selection process, 
rewards and penalties, and modifiers and controls. This exploration is provided in 
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this thesis to establish that generic group behaviour theory is likely to apply to 
corporate boards.  
 
It is unsafe to assume that any organization, including corporations, of 
medium scale and above have one culture. Referencing Trice and Beyer, Brown 
(1994) identified four reasons why sub-cultures emerge. These are:   
1. Differential interaction – the amount of time individuals associate with 
each other influences the likelihood of a sub-culture emerging. The more often 
associations take place, the more the chance of sub-cultures emerging. The 
number of occasions individuals associate with each other is set by the form and 
functions of the organization. Executive directors spend significantly more time 
together and on many more occasions than non-executive directors so will likely 
be influenced by differential interactions.    
2. Shared experience – the more people share experiences, the more 
commonality in their responses to it so creating a sub-culture. Executive directors 
will experience and share the daily life of the corporation far more closely and 
intensely than non-executive directors and so will have a different, shared 
experience of their role.  
3. Similar personal characteristics – the more similar people are the more 
likely they are to form sub-cultures. Given the location and commercial purpose of 
most corporations, executive directors are likely to be drawn from pools with 
similar characteristics. Indeed, to be considered for selection, personal affinities 
are often important along with functional skills. This may result in an informal sub-
culture of actors that think alike with the apparent benefit of operational efficiency, 
which acts to reinforce the sub-culture. This in turn adds to the pool of “shared 
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experiences” amongst executive directors. Selection of non-executive directors 
may well be from a less well defined group, and consequently, may have a wider 
range of personal characteristics resulting potentially in less social cohesion. It 
should be noted that the move to promote diversity amongst directors on 
corporate boards may result in less cohesion as a result of less inherent 
commonality amongst the member whilst at the same time introduce positive 
outcomes such as a reduction in the prevalence of adverse risk creating 
behaviours such as the use of inappropriate heuristics and group thinking.    
4. Cohesion – putting a group of people into a situation where they share 
meaningful experiences such as performance success or a crisis, can promote 
cohesion and then the forming of sub-cultures. Along with “shared experiences”, 
the likelihood of executive directors building cohesion through performance 
success and crisis is greater than for non-executive directors and the board as a 
whole as executive directors are rewarded and penalised for managing such 
events in the context of the corporation.   
 
The existence and combined effect of one or more of these conditions 
would seem likely to be an influence on most corporate boards. Moreover, 
corporate boards are, theoretically at least, selected in a way that aims to reduces 
the risk of the formation of sub-groups through attempts to match the needs of the 
group with the skills of the potential director. However, corporations may well then 
reintroduce the same risks by the way it is structured, (through sub-groups), and 




In general, organizations operating in countries with cultures that stress 
individualism and freedom of association are likely to have more sub-cultures 
(Brown, 1994). On the face of it, the contingent environment for corporate boards 
in the UK and many other western cultures is likely to produce sub-cultures simply 
because they are culturally and socially tolerated.  
 
Table 2 shows the factors highlighted by Brown (1994) and the potential 
divergence between typical executive and non-executive directors in relation to 
these factors and therefore this indicates that sub-cultures are likely to exist in 
corporate boards.   
 
Table 2. Factors for the emergence of sub-cultures – Brown, (1994) 
 
 
In addition to the natural evolution of sub-cultures within corporate boards, 
the expected norms of corporate board structures and roles, such as that of 
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“senior” non-executive directors and the existence of board committees are likely 
to further promote sub-cultures.  
 
2.4.7  Social identity of individuals 
In the main, social behaviour research focuses on the influence of individuals 
within groups (Hogg and Abrams, 1988). This implies that individuals are fully 
formed and fixed in the way they behave in a group, and that the group largely 
acts as an amalgam of the individual behaviours of the participants. Hogg and 
Abrams (1988), claim this view is limited as it fails to consider the way that groups 
provide individuals with a social identity and go on to theorise that belonging to a 
group is a psychological state distinct from being an individual, even when the 
individual is acting away from the group. As a consequence, a social identity is 
created through being “in-group”. This theory would seem to be applicable to 
corporate boards and to non-executive directors in particular. Non-executive 
directors are likely to positively value the “distinctiveness” of being a board 
member through factors such as being the member of an enhanced social group, 
an elevated professional profile and reputation, over and above the financial 
rewards, which are in any case, significantly lower than the financial rewards for 
being an executive director. In this respect, executive directors and non-executive 
directors are different. Hogg and Abrams, (1988), claim that social identity 
belongingness is psychological and not merely a pragmatic knowledge of a 
group’s attributes. Hogg and Abrams, (1988), go on to claim that this 
belongingness is more than simply having the same characteristics as someone 
else and merely being categorised as, for example, a “director”. Of particular 
relevance to the functioning of corporate boards is that society comprises 
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categories, (groups and cultures), that are positioned in power and status in 
relation to one another, Hogg and Abrams, (1988). This condition implies that 
people will seek new ways to acquire higher order social identities, and will act to 
maintain the social identities they already have, in order to be more powerful and 
have a higher social status. As this is a general point being made about both 
society and individuals, there is no reason to assume that the point does not apply 
to directors and potential directors on corporate boards. The questions arise: 
o what will potential group members do to become group members – i.e to 
become in-group? 
o once they are in-group, what do they do to preserve their status and power 
in relation to other groups and individuals? 
o what will they do to diminish the status and power of out-groups?  
 
Hogg and Abrams (1988), describe a process whereby overt and covert 
categorisations and social comparisons are undertaken to the extent that they 
become a distinct form of group behaviour. This involves intergroup differentiation 
and discrimination, in-group favouritism, and also perceptions of superiority of the 
in-group over the out-group. In the context of the corporate board, this may result 
in a reduction of decision-making process quality. This outcome could occur 
through attempts to control access to positions of influence such as committee 
membership, through the nomination of like-minded candidates for vacant seats 
on the board and board committees, the control of the agenda and flow of board 
related activities, and, crucially in the context of this thesis, the control of 
information. Another potential outcome relates to the formation of sub-cultures 
through shared experiences and events that create cohesiveness where success 
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creates hubris within the in-group which reinforces the division between in-group 
and out-groups.  
By applying general group behaviour theory to corporate boards, it can be 
concluded that the present corporate governance frameworks, including those 
promoted by bodies such as the Financial Reporting Council (2016), with the 
institutionalization of board committees and “senior”, “independent”, and multiple 
“chairperson” titles, would seem to encourage and, in some cases, require 
corporate boards to accommodate multiple sub-cultures, sub-groups and, in many 
cases, structuralised status and power relationships - all within a body that intends 
to operate as one and with overt and legally proscribed collective responsibility. 
These conditions are illustrated in Figure 4.   
 






In Figure 4, simplified groups are shown with a distinction made between 
the hard, instructional relationships for executive directors, for example, chief 
executive officer to chief financial officer, and the soft, consensual relationships 
between non-executive directors amongst themselves and with external advisors. 
Figure 4 could be further overlaid and developed with reference to multiple 
external influences including regulators, professional bodies, major shareholders 
and many others. In-group and out-group power relationships and complexity 
would grow and accordingly become entrenched both formally and informally.   
 
In general, groups with mixed status and power members are less 
cohesive, (Hogg, 1992). In groups where there are mixed status participants but 
no defined formalised roles, some cohesion is generated as all participants “like”, 
or at least pretend to like, those with higher status and power as there is a social 
benefit to being seen as liking someone (Friedkin, 2004). Conversely, group 
member likability tends to diminish the lower down the social status ranking as 
there is limited social benefit in tactically “liking” someone with low status and 
power. In groups with defined roles, cohesion is more stratified across the status 
and power levels, (Hogg, 1992). This implies that corporate boards with 
committees and roles are inherently at risk of a lack of group cohesion as each 
committee and role will have a perceived status, informal or otherwise. Hogg, 
(1992), states that increased group size leads to a decrease in cohesiveness. This 
is not group size per se but co-existing features of group size such as poor 
communication and hierarchy command structures that result in diminished 
cohesiveness. Even in corporate boards with smaller numbers of participants, the 
sub-cultures and sub-groups could act to increase the number of participants with 
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their individual and group social identifies all requiring subtly difference 
messaging. Other variables are less obvious but also impactful such as the effort 
each group member puts into a task (Friedken, 2004). This diversity is shown in 
Figure 4. 
 
2.4.8  From sub-cultures to informal sub-groups 
It is likely that any group within a corporate board will quickly acquire their 
own sub-cultures. Brown, (1994), states that organizations with sub-cultures may 
experience internal competition between cultures for dominance. Once a sub-
culture exists it is likely that it will seek to preserve and enhance itself, even if this 
is not overtly done. It will seek to do this by promoting itself and undermining 
competitor sub-cultures. Once it does this it is evolving into an informal group or 
clique. It may then consciously, although informally, seek to gather resources and 
further influence to enhance its status and power. Within the functions of corporate 
boards, this may include access to friendly or at least accommodative professional 
advisors, control of the board agenda, control of board meeting time, and control 
of information depth, breadth, and distribution. The risk and challenge for a 
corporate board, and for corporate governance in general, is that it is hard to stop 
any group which starts out as well-intentioned and supportive of the whole 
corporation becoming side-tracked by its own sub-culture, consciously or 
otherwise. Indeed, when tasked with a particular function or role, such as those of 
the audit committee, it is incumbent on the members of such groups to obtain and 
maintain the best resources for their purpose. Consequently, an outcome of 
effective subgroup behaviour could be the reduction of group performance as 
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resources are consumed by well-intentioned but competing subgroups with their 
outputs positioned, potentially, in a competitive way. 
 
Formal groups such as board committees are as likely to fall under the 
influence of sub-culture / sub-group dynamics. This may well be the case when 
the purpose of the group gives it in-group status and powers that out-group 
participants do not have. In the case of corporate boards, this would seem to be a 
potential risk and flaw in the governance regime as it relates to the existence of, 
for example, the nomination and remuneration committees.  According to Hogg, 
(1992) people self-evaluate from the viewpoint of those they like and not those 
they don’t like, i.e. those they experience cohesion with. This implies that in-group 
participants would be less inclined to recognise that they are undertaking 
detrimental behaviours as they would see, when self-evaluating, such situations 
as positive. As a consequence, corporate board outputs, including technical 
corporate governance outputs, are likely to be influenced by social factors as well 
as technical objectives. Another consequence of general group behaviours is that 
it is likely that the longer a board exists as a stable group, the greater the 
divergence between the participants to the point where there is an informal as well 
as formal in-group and out-group differentiation across multiple functions. This 
would seem to challenge the desirability of the long-term tenure of many board 
members, executive directors and non-executive directors alike. Group cohesion 
may also diminish at times when the group is facing challenges (Friedken, 2004). 





2.4.9  Section summary 
The role and actions of directors of corporations are tightly defined as far as 
intended outputs are concerned, particularly in relation to technical corporate 
governance actions. This definition is predominantly gained from external control 
frameworks which act, in effect, to reverse engineer the inputs. However, the 
behavioural inputs of directors are much more loosely defined. This would seem to 
particularly be the case as far as commercial corporate governance is concerned 
where the actions that directors are intended to take are not described or 
proscribed nor are the specific outputs. (The outputs are described as generalised 
results such as “enhanced shareholder value”). As a result, reverse engineering 
from the outputs is unlikely to produce a common outcome. A particular lack of 
definition relates to the behavioural inputs of non-executive directors in relation to 
commercial corporate governance. The lack of definition as far as inputs are 
concerned implies that the functions of the corporate board are not defined either 
and are, as a consequence, likely to be variable in their quality.  
In addition, corporate boards are exposed to a set of risk inducing 
influences such as sub-cultures, in-group / out-group competition for resources 
and influence, and reward structures that make membership attractive for reasons 
that are not always beneficial to the corporation’s stakeholders.      
 




In common with much of the literature relating to this thesis, the literature 
relating to the corporation boards of directors is generalised and lacks the depth 
and nuance required to adequately describe the specific environment and / or 
specific behaviours that take place. Extant literature also tends to generalise 
actions of directors irrespective of the purpose of the actions.   
 
2.4.11 Corporation boards of directors - relevance to the 
aims of this thesis 
The roles of directors and their specific behaviours relate directly to the 
aims of this thesis. The extent to which director’s behaviour diverges between the 
two distinct populations, (executive directors and non-executive directors), has a 
direct relevance to the hypothesis.  
The lack of definitions as to what actions directors are supposed to take 
beyond generalised actions, the sub-optimal social conditions of the board, and 
the variable rewards combine to place corporate governance in a high-risk 
position. In the next section, the primary function of the corporation’s board, that of 
decision-making, is explored in relation this high-risk position. In addition, the 
corporate board decision-making is explored in a more nuanced way than is 
typically undertaken to reflect the two distinct types of governance, technical and 
commercial. 
 
2.5.1  Decision-making – the principal action of corporation 
boards section introduction 
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In the previous sections of this chapter of this thesis, a description of 
corporations established their form and function as being commonplace, 
straightforward and, consequently, recognisable to all stakeholders. This thesis 
went on to describe corporate governance as being popularly perceived and 
researched as being a uniform endeavour. However this thesis argues that, in 
practice, corporate governance has two distinct strands. The first strand is 
technical corporate governance which is focused on ensuring the corporation 
complies with the legal requirements of its administration including, as examples, 
meeting its legal obligations to pay taxes, and ensuring the corporation it does not 
pollute in a way that is outside the limits permitted by law. These actions are 
beyond the corporation’s social responsibilities, (which are often optional or 
specific to a sector). The second strand is commercial corporate governance 
which is concerned with the profit motivations of the shareholders and seeks to 
take best advantage of market opportunities and to efficiently allocate resources to 
create, exploit, and extend competitive advantages. Both strands of corporate 
governance seek to avoid risk, particularly technical corporate governance where 
this aim is expressed strongly within applicable control frameworks.  
As explored in Section 4 - Corporate boards of directors, the action of 
corporate governance is carried out by the corporation’s boards of directors where 
the chapter explored the general and specific conditions under which corporate 
governance is carried out. These conditions are complex being derived from 
varied sources including overt and externally controlled frameworks, cultural and 
social influences, covert behaviours, and, in some cases, participants exercising 
their agency to pursue personally valued benefits, such as status and power, that 
are not necessarily in the best interests of the corporation’s stakeholders. In 
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Section 4 – Corporate boards of directors it is established that corporate boards 
are likely to behave in a similar way to other formal groups and are exposed to the 
same risks of sub-optimal relationships and dynamics such as the formation of 
sub-groups and sub-cultures.  
Corporate boards have a unique role in decision-making at the strategic 
level and where some of the actors are not directly involved with implementation 
(Bruni-Bossio, 2018). Corporate boards cannot be passive. Even where a 
corporation operates in a stable market within benign wider contingent 
environments, the purpose and processes of corporate boards require actions, be 
they reactive or proactive. Board actions are most commonly a choice between 
two or more options - at a minimum, doing nothing versus do something or a 
choice to carry on doing what the corporation is doing or stopping. Consequently, 
decision-making is the principal action of the board of directors of corporations 
with the consequences of the board’s decision-making being the board’s principal 
outputs. Theoretically, board decisions result in the highest level of value creation 
and the most impactful risk mitigation actions the corporation undertakes. These 
outputs - value creation and risk mitigation - are the premise of the UK’s 
stakeholder governance model.  
 
2.5.2  The nature of decision-making 
In general, we regard decision-making in the context of corporations as 
being intended to near “rational” (March, 1994). This view assumes that decisions 
are made by people who are informed and competent, using decision criteria that 
are specifically intended to result in outcomes that are predictably beneficial to the 
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corporation. For technical corporate governance, decision criteria are typically pre-
selected as they will lead effectively and efficiently to a state of compliance or re-
compliance with recognised external control frameworks. For commercial 
corporate governance, decision criteria should be consistent with the agreed 
corporate vision, objectives, and strategies set within largely internally defined 
control frameworks.  Theoretically, adherence to a rational process and 
appropriate criteria results in a “successful” outcome (March, 1994).  
It is argued that the nature of decision-making in this context is influenced 
by a set of variable factors which act to both undermine the ability of decision-
makers to be fully informed and / or limits their options and, consequently, their 
ability to derive the maximum benefit for the corporation. Variable factors may 
include; decision timing, resource availability, market conditions, relative product 
and service strengths, and organizational capacity, amongst others. Even for 
technical corporate governance, these factors distance the corporation’s board of 
directors from decision-making that aims to be of the lowest risk as possible by 
being “completely informed, infinitely sensitive (to variations in price), and 
rational”, (Weiss and Weiss, 2009). As well as being completely informed and 
rational, we can add the requirement for corporate directors to be sufficiently 
competent to be able to calculate the value of the options for each decision before 
them, and to be able to assess the impact of the set of related decisions when 
viewed together however unlikely this is in practice (Stagner, 1969). In addition, 
corporate directors are assumed to be uniformly diligent in their approach to 
valuing decision options and professional in their allocation of time and effort to 
make the right decision even when there is limited or no personal reward.  
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These conditions are all stated or implied in the external control 
frameworks. For each and every decision in this rational condition scenario, 
directors would be able to describe their actions in examining the decision options 
as well as their reasons for opting for a particularly course of action including the 
decision at the end of a clear and well documented process. The literature is clear 
that this is not the case at present, (Le Blanc and Gillies, 2005).  
 
2.5.3  “Rational” to “preferential” 
Decisions often labelled as “rational”, are in likely to be in practice 
“preferential” (March, 1994). This change in degree of apparent process rigour 
reflects the need to accommodate variability in the factors that influence the 
decision, the criteria used to include or exclude options, and the views and 
interpretations of the information by those making the decision.   
Divergence from the purely “rational” to the “preferential” can be portrayed 
as the product of conditional logic. March (1994), describes a set of four basic 
questions with conditional outputs. These questions are; 1. What are the 
alternatives? 2. What are the expected consequences? 3. What are the 
preferences based on the value of the consequences to the decision-makers? 4. 
What are the rules of the decision-making process in relation to the values? This 
theoretical process is shown in the context of corporate decision-making in Figure 
5. In this theoretical process, the control frameworks typically set the limits of the 
permissible actions which then lead to near rational sets of options, valuations of 
the consequences, and then preference selection.   
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It should be noted that the consequences of the decision, the outcome, are 
discreet within the valuation process. For many corporate governance decisions, 
particularly for commercial corporate governance, this seems difficult to achieve 
given the timeframe of the consequences, (which often extend out beyond a point 
that is credible to accurately predict), and the variability and complexity of the 
contingent environment.   
In the context of the corporation and its board, purely or near rational 
decision-making is implausible for all but the most basic of routine decisions. For 
technical corporate governance, decision “options” are likely to be more fully 
explored as the decision criteria are more easily coded into an assessment model. 
The “consequences” are more likely to be broadly and accurately assessed, 
costed, ranked, or analysed with consequences modelled over a set of 
timeframes. The “preferences” of directors, as the decision-makers, will be 
consistent as the directors’ preferences will be subordinate to those of the 
corporation’s. For commercial corporate governance, the process is less robust. 
The options are less likely to be fully considered because of market variability. The 
consequences will be less well assessed and understood leaving to door ajar for 
the preferences of directors to be more influential even where there is a clearly 
stated set of corporate vision, objectives and strategic preferences to act as a 
preference pre-selector. Finally, are the rules followed in a uniformly logical way? 
In addition to March’s list (1994) we can add further questions and factors 
such as; what is the extent of the cultural impact of each of the alternatives?, what 
is the track record of the corporation in its execution of previous decisions of a 
similar type?, and what are the consequential impacts to previously taken 
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decisions that have the effect of altering the intended consequential value of those 
decisions retrospectively?   
Figure 5.  Theoretical decision-making process in corporate governance 




Another aspect to consider in this context is the maturation of the 
consequences. Existing literature on rational decision-making tends to favour a 
view that alternatives can be expressed in constant value terms giving stable 
values (Weiss and Weiss, 2009). Many corporate governance decisions have 
values that are unstable over time as they are exposed to multiple external factors. 
Apples versus bananas bought and consumed today is not the same as apples 
versus bananas bought today for consumption next week. Moreover, in contrast to 
the value maximisation view of decision-making, directors of corporations are not 
easily able to contract out the decision as to do so would diminish their personal 
value so they will make the decisions whether or not they are most able to do so.   
Ever present are the issues of bias and circularity as illustrated in Figure 6, 
where the decision process could loop through a set of iterations exploring and 
valuing the permissible options or even seeking to add to the permissible options. 
This would seem to be a particular issue with commercial corporate governance 
decisions where the limits of permissible actions are most often defined by the 
corporation using internal control frameworks. This situation may result in both a 
wider range of actions for many decisions, and a greater risk of influence and bias 
from dominant stakeholders. Typically, prior to a board being asked to consider a 
decision, an executive in the corporation will be tasked with compiling information 
for the board.  Deliberately or otherwise, this information will contain biases that 
have their root in the information compiler’s responses to the latter of March’s 
(1994) four questions on alternatives and processes in relation to the value of the 
consequences to the decision-makers and the rules of the decision-making 
process in relation to those values. Within the roles and hierarchies of the 
executive function of the corporation, there may be a covert filter placed in the 
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process as the valuation of the consequences to executive directors will be 
different to the whole board of directors in aggregate and in comparison to the 
valuation in the eyes of non-executive directors. An example of this is impact of 
time on outcomes where executives may place a higher value on short-term 
outcomes and non-executive on long-term outcomes. In many cases, because of 
the lack of external control, the permissible options are more likely to conform to, 
or be accommodative of, the preferences of dominant stakeholders.  
Although factor variability undermines the absolute strength of frameworks 
for approaching the description shown in Figure 6 of decision-making, they are 
considered valid because frameworks can act as the default approach taken by 
people in general when asked to describe their own decision-making (March, 
1994). In Figure 6, decision-maker preferences take an earlier position in the 
process and form part of an iteration loop that modifies the process towards a 
pseudo rational outcome where the rationale is distorted to appear logical but is 
bias towards preferences prior to evaluation of the consequences.    
Rarely will people admit to, or articulate, a random, scattergun approach to 
decision-making. Even when making decisions that are demonstrably irrational, 
such as buying lottery tickets, we can normally substitute pure rationality for 
personal rationality such as “someone has to win”, or “I was close last week”. In 
this way, preferences take a lead over consequence valuation and risk 
assessment so breaking up or at least limiting the logic of decision-making.     
If decision-making processes in the context of corporate boards are not 
purely rational, can they be described as being within a “bounded rationality” with 
a describable set of constraints? Could decision-making also be described as 
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“pseudo rational”? Or be given a “subjective probability” (Weiss and Weiss (2009). 
This alternative theoretical view is illustrated in Figure 6 for both technical 
corporate governance and commercial corporate governance. The key 
differentiator at the theoretical level is the place in the decision-making process 
location of the over-riding influence.  
For technical corporate governance, this is, theoretically, the calculated 
consequences whereas for commercial corporate governance it is, theoretically, 
potentially skewed towards the preferences of the dominant stakeholders. For 
commercial corporate governance decisions, the iteration loop is broader in its 
process stages, so providing more opportunities for decision-makers to influene 












Figure 6.  Bias and circularity in the commercial corporate governance 






Figure 7 Theoretical decision-making for technical corporate governance 
and commercial corporate governance (author’s own model) 
 
 
2.5.4  Decision-making typology in the context of this thesis. 
Having demonstrated the theoretical difference between technical corporate 
governance and commercial corporate governance in the decision-making 
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process, at this point we look to categorise typical decision-making by boards 
within a typology relating to their purpose of the decision with the role of technical 
corporate governance or commercial corporate governance as the substantial 
differentiator. Such categorisation is not part of the typical discourse on corporate 
governance, which predominantly groups together director and board actions 
under broad descriptions. Discourse on the topic tends to ascribe the same or 
similar variances and decision criteria to all decisions as it treats corporate 
governance as one process. This would seem unlikely given the distinct nature of 
the headline differentiators as previously discussed. Table 3 illustrates points of 
potential divergence across a set of features of a decision process, (options, 
consequences, valuation, and process rules) and the conditions and inputs 
(information, scope, control course, and timeframe of outputs).    
Table 3.  Points of potential divergence across a set of features of a 




Table 3 indicates that the decisions made within technical corporate 
governance functions are more likely to be near rational - at least at the outset of 
the process. The alternatives available to a corporation to achieve an intended 
technical corporate governance outcome are dictated by the required outcome 
which is largely proscribed and controlled by external control frameworks. For 
example, there are very few, if any, alternative ways to comply with the 
requirements of an annual audit or to comply with health and safety legislation. 
The expected consequences are often binary – comply / do not comply, risk 
mitigated / risk not mitigated. As well as being limited in number, and often being 
binary in their consequences, there is typically a much larger reference class of 
previous experiences for technical corporate governance decisions, (both internal 
to the corporation and externally validated), which directors can call upon this 
reference class when assessing the expected consequences at the outset and in 
relation to the likely stability of the value of decision consequences over time. As 
previously mentioned, this is not the case with commercial corporate governance 
decisions where a far greater degree of variability would often exist, particularly 
where decisions are being made on new activities or where an existing activity is 
performing outside normal expectations and values. Table 3 relates to the 
research questions by highlighting the opportunity for, and control frameworks to 
constrain, information asymmetry. Table 3 also indicates the adverse conditions 
that may impact information quality, particularly with commercial corporate 
governance.   
As well as presenting directors with challenges in relation to a rational 
process framework for commercial corporate governance decisions, the lack of a 
reference class introduces another set of variables including; the ability of a 
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corporation’s executives to design a presentation of the options, the ability of 
directors to digest, question, and assess the options, and the ability of the 
corporation to complete the agreed course of action following any decision. As 
previously discussed, seemingly there is the potential for a divergence in the 
preferences of directors under some circumstances. Commercial corporate 
governance decisions, particularly ones that relate to remedial actions to rectify a 
shortfall in actual value versus an intended value of a previous decision, are 
potentially exposed to far greater bias, personal agenda setting, and political 
influence than rationally controlled technical corporate governance decisions and 
new commercial corporate governance decisions.  
Both nuanced and more basic additional or alternative criteria can be 
considered in this context including the use of “wide-scope, indirect knowledge” 
held by directors (March, 1994). Assuming such knowledge is used, and the 
decision-making process accommodates it, then the accepted position is that such 
knowledge would assist in the decision process and decision outcome quality 
(Grünera and Schultea, 2010). Particularly in relation to commercial corporate 
governance, often decision-making, at the criteria setting, process, preference, 
and valuation stage is qualified and amended to suit the specific conditions of the 
corporation and its contingent environment. It can be concluded that, despite 
additional criteria and other moderating factors, it seems that commercial 
corporate governance decisions taken by corporations may not be commonly 
described as “rational”. On the other hand, it would generally seem appropriate to 
describe technical corporate governance decision-making as being “near rational”. 
This does not imply that commercial corporate governance decision-making is 
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irrational. Outside near rationality resides the “limited rationality” of commercial 
corporate governance decision-making.  
This thesis argues that commercial corporate governance decision-making 
typology is characterised by input and condition variability and by typically being 
made within a wider, deeper, and often more opaque environment than technical 
corporate governance decision-making. This key factor is explored in this thesis as 
it is manifest through information asymmetry and is the entry point of additional 
risk into the corporation’s decision-making process. As described in Figure 5, the 
rules of the decision-making process are more likely to be internally proscribed 
and controlled, and be undertaken potentially with a buffer between the decision 
and external control frameworks. Such decision conditions, theoretically those of 
agency, expose the decision to a greater degree of influence by board directors 
and by other actors within the corporation who will be charged with compiling 
information relating to the decision, or by other stakeholders such as influential 
shareholders.  
 
2.5.5  Commercial corporate governance decision-making 
resources and conditions 
Central to the effectiveness of the decision-making process is information 
quality where quality is defined as meeting the expected specification as set by 
the control frameworks. For technical corporate governance decision-making, 
meeting the expected specification for information quality is more likely as the 
external control framework influencing both the decision and the expected 
consequences of the decision are typically tightly defined, (for example the format 
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of statutory accounts or the requirements for public liability insurance). With 
commercial corporate governance decision-making this is problematic since the 
expected specification relating to information quality is variable, potentially unclear 
at the outset, and is exposed to bias, influence, and agency (Stagner, 1969).  
Directors face the challenge of being able to utilize new or ad hoc 
information, (March, 1992). Of particular note are issues of comprehension where 
board members are given varying amounts of time and access to review and 
process information so as to be able to participate in decision-making processes in 
the way intended by the control frameworks. It would seem likely that there is a 
significant variance in the exposure executive directors would have to information 
relating to commercial decision-making versus that of a non-executive director 
(Stevenson and Radin, 2015). This is because the executive directors would 
typically be aware of the conditions that give rise to a decision before non-
executive directors, have greater familiarity of the situation, and have greater 
contemporary technical knowledge of the context.  Moreover, executive directors 
would seem to have a greater ability to augment and explain their information 
through greater access to the originators of the information and any limitation in 
the information. This gives executive directors a significant advantage in decision-
making processes and, consequently, in championing their preferences. In the 
decision process, in general non-executive directors would seem to be at a 
structural and institutionalised disadvantage. In addition to issues of quality and 
comprehension, board secretaries face the challenge of being able to assemble 
new and ad hoc information for presentation to directors well before board 
meetings to give all participants adequate time to absorb and question as 
necessary (Kakabadse et al. 2016). Board chairmen face the challenge of being 
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able to identify imbalances in information quality, being able to facilitate debate 
using new or ad hoc information, and consequently, in maintaining balance 
between the preferences of directors.    
 
2.5.6  Prevailing conditions that influence behaviours  
Given the lack of external control frameworks that constrain commercial 
decision-making, and uncertain information quality, at this point it seems valid to 
assume that individual biases, behaviours, and worldviews of directors will 
dominate or at least significantly influence commercial corporate governance 
decision-making throughout the decision-making process. This assumption is valid 
because it is unlikely that directors would be unable to ignore their previous 
experiences, known information gaps, and decision-making process issues. 
Directors would need to act in some way to achieve a personal bridge between 
their view of the preferences and information they have and the quality of the 
preferences and information assumed in control frameworks. This would apply to 
all decision-making but particularly to commercial decision-making because of the 
greater variability in the criteria and preferences. As previously discussed, with 
their greater access to resources useful in the decision-process, including 
information, executive directors would seem more able to influence the decision-
process to achieve their preferred outcomes, even when this diverged from the 
best interests of the corporation, than non-executive directors would be able to.      
Directors would struggle to suspend or limit previous knowledge or 
reference points even if these were not directly applicable to the decision in 
question. Absent an external framework to control them, directors would naturally 
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tend to adopt positions that conform to their core characteristics in relation to 
issues such as risk tolerance and the tolerance of ambiguity. Gaps in knowledge 
may be covered up if seen so as not to reduce the perceived value of a director to 
the board or go unfilled if the gap is an “unknown, unknown”. These are common 
variable traits of individual psychologies of decision-making. Broadly, individual 
psychologies seek to stabilize what the observer sees by likening it to what they 
already know or believe (March, 1994). This implies that individuals have a set of 
frameworks that they recall and use to suit the decision process in front of them. In 
the context of technical corporate governance decision-making, it is proffered that 
an individual director’s frameworks of knowledge and experience have significant 
commonalities with both the internal and external frameworks used by the 
corporation. An effective director recruitment process would have likely flagged up 
areas of technical corporate governance knowledge shortfalls within the existing 
board to be addressed in a systematic way. This would promote conditions where 
a selection process for board membership would naturally result in a commonality 
as the corporation sort out technical skills it needed as well as general skills. For 
example, membership of the corporation’s audit committee is likely to result in a 
candidate shortlist of potential directors with suitable experience, frameworks, and 
information relating to the audit function as well as the corporation. Consequently, 
each director’s individual frameworks would have significant commonality with the 
other directors. This is not the same as a de facto group framework, rather it is a 
composite framework. This is less the case with commercial corporate governance 
decision-making where directors are less likely to be exposed as having clearly 
identifiable, objectively assessed knowledge gaps and where the director 
recruitment process could, as a consequence of allowing more subjectivity, be 
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more accommodative in relation to individual shortfalls instead championing 
generalist experiences and cultural fit.  
 
2.5.7  Abstraction and bias – distil, dilute or dissolve?  
In order to stabilize what an observer sees and to place it into an 
appropriate framework, the observer requires the ability to abstract core 
characteristics of what is being observed. Abstraction is a core human skill 
practised consciously and subconsciously (Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier, 2011). It 
allows us to filter out most data and information we receive and to dedicate our 
mental processing capacity on that which is most relevant to us. Practically, 
decision-making by boards requires abstraction.  
In practice, information relating to any corporate governance decision is 
already abstracted to a large extent. Those within the corporation tasked with 
compiling and presenting information will already have abstracted it from a wider 
set of possible information. The degree to which this is done for technical 
corporate governance will be controlled within a largely external control 
framework. This means decision processes have a greater level of commonality 
across corporations resulting in an awareness amongst experienced directors of 
what is required.  
The extent and way in which information is abstracted for commercial 
corporate governance would seem to be much more flexible with the process of 
abstraction being varied by the speed, scale, and consequence value of each 
specific decision being put before the board. As part of the process, when 
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presented with information relating to a decision, directors will place the 
information into one or more frameworks and reference classes parsing 
information through their own conscious or subconscious abstraction processes 
which act to variously distil, dilute, or even dissolve information at the personal 
level. Ideally, board discussions and supplementary research by directors would 
act to cut down or expand frameworks to achieve a suitable balance of abstraction 
allowing for optimised decision-making. The extent to which this happens in 
practice is influenced by individual psychologies as much as expected decision 
process rigour, the prevailing corporate governance standards, and culture of the 
corporation. 
A set of recognised biases would feature in both the abstraction process, 
and framework selections and uses. Of relevance to this thesis would be 
“confirmation bias”, which leads to the tendency to search for, interpret, focus on, 
and remember information in a way that confirms personal preconceptions. Also, 
“”anchoring bias”, the tendency to "anchor" on one piece of information when 
making decisions may be relevant. “Ambiguity bias”, the tendency to avoid 
alternatives with missing information may be relevant. “Loss aversion”, when the 
disutility of giving up an object is greater than the utility associated with acquiring it 
may be relevant. “Heuristics” and other rules-of-thumb would be deployed allowing 
more experienced directors to quickly cut to the decision, albeit at the risk of 
missing nuance and detail generally or specifically (Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier, 
(2011). 
The rigour of the decision process and, in turn, the quality of the 
consequence is at the heart of the debate on commercial corporate governance. It 
would seem that the literature on decision-making, and the individual psychologies 
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that are inherent within it, would indicate that significant variation will occur. With 
variation of process comes variation of quality and, inherently, consequence 
value.  
As well as quality variation, the literature discusses the tendency of 
decision-makers to resolve decision processes by adopting consequences that 
“satisfice” that is they choose alternatives that meet some criteria fully or all criteria 
partially (March, 1994; Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier, 2011). This may be because 
decision-makers have imperfect information, have limited decision-making time, 
have limited resources, or have other constraints on selecting alternatives. 
Decision-makers may justify “satisficing” as being pragmatic, an outcome that is 
more tolerable in some cultures, including the UK, than others.    
 
2.5.8  Group psychologies and technical corporate 
governance decision-making.   
An assumption that would seem valid for technical decision-making is that 
group psychologies will dominate as external frameworks, and more certain, 
higher information qualities would move the decision process more rapidly and 
effectively into the open debate and resolution stages of board meetings. In this 
scenario, directors would more readily accept the information quality at the outset, 
assuming it conforms to the requirements of an external framework and would be 
able to call upon a proven reference class of previous decisions and 
consequences that the board would collectively recognize, validate, and use. This 
scenario adheres to a rational decision-making typography. Technical corporate 
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governance decision-making is more likely to aim to objectively “maximize” the 
measurable value of a consequence. This is likely since the credible alternatives 
are typically fewer, the decision criteria more consistent and clear, the preferences 
and their values agreed as being corporate, (rather than potentially personal to the 
directors), and the decision process more controlled, (being within external control 
frameworks).  
Despite the rationality of the process and the likely aim of achieving a 
maximised consequence, group psychologies are likely to influence the decision 
process to some extent. These could include; the need or desire to avoid conflict 
within the board to maintain unity, and the desire for inclusion on the part of an 
individual director who may consider themselves vulnerable in the group. These 
may be factors in some technical corporate governance decision-making in, for 
example, board committees on remuneration and nominations.  
Commercial corporate governance could be at greater risk of undesirable 
group psychologies due the impacts of social identity theory (Hogg, 1992). 
Directors could act tactically by agreeing with other directors if the control 
frameworks that promote due process in decision-making, including the provision 
of overt and structured use of information, are weak or removed altogether. This 
may allow a director to “bank” political capital for use in another fight where their 
preference values are greater. At times of commercial stress or success for the 
corporation, a director may succumb to a bandwagon effect and conformity 
biases. Over time, the quality of information used in commercial corporate 
governance decision-making could be allowed to deteriorate as communal 
reinforcement takes hold, particularly where a business is successful, and the 
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shared experience of success acts to reinforce cohesion and in-group behaviours 
(Hogg, 1992; Freidken, 2004).      
 
2.5.9  Decision process to decision consequence  
It is not within the direct scope of this thesis to associate the actions and 
processes of directors to the outcomes of their corporations. However, the 
following chapter section forms a generalised review of the potential 
characteristics and outcomes that may feature.   
In many scenarios and decision processes, what participants say and what 
they do are two separate things. As previously noted, decision-makers are unlikely 
to readily admit to random or clearly flawed decision-making processes - directors 
even less so given the legal, ethical, and commercial implications of doing so. In 
the context of this thesis, extant literature is limited when it comes to clearly 
associating decision processes, including information as a constituent part, with 
decision consequences. This disassociation is not uncommon in decision making 
in general. Assessing the association can be undertaken by using data obtained 
by asking participants, with the previously mentioned issues of veracity. Data can 
be obtained by observing the process. In the context of this thesis, observations of 
this type are a recognised gap in the literature (Le Blanc and Gillies, 2005). Data 
can be obtained by observing decision outcomes, these being issues such as 
participant dissent, and the timeliness of the decision, amongst others. In the 
context of this thesis, decision consequences, in particularly, specific commercial 
decision consequences are semi-detached from their decision process given the 
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issues of implementation over time and myriad external factors such as competitor 
reactions, unforeseen economic conditions, and regulator actions.  
 
2.5.10  “The black box”  
As previously discussed in Chapter One – Thesis Foundation, it is widely 
accepted in the literature that a “black box” exists in the research and 
consequential understanding of decision-making processes of corporate boards 
and of corporate governance in general. Given its previously described “near 
rational” nature, the “black box” conditions for decision processes that relate to 
technical corporate governance actions can, to a large extent, be reliably reverse 
engineered, at least to the board level if not to the individual director level. The 
information scope and quality, the alternatives, the preferences of the corporation, 
and the aim to maximize the value of the consequences are predictable given the 
presence of overt external frameworks and the contingent environments.  
Reverse engineering the decision process is much harder to do with 
commercial corporate governance. The variability of process factors is much 
greater. The limited rationality in the decision process is harder to both define and 
measure. The effect of individual preferences may have a greater influence. The 
more likely acceptance of a satisfactory consequence, rather than a maximized 
consequence, adds to the barriers to gaining insight into the process from an 
external view-point. Even from an internal viewpoint, many of the variable factors 
could result in poor observations of the process. Extending the decision from its 
assessed preference value through to its intended consequence value, to its 
eventual terminal value is a hard stretch. For some commercial corporate 
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governance decisions this is possible, at least at a top level. Apple Corporation’s 
decision to develop the iPhone and Apple “Appstore” are examples. Nokia’s 
decision not to do so, if there was such a decision, is far less obvious. For 
commercial corporate governance the “black box” is sustained.   
 
2.5.11 Section summary  
The literature and commentary typically group all decisions made by boards 
together. This is unlikely to be the case because of the fundamental differences 
between the information, decision processes, and psychologies used in technical 
corporate governance versus those used in commercial corporate governance. To 
a large extent, technical decision-making adopts the characteristics of the generic 
corporate governance role, (described by the Financial Reporting Council’s code 
and the Companies Act 2006), since external frameworks control much of the 
inputs, processes and consequence valuations. These characteristics engender 
group psychologies and act to largely out-weight and/or exclude the preferences 
of individual directors. Conversely, commercial corporate governance decision-
making is internally controlled and is therefore exposed to less process rigour and 
a deferral to individual psychologies of the directors. Although this may result in 
commercially desirable outcomes, such as innovation and the greater exploration 
of alternatives, less process rigour would seem to introduce variability, bias, and 
risk.   
 
2.5.12 Decision-making - gaps in the extant literature 
129 
 
In common with much of the literature relating to this thesis, the literature 
relating to decision-making in the specific environment of a corporation’s 
boardroom is limited. What literature there is often lacks the depth and nuance 
required to adequately describe the “how” of the decision process and outcome 
instead staying at a generalised or theoretical level.  
 
2.5.13 Decision-making - relevance to the aims of this thesis 
The action of decision-making by directors relates directly to the aims of 
this thesis. In particular the differences in behaviours depending on the type of 
governance the decision being made relates to.    
 
This section has explored corporate governance through its primary action 
of decision-making. The processes have been theoretically split into two distinct 
types depending on the type of corporate governance being undertaken be it 
technical or commercial. Central to the decision-making process is the information 
used by decision-makers which is the focus of the next section. 
 
 
2.6.1  Information – the principal resource in decision-
making 
In the previous chapter sections, this thesis explored issues that support 
the view that the way directors approach decision-making will vary depending on; 
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the type of decision being made, the subsequent control frameworks that apply, 
the cultural and social positioning of the director, the functioning of the board as a 
decision-making environment, the adoption of and adherence to decision-making 
processes, and the psychologies of the individual and the group, amongst other 
factors. At this point the thesis focuses in on specific issues that can be used to 
demonstrate these factors in action. To achieve this, “information” has been 
selected as suitable focal point. This is because; information is a constant and 
essential feature in all decision-making processes, information is easily 
recognisable to directors and so does not require further conceptualisation or 
explanation for research participants.  
As previously stated, information is the primary resource used by decision 
makers. This chapter section explores the nature and role of information in the 
context of corporations, corporate governance, and decision-making. This section 
builds upon the conditions put forward in previous thesis chapters by looking at 
information as being specific to the type of corporate governance being 
undertaken, be it technical corporate governance or commercial corporate 
governance, and, consequently, the type of decision being made. Of additional 
relevance are the typical behaviours that, as discussed Section 5 decision-making, 
will likely influence the decision-making process with group behaviours typically 
prevailing over technical corporate governance decision-making and individual 





2.6.2  Definitions of “information” in the context of board 
decision-making processes    
Having stated that information is easily understood by research participants 
and therefore does not require explanation, it is worthwhile defining information in 
terms of its qualities and features as these relate directly to decision-making 
processes, and therefore to decision-making quality overall. Floridi (2013) asks the 
obvious but seemingly widely overlooked question of what exactly is information 
question? Floridi (2013) goes on to point out that there is significant ambiguity in 
the scope and definition of information in external control frameworks and that in 
addition to legislation additional guidance is provided to cover the quality, 
objectivity, utility, and integrity of information. Information is considered to be 
context dependent and therefore variable in its interactions with other information 
depending on a range factors that relate to the systemic complexity of what it is 
being applied to, (Rogova, Hadzagic, St-Hilaire, Florea and Valin, (2013). Floridi 
(2013) further points out that there is no clear agreement as to the scope of the 
variability of information quality. In short, it is left to the users of information to 
specify what they need in terms of the information with which to make a specific 
decision. This is clearly problematic in the context of corporate governance as the 
scope is typically defined by what is known, not by what is not known. Indeed 
Scholten, Nijstad, and De Dreu, (2007) state that when making decisions, 
information users dwell on the information they have rather than considering what 
they don’t have. Building on previously work by Batini and Scannapieco (2006) on 
information dimensions and Wang (1998) on information categories and 
dimensions, Floridi (2013) developed a simple table that marries the dimensions 
and categories as shown in Table 4 in an adapted form which is built upon further 
132 
 
in this section. In this table dimensions include accessibility, accuracy, availability, 
completeness, currency, integrity, redundancy, reliability, timeliness, 
trustworthiness, and usability. Categories are shown as intrinsic, extrinsic, 
contextual, and representational. Form both groups, dimensions and categories, 
Floridi (2013) recognised that the groups where not complete and that other 
dimensions and categories existed. 
Table 4. Information quality categories and dimensions Floridi (2013)   
 
In addition to the provision of an initial framework for information quality 
assessment, Floridi (2013) provides additional insights for consideration including 
“fitness for purpose” and the challenge in assessing the quality of information 
where derivative data is a source as abstraction can only happen at a given level 
which in the case of derivative data, is often above the level visible to the user of 
the information. Because of the generalised view described here and the lack of 
an existing corporate governance decision-making process definition of 
information, this thesis now proposes  one in the next section.  
 
2.6.3  A new information typology for use in this context 
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In this context, “information” has three dominant configurations 
distinguished by its purpose and use. The information types are more or less 
applicable to the type of corporate governance being undertaken.   
 
2.6.3.1  Information type 1 - “Pre-determined purpose 
information” 
The first distinguishable configuration of information in this context consists 
of, or is derived directly from, data that has been processed to meet a pre-
determined purpose (herein “pre-determined purpose information”). This 
configuration would typically be utilized to answer routine questions that prompt 
decision-making relating to actions with options that lie within a normal range of 
resource requirements, timescales, consequences, and risks that conform to a 
known and limited range of preferences. In the context of corporate board 
decision-making, this is a common-place configuration of information and would 
typically relate to repetitive decision-making such as permissions to continue with 
existing, within specification programmes, administrative approvals, (such as 
reviews of current period budgets and performance), and oversight of technical 
corporate governance actions.  
With pre-determined purpose information, corporations would typically have 
standardized and robust processes for data acquisition, processing, design, 
quality assurance, storage, and dissemination. Directors would be familiar with the 
purpose, source, format, and content of pre-determined purpose information. In 
addition, directors would be comfortable with the quality assurance processes. 
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Such quality assurance processes will often be specified by external control 
frameworks and be verified by external auditors.     
Very limited quality variability may occur through a range of factors that are 
typically known to and proactively mitigated by the corporation prior to its directors 
utilizing the information. Quality variability factors may include; data acquisition 
methods, data completeness, data timeliness, and data processing. In most 
instances, the corporation would be able to compensate for quality issues with 
established data triangulation or substitution.  
Whilst bias, in general, cannot be excluded with pre-determined purpose 
information, the board will have typically acted over a period of time to balance 
pre-determined purpose information to ensure it meets the broad needs of the 
corporation and its agreed vision, objectives and strategies, and to achieve 
compliance of the requirements within its external control frameworks. This 
balance also acts to minimise or exclude decision preferences of individual 
directors being selected above corporate decision preferences because such 
preferences would be demonstrably incompatible with the agreed scope of the 
corporation’s pre-determined purpose information.  
In some ways, the use of heuristics could be an issue with directors using 
pre-determined purpose information because familiarity with the content could 
lead to a lack of detailed review at each review and / or decision process. The 
counter argument to this position could be that the design stability of pre-
determined purpose information should result in high-quality information 
presentation and so less time would be spent on interpretation and 
comprehension and, therefore, more time being available for individual director 
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review and subsequent board discussion. Heuristics and their use and misuse is 
explored further later in this section. 
 
2.6.3.2  Information type 2 – “Emergent purpose 
information”   
The second distinguishable configuration of information in this context 
consists of or is derived from data acquired and processed to meet an emerging, 
newly emerged, or ad hoc purpose (herein “emergent purpose information”). In the 
context of corporate board decision-making, this is a regularly occurring purpose 
and use of information. Emergent purpose information quality variability will 
typically be greater than that of pre-determined purpose information because the 
range of factors that contribute to its quality are broader, less well known, less 
tightly managed, less rigorously tested, and less well triangulated and 
contextualised. Commissioners of emergent purpose information may have a 
limited view of the topic it relates to, so may not be in a position to fully or correctly 
specify the scope and design of the information. This may lead to multiple 
iterations of the scope and design of the information and so lead to instability and 
potentially conflicting versions as both the information and emergent events it 
relates develop over time. Acquirers and compilers of source data may need to 
interpret the commissioner’s specification. Acquirers and compilers of source data 
may also need to identify and approach new and unproven data sources. They 
may need to adapt existing data sources to the emergent purpose. In the context 
of corporate board decision-making, emergent purpose information is a less 
common-place configuration of information than pre-determined purpose 
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information, and would typically relate to scenarios such as performance 
deviations from agreed budgets, delivery issues within agreed programmes, rapid 
contingent environment, economic, and market changes, and emergent competitor 
actions. This implies that emergent purpose information would more typically be 
associated with commercial corporate governance actions than pre-determined 
purpose information.     
Of particular significance within this thesis may be the risk of more 
occurrences of conscious or unconscious bias at any stage of the decision-making 
process. From the initial recognition of the stimulus for the corporation to source 
emergent purpose information, participants, including directors, will be able to 
influence multiple factors that will reflect in the scope and design of the 
information. This may include the decision preferences selected for board 
consideration.   
Heuristics, particularly when combined with bias, could be a significant 
challenge for the board when utilizing emergent purpose information. Because of 
the developing nature of the contingent environment, directors could seek to 
reduce the time spent on a decision as a whole, or within certain stages of the 
decision process. This could be achieved by short-cutting time spent interpreting 
the information and focusing instead on the options that the directors perceives as 
an appropriate way forward. This scenario could be a particular challenge with 
fast-moving decision processes or where directors have significantly different 
amounts of exposure to the events that led to the need for the emergent purpose 
information. Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier (2011) argue that heuristics can lead to 
better judgements overall as they are preferable to trying to develop suboptimal 
information through weighting and averaging, for example in instances where 
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there is a low sample size or the situation is uncertain as with emergent purpose 
information decision-making.    
 
2.6.3.3  Information type 3 – “Extant information” 
The third distinguishable type of information in this context is where 
information is embedded in directors, and in other participants in the corporation 
such as senior managers, and is herein described as “extant information”. In 
decision-making processes, there is rarely a void of information at the outset. The 
general decision process context is pre-seeded with data, information, 
experiences, and other knowledge held individually by directors and by other 
influential stakeholders.  
Extant information is not bias, although it may be biased. Rather extant 
information is a reference class of sometimes objective, sometimes subjective, 
sometimes incomplete, sometimes wrong or obsolete information held by directors 
which is applicable, to a varying extent, to a decision process. Extant information 
will vary between directors reflecting their individual origins, careers, social and 
cultural interactions, education, and professional development, amongst other 
factors. Communication by each participant is central to the value realization of 
extant information (Malenko, 2014)  
 
2.6.4  Over-lapping and intertwined information. 
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The existence of extant information implies that decision-making in this 
context is not fully controlled, sequential, or discreetly contained neatly within a 
pre-defined decision-making process. Newly issued pre-determined purpose 
information will overlay or replace existing pre-determined purpose information 
and will add to the board’s and an individual director’s extant information reference 
class. Because of the accepted quality assurance processes with pre-determined 
purpose information, and its repetitious nature, there is likely to be limited conflict 
between new information and extant information, at least in terms of its quality. 
When there is conflict between the information, across the directors, pre-
determined information will trump extant information because of its accepted 
quality, and the condition that it is commonly help by the decision participants. 
Newly issued emergent purpose information is more likely to conflict with extant 
information. This may be because the new emergent purpose information is 
potentially different in its scope or because it is representing the same or similar 
information in a new way or with a new narrative angle. Moreover, it may 
contradict extant information by significantly updating or changing the data. It may 
widen the scope to include new data from a new data source. In this way, the 
extant information reference class may be strengthened, expanded, or in some 
cases be weakened at board and / or director level, or both. In addition, emergent 
purpose information is more likely to conflict with extant information because it is 
less accepted by the decision participants so allows for doubt, misunderstanding, 




2.6.5  Individual and group behaviours and responses to 
information   
As a result of change and potential conflict, it is likely that individual 
psychologies will act upon a director’s inclination to communicate, defend, and 
utilize their extant information depending upon the rewards to them as individuals 
for doing so. Individuals may feel that they place themselves at risk by revealing 
their extant information if they assess that it is inferior in scope, completeness, and 
/ or quality to the extant information of other directors. Group psychologies may 
act to restrict the acceptance of one or more director’s extant information if it 
differs from, or conflicts with, corporate or dominant individual director 
preferences. Consequently, extant information could have a significant influence in 
commercial decision-making in particular where there is greater latitude in the 
decision-making process.  
The extent to which directors can ring-fence extant information, even when 
it is extraneous to a specific decision, is uncertain and, in any case, would be vary 
depending on the individual director concerned based upon individual 
characteristics including their cognitive abilities. In addition, to some extent, extant 
information is unstable. Throughout their participation on a board, an individual 
director’ extant information array would change. Because of their proximity to the 
corporation and operating market, executive directors are more likely to be in a 
position to increase their contemporary commercially relevant extant information 
reference class. Non-executive directors, may be in a position to increase their 
social and cultural extant information reference class, possibly through 
participation on other boards. A challenge may exist for non-executive directors 
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where their contemporary commercially relevant extant information reference 
class could variously decline, decay, or become redundant if they are no longer 
operating as an executive in a sector relevant to the corporation. 
Pre-determined purpose information and emergent purpose information 
emanate from the corporation and are then provided to directors, albeit in 
response to design specifications and requirements set by the board, (particularly 
in the case of pre-determined purpose information). Extant information flows the 
other way and in a format acceptable and / or useful to the individual. As it is a 
widely promoted feature in the recruitment process of directors and non-executive 
it particular, it could be argued that displays of extant information will add to the 
economic value of an individual director in the market for directors. This could lead 
to the inappropriate, gratuitous use of extant information, along with attendant 
risks derived from the extant information being erroneous or inappropriately 
deployed in a decision-making process. The assumed value of extant information 
held by individual directors is at the heart of the debate about corporate board 
membership diversity where a wider array of extant information and the attendant 
reference class, would provide the corporation with greater nuance and insight. 
This may be the case but a director would need to demonstrate such wider extant 
information is useful as this cannot be assumed.    
In addition to the three distinguishable configurations of information 
discussed in this section, the existence of new raw information cannot be 
excluded. Information about events, such a natural disasters, will reach directors 
from channels beyond the control of the corporation, and in unconventional 
formats. This is an increasingly common occurrence as conduits such as social 
media proliferate in their number, scope, usage, and quality. In scenarios where 
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the event is of relevance to the corporation, emergent purpose information may 
then be provided, (as a reaction to the new raw information), to the corporation’s 
directors. The challenges here are that the raw information already received will 
have a residual influence and the recipient is often prone to anchoring bias. This 
could be the source of information conflict, or be perceived as more or less 
relevant by a director versus the perception of relevance held by the corporation 
and other directors.     
 
2.6.6  Section summary  
This section positions information as the central resource used in corporate 
governance decision-making but goes on the argue that, at present, information 
quality is poorly covered in the literature. This section has built upon the Floridi’s 
(2013) categories and dimensions association and extended information 
typologies as summarised in Table 5. To reference back to Floridi’s (2013) work, 
Table 6 combines the categories and dimensions mapped against potential 
features of the new typologies presented here. However, as summarised in Table 
6, given the complex variability of decision-making conditions discussed in this 
section and previous sections, information, its use, and its influence is not likely to 
be uniform amongst directors. Significant variability will occur because of the 
typology of corporate governance the information relates to, the scope, design, 





Table 5.  Information typology  
 
In addition, significant variability is likely to occur in the way information is 
perceived, adopted, and utilized by directors reflecting the variability in directors as 
individuals, their cognitive abilities, their role on the board, their position within the 
Board’s social systems, and within the wider corporation. In addition, the use of 
heuristics may play a significant part in the decision process where emergent 
purpose information is used. Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier (2011) point out the 
heuristics are used to short-cut forming the “search rules” which specify in what 
direction an information search extends, the “stopping rules” which specify when 
the search for information is stopped as well as the “decision rules” specify how 
the final decision is reached.  
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Table 6. Floridi’s (2013) “categories” and “dimensions” of information 
quality  mapped against potential features of the new typology of 
information developed in this thesis  
 
  
2.6.7  Information - gaps in the extant literature 
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The subject of information is poorly served in the literature in general with 
limited definition as it seems the ubiquitous nature of information has resulted in 
limited research being undertaken on the subject. The Floridi (2013) description 
helps here and is used as this is an applicable information characteristic 
framework.  
 
2.6.8  Information - relevance to the aims of this thesis 
The typology of information developed for this thesis provides a framework 
for a more detailed description of information in the specific environment and 
against the specific behaviours being discussed.    
 
2.7  Chapter summary 
This chapter has described, in sections, two major influences on the 
hypothesis. The first is the complexity and inter-relatedness of the specific 
environment and the specific behaviours being researched. The environment is 
subject to complex internal and external control frameworks. These, along with the 
second influence - that of the “black box” - result in the extant literature being 
generalised and lacking the granularity needed to move the literature from 
descriptions of what might being happening towards explanations of how 
something might be happening. This conclusion is particularly the case with 
decision-making and information. In relation to the propositions and hypothesis in 
this thesis, the sequentially compounded influence of the gaps in the extant 
literature, are the most relevant. The research in this thesis recognises the 
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sequence as well as the complexity of the conditions within the specific 
environment and addresses these as propositions in the quantitative research 
stage. The sequence is then continued with the hypothesis explored in the 
qualitative research stage.  
The next chapter of this thesis builds upon the definitions of information 
given in this chapter, as well as the conditions, behaviours, dynamics, and 
processes described in previous sections of this chapter to explore information 
asymmetry as a theory and to set out the grounds for the research sections of this 






CHAPTER THREE - DEVELOPMENT OF PROPOSITIONS AND 
HYPOTHESIS 
 
3.1  Chapter introduction. 
This chapter describes information asymmetry as the product of the specific 
environment and specific behaviours at work in boardrooms. The chapter goes on 
to explore the propositions and hypothesis researched in this thesis. 
 
3.2  Information asymmetry 
Information asymmetry is a “cornerstone of management research” (Bergh, 
2019). Information asymmetry is a condition where one party in a relationship has 
more and / or better information than another (Akerlof, 1970; Bergh, 2019). 
Information asymmetry is a foundational element of theories applicable to 
corporate governance including agency theory, transaction cost economics, 
resource-based theory, institutional theory, resource-dependence theory, and 
signalling theory. Despite information asymmetries apparent role in these theories 
and its ubiquity in general, in a 2019 review of the literature on information 
asymmetry, Bergh (2019) states that no comprehensive review of the knowledge 
of information asymmetry as a management concept had taken place. This places 
information asymmetry in line with many foundational aspects of research covered 
in this thesis as being incomplete and / or contradictory. 
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The previous chapter of this thesis described, in Section 2.6, a new information 
typology with three distinct types of information: 
o “Pre-determined Purpose Information” - where the data, source, quality 
assurance, design, scope, presentation format, and other features are 
recognised, understood, and accepted by users, including directors. 
Largely, the features of this information type conform to requirements set by 
external control frameworks.  
o “Emergent Purpose Information” – where the data, source, quality 
assurance, design, scope, presentation format, and other features are more 
variable and subject to change and ad hoc criteria. This information type 
will be less recognisable, understood and accepted by users, including 
directors. Features of this information type may conform to requirements 
set by internal or external control frameworks.  
o “Extant Information” - where a wide array of formal and informal information 
is already held by directors. 
 
Despite widespread acceptance that information asymmetry is omnipresent in 
markets (Akerloff, 1970; Bergh, 2019) prevailing corporate governance 
frameworks adopt a working assumption that board decision-making processes 
will distribute information evenly amongst the directors to ensure they are equally 
informed. This is because the shareholder value view of corporate governance 
adopted in the UK is rooted in neoclassical economic theoretical outcomes which 
are assumed to be the outcome of impersonal market dynamics and forces. 
Although participants in such markets are assumed to behave as individuals in 
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that they are somewhat immune to social influences, in the case of corporate 
boards, where they are assumed to act as a group, the prevailing forces will be in 
favour of market mediated outcomes. This should result in the sharing of 
information amongst participants in order to inform the group so allowing the group 
to fully exploit the market opportunity (Malenko, 2014) in the same way the 
neoclassical economic theory assumes that an individual would, (Taleb, 2010). 
Neoclassical economic theory does not assume that the decision-making 
individual always optimizes each decision rather that they always fully attempt to 
do so.  Prevailing corporate governance frameworks in the UK assume this for the 
board as a group also. However, this seems unlikely for a number of reasons 
including: 
o Directors will not all evaluate the market and options in the same way 
o Directors are not equally able to comprehend the information 
o Directors may not all have adequate time to review the information  
o Directors are not equally motivated to invest time in reviewing the 
information 
o Directors are not equally motivated to question and or augment the 
information to improve its quality  
o Directors do not all have equal access to methods of questioning and 
augmenting the information to improve its quality 
o Directors do not all share the same view of the impacts of the information 
o Directors have different experiences, skills, and worldviews outside the 
board      
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In addition, a specific instance of an information asymmetry can be described and 
/ or categorized in relation to its origins such as being derived from hidden 
information or different information, or a range of other differentiators.  
 
3.3  Hypothesised conditions for information asymmetry 
leading to corporate risk. 
As a consequence of the factors mentioned above, this thesis argues that a 
complex information asymmetry exists amongst the board of directors. 
Furthermore, this thesis argues that the type of information will vary the likelihood 
and influence of any information asymmetry, and that the type of corporate 
governance being undertaken, categorised previously in Chapter Two - Corporate 
governance as “technical corporate governance” or “commercial corporate 
governance”, will also influence the information asymmetry. This thesis also 
argues that other factors add to the conditions that are stimulative and / or 
accommodative of information asymmetries. As described in Chapter Two – 
Corporation boards of directors, these factors include conditions that are suitable 
for the development of in-groups and out-groups within the corporation’s board 
and amongst the extended structures associated with the board, including senior 
corporate managers and advisors. This is because information is the primary 
resource used in decision-making so it is logical that controlling information 
(thereby creating an information asymmetry or failing to rectify one that already 
exists), with the aim of influencing decision-making towards a particular 
preference, increases the power of one group above that of other groups. This 
may seem to be an illegitimate action on behalf of directors. However, given the 
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variability in the control frameworks, particularly as they relate to commercial 
corporate governance, directors may act to create an information asymmetry so as 
to champion their preference, or at least minimises the barriers to its adoption – a 
course they may believe to be in the best interests of the corporation.     
Information control and sustaining or creating an information asymmetry 
could be passive on the part of an in-group, for example, by failing to rebalance a 
known information asymmetry. Equally, information control could be active on the 
part of an in-group carried out through a range of actions which create information 
asymmetries including restricting time to review information, omission, and 
deliberately poor presentation. The opportunities for in-groups to passively or 
actively create information asymmetries would seem to be greater for executive 
directors as they are temporally, physically, and organizationally closer to the 
sources of information and the events that stimulate the information’s creation.  
As previously described in Chapter Two - Corporation boards of directors in 
relation to the differentiation between technical corporate governance and 
commercial and corporate governance, and Chapter Two – Information in relation 
to the typology of information as being pre-determined purpose information, 
emergent purpose information or extant information, the conditions for the 
information asymmetry can be visualised as shown in Figure 8. As the control 
frameworks become internal to the corporation the quality assurance becomes 
less stringent as it does when the information used for decision-making becomes 
less structured. Consequently, the conditions that are likely to result in information 
asymmetries are increased. Particular areas of risk are the intersections between 
commercial corporate governance and emergent purpose information and extant 
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information as illustrated in Figure 8. Here the conditions for agency are high as 
are the potential rewards.  






3.4  Thesis theoretical narrative  
The purpose of this thesis is not to prove the existence of information 
asymmetry which is widely accepted. The purpose instead is to provide an 
evidence base for the when, where, and how of information asymmetry in the 
context of a corporate boards decision-making process. This is achieved by 
illustrating information asymmetries in detail at the level of information’s qualities 
including its dimensions and categories. This stance is in contrast to the 
practitioner’s view where a prevailing feature of contemporary board management 
“best practice” and corporate governance codes appears to be the assumption 
that information asymmetries are not a factor, or do not exist, or are fully mitigated 
by standing board structures and actions. The quality of information intended for 
the board’s use is rarely mentioned in the literature, as explored in Chapter Two –
Information. Where information is mentioned, it is typically highly generalised as a 
topic. In addition, the literature is very limited in isolating the conditions and 
reasons for sub-optimal Information as they relate to specific board decision-
making processes. This is part of the ongoing and well discussed dearth of 
literature on cause-and-effect in board actions in general, the so-called “black box” 
(Le Blanc and Gillies, 2005).  There are plenty of instances where sub-optimal 
Information is blamed, wholly or in part, for poor consequences of board decisions 
or inactions, the Enron scandal as an example (Committee on Commerce, 
Science, and Transportation, United States Senate, 2005). These instances come 
to light when evidence is presented to an enquiry or as evidence in court 
proceedings, or when the media pick over the bones of high-profile corporate 
failure. Occasionally, as part of an enquiry or court proceedings, a forensic 
exercise is undertaken to piece together or reverse engineer the information array 
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that directors of the corporation in question had available to them. This partially 
happened in parliamentary committee hearings into the collapse of Carillion plc 
where explanations of the board’s decision process were constructed by working 
backwards from the consequences (House of Commons 2018). Carillion plc board 
minutes laid open some of the “rationale” of the decision process outcomes 
including some of the information used. Typically missing however, is what is not 
shared such as extant information, bias, or inappropriate heuristics. Also missing 
is the design brief given to executives of Carillion plc relating to emergent purpose 
information, (this type of information is referenced in the Carillion plc board 
minutes shown in Appendix 1). It seems that the balance of Carillion plc board’s 
focus and actions seems to have become less structured during the decline in the 
health of the business and eventual crisis that preceded Carillion plc’s collapse. 
Also missing is a full contemporary record of the board’s discussion on a particular 
decision as the verbatim of such discussions are not required to be recorded by 
law. The law requires, amongst other details, attendance, proceedings, and 
decisions to be recorded. Also in short supply is a board level document that 
records narratives that relate to the commissioning of all information, which may 
be particularly relevant for emergent purpose information. In the case of Carillion 
plc, much of the information was produced by external parties such as legal and 
financial advisors. Whilst adding to the credibility and quality in some respects, this 
state of affairs further distances many of the information users from the source of 
the information. 
In summary, the foundation of this thesis is that the process of corporate 
decision-making is distinct in many fundamental respects depending on the type 
of corporate governance being undertaken. This is demonstrated by the 
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prevalence, tolerance, and reaction to information asymmetries amongst directors 
on the boards of corporations.  
Chapter Two - Defining corporations of this thesis described the conditions 
of corporate board decision-making by exploring features of typical corporations 
operating within the UK. These are distinct entities, ones with a clear commercial 
purpose, and a set of features that, whilst not entirely exclusive to corporations, 
are sufficiently distinct to be discreet in research terms.   
Chapter Two – Corporate governance explores the corporate governance 
control frameworks that UK corporations exist and operate within. A clear 
distinction is made between two types of corporate governance where hitherto, 
typically these two distinct functions are lumped together under the broad banner 
of corporate governance. The first distinct type is technical corporate governance 
which focuses on, in the main, ensuring the corporation is compliant with 
externally set control frameworks including laws and clear societal expectations 
that are sufficiently impactful so as to compel most corporations to comply with 
their requirements. Technical corporate governance addresses, in the main, a 
wide group of stakeholders. Commercial corporate governance are actions taken 
by directors to promote the interests of shareholders through commercial 
performance.  
Chapter Two – Corporation boards of directors explored the role of the 
principal actors which are the directors of the corporation who, through decisions 
made in board meetings, cause the corporation to follow a formal and agreed 




Chapter Two - Decision-making described the decision-making process in 
the context of corporate boards as being more complex than the literature 
normally portrays. Despite having a uniform stated purpose and collective 
responsibility amongst members, Chapter Five develops the argument that 
corporate boards may operate in conditions and use structures that will stimulate 
the type of group dynamics that occur within groups in general including the 
development of informal or subversive in-groups and corresponding out-groups, 
and other problematic social systems. These conditions are likely to result in sub-
optimal social cohesion, diminished board effectiveness, and the emergence of 
individualistic behaviours, such as preference choice that may conflict with, or 
undermine, the corporation’s best interests. As an outcome of this summarised 
position, it is concluded that directors may make decisions with different sets of 
information and that information is unevenly distributed across the board – it is 
asymmetrical. Indeed it can be described as having a “complex asymmetry” as it is 
different and unbalanced across multiple measures and qualities.  
Chapter Two – Information describes information as being the core 
resource used by directors in their decision-making and introduced a typology for 
three types of information used by directors for decision-making. The typology 
describes pre-determined purpose information, emergent purpose information, 
and extant information as being distinct in their source, purpose, quality and use. 
This new typology of information is combined with an existing description of 
information quality with categories and dimensions.  
Sections 3.2 - Information asymmetry in this chapter describes the 
conditions and features of information asymmetries in the context of corporate 
governance. Developing the themes and narrative of the preceding chapters, this 
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chapter position information asymmetry as ubiquitous but understood at the 
theoretical level. At this point the thesis develops a model that allows research at a 
practical level to demonstrate information asymmetry with specific features which 
can be further developed to demonstrate outcomes for the corporation. This is 
achieved by demonstrating a hypothesized condition where information of varying 
qualities is permitted by the interaction of the type of corporate governance being 
undertaken and the type of information being used. 
 
3.5  Proposition and hypothesis development  
As previously described in the chapter the hypothesis is that the two main 
conditional typologies relating to corporate governance type and information type 
provide the conditions for increasingly impactful information asymmetries. The 
theoretical existence of information asymmetries allows for research design that 
asks participants to recall these conditions in their raw form and then explore 
potential outcomes. This development is illustrated in Figure 9 where the start 
point is the inter-relationship between the information and corporate governance 







Figure 9. Summary theoretical outcome of conditionality of information 




3.6  Theoretical distinctions in corporate governance 
decision-making. 
The theoretical outcome of conditionality of information asymmetries and 
outcomes shown in Figure 8 is consistent with agency theory in general and 
potentially as an indicator outcome in this context as directors of corporations, are 
often not substantial owners of the corporation. Moreover, as stated by Macintosh 
and Quattrone (2010), 
“Asymmetrical information is the most fundamental concept in agency 
theory because it gives rise to all the other problems: adverse selection, 
moral hazard, signalling, and incentives”.  
These conditions and outcomes would seem particularly relevant to 
commercial corporate governance decision-making as hypothesised in this thesis, 
as the degree of quality variability in the information is highest and the external 
setting of control frameworks is lowest. This condition is shown in Figure 10 where 
the two types of corporate governance are described as flows through the 
decision process to a divergence where the preferences driven by agency are 
introduced. This is further made permissible by the information types then used in 
the latter stages of the process. For instance, as a lack of quality assurance 
becomes a feature, individuals have a choice to make concerning their abilities 
and needs to rectifying information quality issues. This is individualistic behaviour 
rather than group behaviour. This may influence those who are least able and / or 
least motivated to take action, in this environment, this is typically the non-
executive directors.         
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Figure 10.  Theoretical distinctions in corporate governance 





As a consequence of the development of the conditions and hypothesis 
described so far and summarised in Figure 8, the purpose of this research is to 
isolate factors and conditions that confirm the existence of information 
asymmetries, and of outcomes and behaviours that can theoretically be 
associated with information asymmetries. The research will then go on to 
demonstrate that it is credible to conclude that these outcomes and behaviours 
are potentially detrimental to the corporation and its directors. These latter stage 
hypothesised conditions are further illustrated in Figure 11.   
Figure 11. Hypothesised latter stage of decision process (author’s own 
model) 
 
A condition for this hypothesised latter stage dissfunctionality is the 
theoretical difference between the influences of the control frameworks that 
dominate the types of corporate governance being undertaken. This is illustrated 




Figure 12. Influences of the control frameworks that dominate the types of 
corporate governance (author’s own model)  
 
 
3.7  Chapter summary  
As previously discussed, the overriding challenge in expanding the 
understanding of decision-making by corporate boards is the lack of a general 
requirement or motivation to open the “black box”. As mentioned in Chapter One -  
Thesis Foundation, the focus of this thesis is specific environments and specific 
behaviours relating to the use of information in corporate board decision-making 
processes. More specifically, this thesis explores asymmetrical information within 
boards as an indicator of other conditions within the “black box”. The next chapter, 
Chapter Four - Research Design and Methodology ties the gaps highlighted in the 
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literature review in Chapter Two – Literature review to the propositions and 




CHAPTER FOUR - RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1  Chapter introduction 
As discussed in Chapter One – Thesis Foundation, the overall aim of this 
thesis is to increase the understanding of the conditions, processes, actions, and 
resources that influence decision-making by corporate boards of directors. As 
previously explored, to achieve the overall aim of this thesis, it was necessary to 
adopt research objectives that moved on from the “what” to the “how”. This was 
important because much of the extant literature on corporate governance is either: 
oversimplified and generalised in its conclusions so staying at the “what” level; is 
counteracted or contradicted by similar research which provides conclusions that 
significantly dispute the research’s conclusions; difficult to replicate; or all three. 
Because of the gaps in the existing literature, and the apparent reasons for these 
gaps, an alternative approach to the research for this thesis was adopted.  
The thesis research design took its form from following Maylor and Blackmon’s 
“abstract to concrete” model, (2005), as summarised in an adapted form in Figure 
13.  Following on from sections on the overall aim, the objectives, and research 
question, the rest of this chapter is structured broadly in line with the Maylor and 
Blackmon (2005) model. This model was adapted by the author by extending the 
model upwards from the “approach” stage to incorporate the “thesis aims”, 
“research objectives”, and “research questions”. This was done to illustrate the 




Figure 13. Maylor and Blackmon’s “abstract to concrete” model (2005), 
adapted by the author 
 
 
4.2  Pre-seeded risk mitigation in the research process 
It should be noted that the model shown in Figure 13 starts at the 
“approach” stage and therefore after the research aim, objectives, and questions 
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had been, at least, drafted. This introduced a number of risks to the research 
quality which were considered in the research design process.  
A major risk here is that the philosophy and perspective are pre-seeded into 
the research design as they pre-exist having been influenced by the personality 
and experience of the researcher. This condition can act to prompt, create, and 
reinforced research objectives and research questions which are overly attached 
to practitioner or academic needs, as illustrated in Figure 14. Three potential 
issues arose; undue focus on certain aspects of the research subject and object, 
bias, and selective triangulation. This risk was mitigated by; an ethnographic 
approach led by the research participants, the literature review; the two stage 
research process using quantitative research to establish the validity of research 
propositions; in-depth qualitative research stage; and reflection.   





4.3  Research question analysis 
This thesis addresses three formal research questions. In order to validate 
the choice of research methods used, the extent to which these three questions 
are similar and connected, but still distinct, was assessed to validate the suitability 
of adopting the same research methodology for all three questions. This process 
was undertaken by analysing the questions subject and object as shown in Figure 
15. 
Figure 15. Thesis and research question subject and object analysis 
 
  Figure 15 illustrates that the research questions have both commonality 
and differences. The thesis has two subjects and three objects. Subject 1 is the 
“nature and influence” of Object 1, “information quality”, and Object 2, “information 




Research question 1 includes Object 1 and Object 3, and Subject 2. It also 
includes Subject 3 which is “different actors” so introducing the researchable 
divergence between the two populations in the sample. Research question 2. 
includes Object 1 and Object 2. It also includes Subject 4, “relate” so introducing 
the researchable relationship between information quality and information 
asymmetry. Research question 3 includes Object 1, Object 2, and Object 3 and 
Subject 1. Analysis of the subjects and objects of the thesis and research 
questions demonstrates that there are significant fundamental commonalities 
whilst also including substantive differences in structure, inputs, and outputs. 
Consequently, it is shown that the choice of a single research methodology is 
appropriate for this thesis.  In addition to the association of the thesis title to the 
research questions, the thesis objectives are similarly associated through the 
research question subjects and objects. This is illustrated in Figure 16 where the 
research objectives are highlighted in relation to the research question subjects 
and objects. 





The subject and object complexity and the ethnographic nature of the 
research narrow down the research methodology and design options away from 
fixed designs so again validating the mixed method approach taken in this thesis. 
 
4.4  Hypothesis, research methodology, and theory 
building 
The central hypothesis of this thesis is that the two main conditional 
typologies (relating to corporate governance type and information type) provide 
the conditions for increasingly impactful information asymmetries that benefit 
executive directors and create conditions of greater risk for the corporation. In 
order to demonstrate the validity of the hypothesis, this thesis develops a new 
theory of executive agency which uses the research design to bring together a 
broad descriptive evidence base to support the propositions and specific features 
and details of corporate director behaviours and the corporate governance 
environments.  The relationship between the research objectives, research 
questions, hypothesis conditions, and hypothesis are demonstrated through the 
commonality of the subjects and objects of the research questions.  
 
4.5  Research approach 
A corporation’s board is formalised and hierarchical because of titles and 
roles (such as chairperson), because of in-group and out-group dynamics, and 
because of the competitive nature of the boards operation where control of 
information is sought in order to create a exploitable resource dependency. The 
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research design has considered these features and their influences on the 
participants, their social identities, and positioning theory as it applies in this 
context. Harre & L. Van Langenhove, (1999, p2) state that positions are relational, 
therefore, in a social system. As a result, the research approach is ethnographic.  
The ethnographic research approach has been further validated by 
positioning the research questions within a grid assessing the generality or 
specificity of the environment and behaviour of research subjects, as shown in 
Figure 17.   
Figure 17. Behaviour and environment analysis to validate research 
approach  
 
For research questions 1 and 2, the behaviours are specific to the actions 
of corporate governance, decision-making in this context, and executive agency. 
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The environment is specific to boardrooms controlled within UK frameworks. This 
is consistent with the overall aim of this thesis which required the research to 
reliably demonstrate specific features of conditions, processes, actions, and 
resources at work within the boardroom. This specificity was needed in order to 
avoid the thesis adding to the general research on boards which, as previously 
stated, is often oversimplified in order to make up for the lack of granularity. For 
research question 3, the relationship between information quality and information 
asymmetry is more hybridised but is accommodated within the thesis research’s 
mixed method design.  
 
4.6  Research philosophy 
 The research philosophy can be described across a number of 
characteristics.  
“Explanatory”  
The research aims to provide deep, specific outputs by exploring specific 
behaviours within specific environments. Whilst descriptive in many ways, 
this thesis provides an explanation of the “how”.    
“Comparative”    
The thesis does not aim to measure anything accurately but rather to 
broadly value aspects of the conditions and behaviours in the boardroom 
and decision-making process. Such broad valuation, in a business research 
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context or general ethnographic context, is generally comparative as 
opposed to being absolute.  
“Multiple perspectives”  
The thesis provides a balanced perspective of the conditions and 
behaviours in the boardroom and decision-making process. This is across 
two populations, (executive directors and non-executive directors), and 
across a number of participants from each population. A challenge faced in 
similar research was also faced in this thesis in that the research is 
resource dependent on enough participants being able and willing to give 
multiple perspectives.   
“Open ended” 
The thesis research is in some ways a full explanation of the conditions and 
behaviours described by the research participants. The thesis research can 
standalone so be regarded as “closed”. However, as is the case with most 
of the research undertaken on corporate outcomes, both the researcher 
and the reader are left asking “what happened next?” What happened to 
the corporation because of the decisions taken whose conditions and 
behaviours were referenced in the research? Was the decision, despite 
being compromised, a success in commercial terms? What happened 
afterwards to amend, change, or improve the decision? Can the effect of 




The research is holistic in its approach and philosophy as it aims to capture 
through two stages of a whole system explanation and to give indicators as 
to further reductionist research directions picked up in Chapter Nine.  
“Causality” 
The thesis research aims to understand the cause of events and so to be 
able to illuminate the “black box”, and to build a credible theory to explain 
how the conditions and behaviours occur and evolve in the context of the 
boardroom and the decision-making process.  
The research philosophy is consistent with the thesis aims, research 
objectives, and research questions as it seeks detail to move from “what” to the 
“how”.     
 
4.7 Research perspective 
This thesis’s research perspectives are based on a set of assumptions 
about the prevailing attributes of the population of UK corporate board directors. 
As discussed in Chapter Two, the operating environment, selection process, 
career profile, cultural influences, and biases would lead the research population 
to be atypical of the general population. The position of “director”, socially and 
within the corporation, would typically be higher than the norm. Therefore, people 
who “achieve” this status are, in general, more successful than the average for the 
general population. As the researched population is typically a professional 
manager, valid assumptions here are that directors are; well educated, socially 
able, career oriented, ambitious / self-motivated, and articulate. It is also valid to 
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assume that people with these characteristics are able to construct and sustain a 
view of their place in the world which suits their self-perception, their perception of 
the value of their actions, and of their social position. The research perspective 
kept this in mind in the survey respondent selection phase of both stages of the 
research. As will be described, care was taken to balance the selection of the 
research participants by pursuing a numerical balance of sub-populations, 
(executive director and non-executive director), within each data gathering 
session. Whilst this could not remove the potential impact of research perceptions, 
it did, as far as possible, mean that both sub-populations are equally influenced. 
Social positioning, in particular, is a prevailing assumption within this research. In 
many ways, a more exact description could be “social market positioning”. The 
perceived position of an individual participant influences their value within the 
market for directors internally within the corporation, and externally within the 
whole market for director services. This introduces a research perspective of mild 
but consistent dishonesty on the part of the research participants. This subject is 
discussed further in Section 4.9.     
 
4.8  Research methodology 
As previously discussed, this thesis aimed to move from the “what” to the 
“how” of a specific action of corporate governance. This was achieved through 
mixed method research which validated the hypothesis allowing for the 
development of a new theory to explain how decision-making, in the context of this 
thesis, happens in a way that increases the agency of executive directors and 
general risk to the corporation. This required the research to have outputs with 
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depth and nuance. At the same time, the propositions on which the eventual 
theory building rests needed some degree of external triangulation to demonstrate 
validity. The combination of a quantitative survey to establish descriptive 
propositions which were then taken forward for exploration in semi-structured 
interviews provided the triangulated basis and the depth and nuance. The 
transition across the hypothesis to the eventual theory building is shown in Figure 
18. 
Figure 18. Overall research design and method transition  
          
4.9  Research design - Stage 1 - quantitative research 
stage using a survey  
4.9.1  Quantitative research overview 
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As previously discussed, the primary research undertaken within this thesis 
has been completed in two stages. The first stage of the primary research within 
this thesis, which is quantitative, aims to illuminate the key themes relating to:  
o the existence, or otherwise, of differences in information quality and, in 
particular, information asymmetries amongst boards of directors, 
o any consequent influence that differences in information quality and 
information asymmetries have on risk-taking behaviour by directors 
The key outputs of the qualitative research stage are descriptions of the “what “ of 
the specific environment of the boardroom.   
Figure 19. Quantitative research stage description 
 
The first stage research is intended to provide thematic indicators for further 
exploration within the second stage of the primary research, which is qualitative in 
176 
 
nature to explain the “how” with this process illustrated in Figure 19.  From this 
point, the results and outputs of both stages are intended to aid in the 
development of a conceptual framework for the management and mitigation of 
information asymmetries and to lead to the improvement in the qualities of 
information used by directors of corporation when making board decisions. 
 
4.9.2  Requirement to achieve overall research objectives 
In order to achieve the overall objectives of this stage of the research, there 
was a need to identify two distinct groups of participants in order to establish the 
existence of any information asymmetry, and to begin the process of giving the 
implications of any information asymmetry some form and characteristics to be 
explored further in the second research stage. The broadest categorisation 
amongst the participants was whether they were executive directors or non-
executive directors. As well as being an unambiguous and overt characteristic, this 
categorisation is valid because it indicates substantive differences in a range of 
relevant characteristics, such as access to information, social positioning, and, 
potentially,  other factors such as behaviours when faced with challenges relating 
to information quality issues.     
 
4.9.3  Data collection 
Stage 1 data was collected by means of a survey, (see Appendix 2). The 
survey was made available to potential respondents via three main channels:  
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1. Potential survey respondents were provided with an electronic link to an 
online survey using the “Bristol Online Survey” platform recommended by 
the University of Birmingham. 
2. Potential survey respondents were provided with paper surveys for 
respondents to complete in the presence of the researcher. 
3. Potential survey respondents were approached in suitable locations and 
requested to use an “ipad” tablet to complete the survey in the presence of 
the researcher.  
The original data gathering plan was that the first method, providing an 
electronic link, would be the primary method of obtaining survey responses. Data 
collection took place between July 2016 and October 2017 which is significantly 
longer than originally anticipated. Three main reasons for slow data collection are 
suggested. The first reason is that the providing an electronic link for survey 
respondents to click through to proved to be an ineffective way of obtaining 
responses. Using this approach method, potential survey respondents were either 
not engaging with, were not motivated, or not incentivized to undertake the survey. 
As an example of this, an appeal for responses was put out through a “Linkedin” 
group formed as a “Chartered Director Network”. This network is an online 
community of active directors who, because they have been through a formal 
certification process aimed at improving corporate governance, should mean that 
the network members would be amenable to supporting this field of research. This 
appeal had little effect. The Institute of Directors was also approached to request 
participation with the survey directly to potential respondents via a regular 
newsletter to Institute of Directors Chartered Directors. As with the Chartered 
Director Network, again a very limited response was received. In analysing the 
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responses, out of 100 completed responses, it is thought that, based on the dates 
of the responses and the dates of the online respondent recruitment activities,  11 
participants responded to a request directing them to use an online link. The 
second response method of providing hard copy surveys for completion proved 
more effective. Surveys were provided to directors of companies approached via a 
limited number of contacts of the researcher, 16 in total. In addition, the 
researcher made approaches at random to people at the Institute of Directors in 
London to complete paper surveys. This approach method produced 20 
responses making 36 paper survey responses being received in total. The final 
data collection method also involved approaching people at the Institute of 
Directors to complete the survey using a web-connected ipad to access the Bristol 
Online Survey tool. This final method proved to be the most effective overall with a 
total of 53 survey responses were received this way. For the latter two data 
collection methods, data collection took place at the Institute of Directors on eight 
occasions eight occasions between January 2017 and October 2017. As these 
responses were the last collected, the responses excluded to balance the 
participant group numbers were collected this way meaning that 49 of these 
survey responses were used in the data sample. Any data or record of abandoned 
or incomplete surveys was deleted in line with the stated data management and 
security policy communicated as part of the survey introduction. The survey 
respondents are regarded as being generally representative of the director 
population of corporations. Where appropriate, characteristics of the survey 




4.9.4  Stage 1 survey design 
The survey was designed to isolate one set of experiences of a specific 
directorship role. The purpose of this approach was to better compare the distinct 
experiences of executive and non-executive directors in isolation rather than to 
allow the survey respondent to give their general or best / worst experiences of 
being a director, (which could include executive director and non–executive 
director experiences), or to cherry pick certain experiences to steer their 
responses towards a narrative they personally favour or that re-enforces a point 
they may wish to make. Although this was the intention of the survey design, there 
is no absolute guarantee that the survey respondents strictly followed the 
instruction to relate their responses to one specific directorship consistently 
throughout the survey.      
The survey’s structure was designed to be broadly sequential following a 
timeline of board meeting preparation stages leading up to the board meeting and 
the survey respondents participation in the board meeting. The survey flow is 
shown in summary in Figure 20. Initially, the survey explored some relevant 
personal characteristics relating to the survey respondent and then followed on to 
explore specific actions, behaviours, and attitudes the survey respondent reported 







Figure 20.  Stage 1 - quantitative survey design summary 
 
The survey was intended to take around ten to fifteen minutes to complete. 
This estimate was based on the number of questions and the question type. In 
addition, a planning assumption was made about the reasonable amount of time 
to ask someone to give up in order to complete the survey and to avoid 
abandonment of the survey during completion. In practice, it seems this was about 
the right amount of time as it seems few surveys were abandoned once started.    
The survey respondents were provided with an introduction, (shown below), 
in order to position the survey as relating to one specific director role in order to 
tightly frame their perspective accordingly.    
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Survey introduction to be read by survey respondents and agreed to.  
Survey into assessing information flow and its influence on decision-
making by company boards.  
Thank you for taking part in this survey, which should take around 10 
minutes to complete. 
This survey is part of a University of Birmingham research project 
looking at how Directors of Companies use information in their Board 
level decision-making processes. 
This survey is anonymous. No personal information will be recorded in 
this survey that can identify you or any organization you were or are a 
director of. 
Instructions. 
Please think about a specific role you have, (or have had), as a Director 
of ONE organization only and relate your answers to that ONE 
directorship only. 
Throughout the survey, the questions are worded as if the directorship 
is current. This applies to past directorships also. 
The term "Company" is used throughout. In this survey, this applies to 
any organization type. 
The term "Board" is defined as the most senior decision-making body in 
the Company. 
Notes on confidentiality and data security. 
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Once submitted, your survey results are totally anonymous and, 
therefore, can not be deleted.  
You can stop the survey at any time. Answers provided up until that 
point will not be retained.  
 
4.9.5  Statistical analysis of survey data 
The survey results were analysed using a simplistic method of comparison 
across the range of question response. The data was downloaded from the 
“Bristol On Line” survey tool into Microsoft Excel to give better control over the 
visual presentation of the results. From this point, where applicable, differences 
between the responses given by executive and non-executive directors were 
evident, Stata 15 statistical analysis software was used to perform T-test analysis 
so ascertain the statistical significance of the differences between responses from 
executive and non-executive directors. In Appendix 3, the T-test analysis is shown 
as a screen shot from the Stata 15 software for each comparison of interest to the 
thesis subject. Where the comparison is statistically relevant, the screenshot is 
outlined in blue. Where it is clear and of interest, but does not have a statistically 
relevant T-test score, the screenshot is outlined in orange. Where there is no 
significant difference, the screenshot is highlighted in grey. Where relevant, a 
summary table for each question is shown with blue shading used to highlight data 




4.10  Stage 2 – qualitative research using semi-structured 
interviews  
 
Figure 21. Qualitative research stage description 
 
4.10.1 Qualitative research overview 
As previously discussed, the primary research undertaken within this thesis 
has been completed in two stages. The second stage of the primary research 
within this thesis, which is qualitative, aims to illuminate the key themes relating to:  
o how the conditions and behaviours proposed in Stage 1 create conditions 
hypothesised in this thesis, 
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o specific descriptions that allow for the development of a new theory of 
executive agency under certain conditions  
The key outputs of the qualitative research stage are descriptions of the “how“ of 
commercial corporate governance decision making processes as illustrated in 
Figure 21.   
 
4.10.2  Qualitative method overview 
Reflecting back on the discussion in Section 4.6, relating to the overall 
research philosophy and design employed in this thesis, the central research 
challenge experienced by researchers in this field is that the problem is “wicked” 
as its characteristics and conditions are “messy, “circular” and have no “single 
right solution” (Savin-Baden and Howell, 2013). In recognising this challenge, this 
thesis adopted a staged approach by employing a quantitative stage to support or 
disprove the hypothesis and to reduce the “mess” of characteristics. From there, a 
qualitative stage has explored the characteristics in an attempt to straighten-out 
the circularity and describe a reduced set of evidence based potential solutions.      
The broad research paradigm adopted for the qualitative research stage 
was “social constructivism” in that characteristics and conditions of the topic are 
held within an artificial environment, (largely a corporation’s board), are where 
dialogue and negotiation take place so are, by definition, a “social construction” 
(Savin-Baden and Howell, 2013). As well as the environment being a social 
construct, the role of the director is also considered a social construct, (Maylor and 
Blackmon, 2005). Using Savin-Baden and Howell’s (2013) “Qualitative 
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Researchers “Wheel of Research Choices” model indicates that participants in this 
stage of the thesis are individuals, and that the narrative descriptions of their 
experiences, gathered through interviews, is an appropriate approach. The overall 
objective was is to be able to undertake thematic analysis that added a nuanced 
and coloured layer to the research undertaken in the quantitative research stage. 
This approach proved to be effective. The overall outcome of combining the two 
stages results in a balanced thesis but one with a subjectivist ontology. This is 
considered appropriate as however the data was obtained, it is derived from 
humans operating within social constructs, so will always be subjective (Maylor 
and Blackmon, 2005). 
A quantitative approach was used in Stage 1 to move on from the 
constrictions of the prevailing “black box” assumption relating to research on 
corporate board behaviours. This was achieved by isolating a limited number of 
behaviours of directors and reliably demonstrating that two distinct groups, 
(executive and non-executive directors), behave in different ways and that these 
differences are detrimental to the corporation because it increases risk by lowering 
the overall quality of the information used in the decision-making process. Despite 
this solid evidence foundation, the overall outcome is not fully objective. It is 
argued that the two stage approach produces a diluted objective basis but a fuller 
explanation of what is happening within the “black box”.  
 
4.10.3 Interview method 
A semi-structured interview took place in which interviewees were asked a 
set of questions in a predetermined order. A semi-structured interview approach 
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was selected as the participants can be regarded as sophisticated and 
knowledgeable about the topic. It was anticipated that the interviewee’s 
knowledge base and experience would allow them to understand and 
contextualised the topic and questions being posed, and to construct answers that 
directly addressed the questions, and to then expand their responses with 
additional, associated points and follow-on observations (Savin-Baden and 
Howell, 2013).  
In addition, the semi-structured interview format allowed the interviewer the 
latitude to expand and explore responses outside the confines of tightly defined 
questions. In this way the questions could be regarded as being “open” in that the 
answers given, even if they were potentially initially answered with a binary “yes” 
or “no”, were intended to be expanded upon (Savin-Baden and Howell, 2013).  By 
allowing interviewees to respond largely in their own way, semi-structured 
interview techniques allows for terminology and thematic analysis also (Savin-
Baden and Howell, 2013).     
In practice, both assumptions about the interviewees’ understanding and 
responses, and the development of additional and associated lines of discussions 
proved to be the case. On occasion, the interviewer prompted the interviewee to 
expand on points made and to specifically address points where contrarian or 
alternative views were put forward.   
 
4.10.4  Method of data collection  
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Interviews were held face-to-face with interviews lasting around 90 minutes. 
Responses were recorded in note form within a pre-formatted question and 
answer sheet. The interview started with a verbal introduction covering an 
explanation of the background and generalised purpose of the research, the 
reason why the interviewee was selected, a description of the format of the 
interview, and a brief explanation of the semi-structured nature of the interview 
questions. 
Following the introductory statement, a summary statement covering the main 
outputs of the Stage 1 quantitative research was read out as shown below. 
Broadly, the Stage 1 survey indicated that:  
o Executive directors have more company specific information than non-
executive directors 
o Executive directors have more ways of obtaining company further information 
than non-executive directors 
o Non-executive directors have a wider, non-company, information set than 
executive directors 
o There are more occasions when non-executive directors are unsure about the 
board decisions they make because of the quality of information they have 
available to them  
Six pre-drafted questions were used which acted to control the structure of 
the interview and to give interviewees the opportunity to develop their responses. 
Care was taken not to impose the researcher’s preconceptions or ideas through 
the wording or language of the interview questions (Maylor and Blackmon, 2005). 
At the same time, there needed to be continuity and flow from the output of the 
Stage 1 quantitative research. As with the stage 1 quantitative research, the 
choice of appropriate vocabulary, syntax, and terminologies was considered 
important to the outcome (Bryman and Bell, 2003). This was particularly relevant 
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for the semi-structured interviews as, on occasions when interviewees require 
prompting or points suggested the need or opportunity for further development, 
the use of a corporate vernacular was employed.  
 
4.10.5 Question design 
Given the commonplace reticence of many practitioners to discuss, in 
detail, events and conditions in the “black box”, care was taken to avoid questions 
that might bring down the shutters. A number of alternative question wordings 
were considered for each question to balance the tonality. This was achieved 
using question wording and tonality that attempted to avoid asking the interviewee 
having to describe specific situations rather than generalised experiences. Overall, 
a balance was achieved for the interview questions which avoided an overly 
technical tone.  
 
4.10.6 Selection of participants for qualitative interview  
Interviewees were selected based on their general experiences being 
representative of the themes and concepts being researched rather than being 
representative of the whole population of corporate directors (Maylor and 
Blackmon, 2005). 
Given the purpose of the second research stage and the validity of the 
Stage 1 quantitative research, an initial target of ten interviews were considered a 
useable sample size. Five executive directors and five non-executive directors 
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were selected by the researcher using a profile of the selected director’s 
experience of corporate boards.   
In practice ten interviews proved to be sufficient as a degree of saturation 
was reached be this point with the comments being made by both groups 
becoming re-affirmative of both stages of the research. 
 
4.10.7 Research environment and timing 
The interviews were held in corporate offices and business oriented 
environments to aid scene setting and frame-of-mind.  Interviews took place in the 
first half of 2018. 
 
4.10.8 Research questions   
The research questions were designed to reflect the output of Stage 1 but 
to give the interviewee the opportunity to tell their stories as best as possible.     
Question 1. In your experience, do these summary results sound realistic?  
Question 2. If so, can you describe your experiences of these types of 
circumstances? 
Question 3.  If not, how does your experience differ? 
Question 4. When you have made board decisions, are you aware, or do you 
expect, that people around the table are using different sets of information?  
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Question 4.  Supplementary prompt statement on governance typology.  
“In this research, the distinction between two types of corporate governance 
has been explored. These two types are technical corporate governance, where 
the aim is to ensure the corporation operates legally and meets its corporate social 
responsibilities, and commercial corporate governance, where the aim is to 
promote the commercial success of the corporation”. How does influence your 
answer to the question? (question repeated)  
Question 4.  Supplementary prompt statement on information typology.  
In this research, three different types of information used by corporate 
boards have been described. These are predetermined purpose information, such 
as normal, standardized board reports, emergent purpose information where the 
board is using a new report relating to a new topic such as take-over and market 
development, and extant information, where the directors, based on their previous 
experiences, already have knowledge and information about a topic before the 
board considers it. How does this influence your answer to the question? 
(question repeated) 
Question 5. 
(NED version). Do you rely on Executive Directors having better information, 
or different information, to you when making board decisions? 
(ED version). Do you feel that NEDs rely on Executive Directors having 
better information, or different information to NEDs you when making board 
decisions?   
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Question 6. Because of the different information they have, do you think 
that Non-executive directors take more risks or different risks when making 
company board decisions? 
 
4.11  Theory building 
In common with most work on this subject, this thesis states in the 
introductory sections and in the literature review that the extant knowledge base 
on the “how” of corporate governance is very limited. Stage 1 and stage 2 of this 
thesis provide an evidence base for a new credible theory of how the conditions 
and behaviours prevalent in commercial corporate governance give rise to 
executive agency and how this can increase risk for the corporation. The theory 
building is carried out in Chapter Eight. 
 
4.12  Chapter conclusion 
This chapter has described the research undertaken for this thesis within an 
adapted Maylor and Blackmon (2005) “abstract to concrete” model. A mixed 
method research process has been described with a quantitative research stage 
building propositions that were then enriched and nuanced in a qualitative 
research stage allowing the hypothesis to be validated. From this point, this thesis 




CHAPTER FIVE - STAGE 1 QUANTITATIVE SURVEY RESULTS 
 
5.1  Summary statement on contribution to knowledge 
As is widely accepted and explored in Chapter Three, Section 3.2, it is likely 
that a complex information asymmetry already exists at the start of corporate 
decision-making process along with the theoretical assumption that the decision-
making process acts to reduce or close the information asymmetry. This research 
stage indicates the opposite may well be the case. Instead of closing the 
asymmetry during a decision-making process, these findings imply that existing 
and new information asymmetries could be opened up, in favour of the board’s 
executive directors, increasing the potential for agency, adverse preference 
selection, and risk exposure. 
 
5.2  Chapter introduction and summary results 
The chapter discusses the purpose, design, and results of the first stage of 
the primary research undertaken for this thesis. This research was quantitative 
and employed an interviewee completed structured survey to explore core 
characteristics and behaviours of corporate board directors in relation to their roles 
as a director in general and, specifically, in relation to the focus of this thesis. This 
quantitative research stage was intended to be the first part of a two stage 
research process.  
The survey process produced 100 complete responses, including 52 survey 
responses from executive directors and 48 survey responses from non-executive 
directors. The survey results were analysed using these two groups to compare 
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and contrast variations in the responses. For the statistical analysis undertaken, 
the group response numbers were evened to 48 survey responses for each group 
by excluding the last four survey responses received from executive directors.       
In summary, the results of the survey indicate that: 
o in general, there are not significant differences in the personal 
characteristics between the two groups of directors. The only notable 
difference was an increased incidence of a risk taking behaviour indicator 
on the part of non-executive directors which could be credibly explained by 
other factors, such as the respondent’s age,  
o in general, executive directors report that they are better informed about the 
decisions made by the corporate board than non-executive directors report 
they are. 
To this point, the findings are within what would be expected based on the 
literature and demography of the director population. From this point, the Stage 1 
quantitative research provides new insights in finding that:   
o in general, executive directors report that they take more actions to improve 
their information qualities than non-executive directors report they do, 
o in general, executive directors report that they have more options and 
opportunities open to them to improve their information qualities than non-
executive directors report that they do. Moreover, executive directors take 
these opportunities,   
o in general, non-executive directors take greater risks in decision-making, 
because of inferior information qualities, than executive directors do. 
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Consequently, the Stage 1 quantitative research results support the 
hypothesized condition in that information is not spread evenly across the 
corporate boards of directors and that this condition negatively influences overall 
decision-making process quality. This condition results in higher risk taking by 
some participants. In addition, as no effective compensating action is seen to be 
taken to mitigate the additional risk being taken by some decision participants, the 
implication is that this condition leads to lower quality decision-making overall, and 
therefore higher risk for the corporation. 
 
5.3  Stage 1 research results summary 
Stage 1 research results are presented in relation to themes in the 
questions and responses as opposed to the sequential order of the survey 
questionnaire. In addition, and where appropriate, the research results are 
presented in relation to themes covered in the literature review and propositions 
and hypothesis. Table 7 summarises the broad themes covered by the survey 








Table 7. Survey question results summary in relation to themes covered 





5.4  “Corporations” theme 
As illustrated in Table 7, although influential as a theme, Corporations are 
relatively benign in the Stage 1 research. The related survey questions and 
responses were centred on technical features of the corporation such as length of 
time in existence and ownership. The commonality in the responses reflects the 
overt nature and stability of the external frameworks that control the specific 
environment. The Corporations theme is associated with the Corporate 
governance theme across a set of benign, technical survey responses.     
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5.5  “Corporate governance” and “corporation board of 
directors” themes 
As illustrated in Table 7, Corporation governance is an influential theme in 
the Stage 1 research as both a standalone theme, and in its relationship to other 
themes. The related survey questions and responses were broad in their 
importance. The first cluster was around the survey respondents’ previous career 
experience (greater for non-executive directors) and their comparative closeness 
to the corporation (greater for executive directors). The second cluster was around 
the survey respondents’ view of aspects of information quality including timeliness 
and perception of accuracy and completeness, (better for executive directors). The 
third cluster was around the survey respondents’ view of their ability to exercise 
their corporate governance role due to the broad range of information quality 
issues, (better for executive directors).  The Corporate governance theme is 
widely associated with the other themes across the clusters.     
 
5.6  “Decision-making”, “information”, “information 
asymmetry”, “executive agency”, and “risk” themes. 
As illustrated in Table 7, these themes are closely associated and cluster 
around survey questions and responses relating to actions taken or not taken by 
the two different populations (executive director and non-executive director). This 
cluster illustrates that executive directors have more information, better 
information, and will take more action to sustain and increase such complex 
information asymmetries. Moreover, non-executive directors are aware of the 
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asymmetry and will take decisions under these conditions thus facilitating in 
greater executive agency and risk for the corporation. To further associate this 
cluster, using Floridi’s (2013) description of information quality, Stage 1 research 
indicates that the intrinsic information quality experienced by executive directors 
and non-executive directors in demonstrably different across a number of 
dimensions leading to conditions that would indicate increased information 
asymmetries. These are presented in Table 8.  






 5.7  Contribution to the understanding of board behaviours 
and functions and consequently, corporate governance 
The practice of corporate governance, (as opposed to the theory), seems to be 
a version of “don’t ask, don’t tell”. Save instances when a forensic enquiry takes 
place, the “black box” is not only tolerated but, it could be argued, is venerated as 
its existence adds to the value of those practitioners who have a privileged 
insider’s view. So the generally limited understanding of the practice of corporate 
governance has endured. The Stage 1 quantitative research of this thesis adds to 
the knowledge of corporate governance in two ways that are both supportive of 
the thesis propositions and hypothesis: 
o Firstly, the research establishes an argument that the unitary board 
structure with its assumption that, once inside the board boardroom, the 
hats of “executive” and “non-executive director” are taken off, does not 
deliver its intended outcome of a unified effort to deliver the best corporate 
governance possible. There are two groups of people in the board room 
with markedly different sets of tools at their disposal.    
o Secondly, the joint and several liabilities external control framework of UK 
boards of directors does not seem to result in the functions that the control 
frameworks are intended to deliver as non-executive directors will 
knowingly make decisions with deficient information. For non-executive 
directors in particular, the “stick” of liability is tolerated in return for the 




5.8  Survey results 
To aid readability, the analysis of a number of low impact questions and 
responses has been placed in Appendix 4. Higher impact questions and 
responses have been grouped and discussed in the clusters of associated themes 
with the highest impact theme cluster discussed first.   
 
5.9  Survey results for “decision-making”, “information”, 
“information asymmetry”, “executive agency”, and “risk” theme 
cluster  
 
Stage 1 Survey Question 26   
Please indicate your membership of any formal Board Committees (tick 
more than one if applicable) 
Stage 1 Survey Q26 Question purpose. To assess the level of interaction a 
survey respondent has in addition to board meetings.  
Stage 1 Survey Q26 Interpretation of answers in isolation. The 
responses indicate that the use of non-executive directors on board committees is 
widespread but that this activity is focused on committees that are not in the core 
three committees of Remuneration, Audit and Appointments. Of note is that some 
executive directors report they are active in audit committees.  
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Non-executive directors are more active than executive directors on committees 
with an average of 1.8 committee roles versus and average of 1.4 committee roles 
for executive directors. In both cases, this is skewed by roles on non-core 
committees. 
Stage 1 Survey Q26 Interpretation of answers in context. The survey 
responses indicate that the two groups are diversified in their interactions. 
Using a t-test there is a significant difference between the means of the two 
groups for membership of a Remuneration Committee, t= -2.2243, degrees of 
freedom=94. 
Using a t-test there is a significant difference between the means of the two 
groups for membership of a Audit Committee, t= -2.5552, degrees of freedom=94. 
Using a t-test there is a significant difference between the means of the two 
groups for membership of no major committee, t= -2.5912, degrees of 
freedom=94. 
Stage 1 Survey Q26 Summary output and implications. In relation to the 
answers given to Question 24 on meeting outside the board, there is a notable set 
of conditions where sub-cultures and in-group / out-group behaviours could 
emerge.   
Stage 1 Survey Q26 Further questions. As with the responses to 
Questions 23 and 24, the data was considered to be relevant for inclusion in 





Table 9. Summary results for Question 26 
 
 
Stage 1 Survey Question 28 
Do you feel that the Board Meeting agenda is distributed to you in good time 





Table 10. Summary results for Question 28 
 
Stage 1 Survey Q28 Question purpose. In conjunction with Q 25 and Q 27, 
to assess the level of planning, pro-activity and structure there is to board activities 
and board management.  
Stage 1 Survey Q28 Interpretation of answers in isolation. Responses 
would indicate that executive directors have earlier sight of agendas and therefore 
more time to consider the content and act if required. 
Stage 1 Survey Q28 Interpretation of answers in context. Within the 
Stage 1 survey this is the first point of divergence in the quality of the information 
between executive directors and non-executive directors based on the amount of 
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time they have to process and act upon the board agenda.  Survey respondents 
are reporting an information asymmetry in favour of executive directors. Using a t-
test there is a significant difference between the means of the two groups for 
receiving the agenda in good time, t= -3.4457, degrees of freedom=94. 
Stage 1 Survey Q28 Summary output and implications. The reported 
information asymmetry could be regarded as being systemic as it emanates from 
a corporate governance administration process, that of assembling and 
distributing the agenda.  
Stage 1 Survey Q28 Further questions. The data was considered to be 
relevant for inclusion in Stage 2 research. Further questions and themes include: 
o What is the impact of the lack of time in Board meeting participation?  
 
Stage 1 Survey Question 33 
If applicable - when initially received by you, is the Board Pack sufficiently 
detailed to allow you to participate in Board Meetings in an appropriately 
informed way? 
Stage 1 Survey Q33 Question purpose. To assess the level of quality of 
the information provided to the board.  
Stage 1 Survey Q33 Interpretation of answers in isolation. Executive 
Directors are more confident in their information array in general. They quality of 
the information provision may well be influential in the way that information is used 
by the receiver. Executive directors report less instances where there are 
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deficiencies in the board pack giving executive directors potentially a greater 
ability to use the information.   
 
Table 11. Summary results for Question 33 
 
Stage 1 Survey Q33 Interpretation of answers in context. This could 
indicate a significant point of information asymmetry between executive directors 
and non-executive directors again in the favour of executive directors.  Using a t-
test there is a significant difference between the means of the two groups for 
receiving the board pack in a sufficiently detailed state “Always”, t= 2.6223, 
degrees of freedom=94 and “Sometimes” t= -2.4563, degrees of freedom=94. 
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Stage 1 Survey Q33 Summary output and implications. By this point the 
survey has established a systemic bias towards executive directors. 
Stage 1 Survey Q33 Further questions. The data was considered to be 
relevant for inclusion in Stage 2 research as a discussion prompter.  
 
Stage 1 Survey Question 34 
If applicable - prior to the Board Meeting, if you have concerns or questions 
about the content of the Board Pack, or there is insufficient information, 
omissions or errors, do you? (You may tick more than one answer) 
Stage 1 Survey Q34 Question purpose. To capture the types of actions 
taken, in any, by directors in relation to shortfalls in the information provided to the 
board.   
Stage 1 Survey Q34 Interpretation of answers in isolation. Executive 
directors are more proactive in resolving issues and weaknesses in their 
information array and appear more equipped to be able to do so. This could 
indicate a significant point of information asymmetry between executive directors 
and non-executive directors again in the favour of executive directors.  (An 
anomaly in this data for further exploration is that executive directors also report 
doing nothing in the event of an issue with board information. This may indicate 
that they are able to informally compensate for the issue).  
Stage 1 Survey Q34 Interpretation of answers in context. In the context 
of the board, executive directors may well be enjoying complex information 
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asymmetries over non-executive directors which are systemic. However, to some 
extent the survey responses to this question run counter to expectations. Whilst 
executive directors report that they take actions to improve their information 
quality, they also report that they do nothing a greater number of times than non-
executive directors. This issue will be discussed in the analysis of the survey 
responses to the next question. Using a t-test there is a significant difference 
between the means of the two groups for perceived board pack information quality 
- “Ask for the board pack to be rectified before the meeting”, t= 2.2361, degrees of 
freedom=94 and “Ask for additional information separate to the board pack before 
the board meeting” t= 3.1364, degrees of freedom=94. 
Stage 1 Survey Q34 Summary output and implications. Executive 
directors may be able to further control the selection of their decision preferences 
due to their enjoying multiple information asymmetries over non-executive 
directors.  
Stage 1 Survey Q34 Further questions. The data was considered to be 









Table 12. Summary results for Question 34 
 
 
Stage 1 Survey Question 37 
When decisions are made at Board Meetings, do you personally feel that you 





Table 13. Summary results for Question 37 
 
Stage 1 Survey Q37 Question purpose. In conjunction with Q 36 and Q 38, 
to assess the prevalence of outcomes that are indicators of sub-optimal decision 
making processes where information quality is a cause or contributory factor.  
Stage 1 Survey Q37 Interpretation of answers in isolation. Executive 
directors are more confident in their information array in general. 
Stage 1 Survey Q37 Interpretation of answers in context. In the context 
of the board meeting, executive directors are in a position where they may well 
perceive the risk to be lower than non-executive directors due to them having 
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better information. Consequently, executive directors may well act more decisively 
to secure the outcomes they want. Using a t-test there is a significant difference 
between the means of the two groups for the participants feeling that they had 
sufficient information quality - “For all decisions”, t= 2.8419, degrees of 
freedom=94 and “Sometimes” t= -2.5552, degrees of freedom=94. 
Stage 1 Survey Q37 Summary output and implications. The output 
indicates another difference between executive directors and non-executives 
directors in relation to their ability to use and exploit information.   
Stage 1 Survey Q37 Further questions. The data was considered to be 
relevant for inclusion in Stage 2 research as a discussion prompter.  
 
Stage 1 Survey Question 38 
Do you feel that the Board has ever made decisions with insufficient or 
erroneous information? 
Stage 1 Survey Q38 Question purpose. In conjunction with Q 36 and Q 37, 
to assess the prevalence of outcomes that are indicators of sub-optimal decision 
making processes where information quality is a cause or contributory factor.  
Stage 1 Survey Q38 Interpretation of answers in isolation. Non-executive 
directors are more likely to report that boards do make decisions with suboptimal 
information.  
Stage 1 Survey Q38 Interpretation of answers in context. The responses 
imply take executive directors take greater risks when making decisions as they 
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report a number of information quality issues and information asymmetries. 
Although, marked, these responses are not statistically different using a t-test. 
Stage 1 Survey Q38 Summary output and implications. Risk is adopted 
by the non-executive directors and by the corporation as a whole. 
Stage 1 Survey Q38 Further questions. The data was considered to be 
relevant for inclusion in Stage 2 research. Further questions and themes include 
the board directors awareness of the apparent risks? 




Stage 1 Survey Question 39 and Question 40 
Away from Board Meetings, do you have access to executive Directors of 
the Company for dialogue and information exchange?  
Do you have access to senior managers for dialogue and information 
exchange?  
Table 15. Summary results for Question 39 and Question 40 
 
Stage 1 Survey Q39 & Q40 Question purpose. In conjunction with Q 40, 
41, and 42, to assess the environment in which directors have opportunities to 
improve their information. 
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Stage 1 Survey Q39 & Q40 Interpretation of answers in isolation and in 
context. Added to the previous questions, executive directors have access to 
more information sources and more diverse information than Non-executive 
directors.  Using a t-test there is a significant difference between the means of the 
two groups for their access to senior managers - “Yes – planned”, t= 3.6800, 
degrees of freedom=94.  
Stage 1 Survey Q39 & Q40 Summary output and implications. As already 
established, this demonstrates the clear potential for information asymmetries, risk 
adoption, and suboptimal outcomes.  
Stage 1 Survey Q39 & Q40 Further questions. The data was considered to 
be relevant for inclusion in Stage 2 research.  
Stage 1 Survey Question 41 and Question 42 
Do you have access to the Company's current management accounts and / 
or other financial records such as bank statements?  
Do you have access to the Board Committee's minutes and reports? 
Stage 1 Survey Q41 Question purpose. In conjunction with Q 39, 40, and 
42, to assess the environment in which directors have opportunities to improve 
their information. 
Stage 1 Survey Q41 Interpretation of answers in isolation and context. 
Added to the previous questions, executive directors have access to more 
information sources and more diverse information than non-executive directors. 
Using a t-test there is a significant difference between the means of the two 
groups for their access to current management accounts and / or other financial 
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records - “Yes – planned”, t= 3.9869, degrees of freedom=94, “Yes – ad hoc / on 
request” t= -3.1965, degrees of freedom=94 . Using a t-test there is a significant 
difference between the means of the two groups for their access to senior 
managers - “Yes – planned”, t= 3.6800, degrees of freedom=94. 
Table 16. Summary results for Question 41 and Question 42 
 
Stage 1 Survey Q42 Summary output and implications. As already 
established, this demonstrates the clear potential for information asymmetries, risk 
adoption, and suboptimal outcomes.  
Stage 1 Survey Q42 Further questions. The data was considered to be 
relevant for inclusion in Stage 2 research.  
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Stage 1 Survey Q42 Question purpose. In conjunction with Q 39, 40, and 
41, to assess the environment in which directors have opportunities to improve 
their information. 
Stage 1 Survey Q42 Interpretation of answers in isolation and context. 
Added to the previous questions, executive directors have access to more 
information sources and more diverse information than non-executive directors. 
Using a t-test there is a significant difference between the means of the two 
groups for their access to board committees minutes - “Yes – planned”, t= 2.372, 
degrees of freedom=94.  
Stage 1 Survey Q41 Summary output and implications. As already 
established, this demonstrates the clear potential for information asymmetries, risk 
adoption, and suboptimal outcomes.  
Stage 1 Survey Q41 Further questions. The data was considered to be 
relevant for inclusion in Stage 2 research.  
 
5.10  Survey results for “corporate governance” and 
“corporation board of directors” themes cluster 
Stage 1 Survey Question 2 
“How would you broadly categorise your career / profession?  
(You may tick more than one box)” 
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Stage 1 Survey Q2 Question purpose. This question’s purpose was to capture 
the professional function, background, and breadth of experience of the survey 
respondents.  
Table 17. Summary results for Question 2. 
 
 
The survey respondents could tick more than one categorisation. In 
addition to the data shown above, the survey indicated that executive directors 
reported a less varied experience set than non-executive directors with an 
average of 1.15 career / professional descriptors as opposed to 1.77 careers / 
professional descriptors given by non-executive directors. These results are 
similar to other research on director experience diversity (Pass, 2004). No survey 
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respondent gave more than three career descriptors. Graph 1 shows the number 
of descriptors given by executive directors and non-executive directors.  





Graph 1. Career / profession descriptors given by survey respondents 
 
Using a t-test there is a significant difference between the means of the two 
groups, t= -5.5156, degrees of freedom=94. This supports the view that executive 
directors and non-executive directors have different career / professional 
backgrounds leading to different extant information.  
  19% of non-executive directors gave three career descriptors as opposed 
to 2% of executive directors. 40% of non-executive directors gave two career 
category descriptors as opposed to 10% of executive directors. 42% of non-
executive directors gave only one career descriptors as opposed to 88% of 
executive directors. There are possible explanations for this. The first is that non-
executive directors are potentially selected to be non-executive directors because 
they have broad experience of being executive directors or senior managers and / 
or have experience of operating of other sectors with relevance to the corporation. 
Also, non-executive directors are potentially selected because they have 
complimentary experience to executive directors. Non-executive directors are 
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typically older than executive directors and so have more years of experience 
which may lead to a broader experience set. These results are similar to other 
research on director experience diversity, (Pass, 2004). 
Stage 1 Survey Q2 Interpretation of answers in context. In the context of this 
thesis, the career and professional experience of survey respondents is highly 
likely to be a direct factor in their selection to be a director. This view is consistent 
with publically available non-executive director recruitment selection criteria and 
with the control frameworks for selection such as those published by the Financial 
Reporting Council (2016). In addition, there is a significant difference between the 
executive and non-executive directors data obtained as indicated by the t-test 
shown in Appendix 2. The data indicate that the breadth of “extant Information”, as 
described in Chapter Two - Information, is likely to be significantly different 
between executive directors and non-executive directors. This is because of non-
executive directors’ exposure to and experiences of a more diverse set of work 
place contingent environments. Non-executive directors may have greater 
breadth, though this may be of a more generic nature in the context of a specific 
corporation. In contrast, executive directors may have greater depth of experience 
in the specific industry and sectors the corporation operates in, and clearly this is 
likely to the case in relation to the specific corporation being discussed in the 
survey.     
Stage 1 Survey Q2  Further questions. The data was considered to be 
relevant for inclusion in Stage 2 qualitative research, (presented in the next 
chapter). Further questions and themes include: 
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o Does the existence of a wider set of experience and extant information filter 
into decision-making, formally or informally? 
o Once the non-executive director is recruited to the board, does the board 
then deliberately exploit any wider set of experience and extant information 
held by non-executive directors? 
 
Stage 1 Survey Question 3 
“Thinking about this one specific directorship, how long have you been a  
director of this Company?” 
Stage 1 Survey Q3 Question purpose. To capture the typical length of service of 
the survey respondent in the role being considered for the survey. 
Stage 1 Survey Q3  Interpretation of responses in isolation. As shown in 
Table 10 the responses were similar so no conclusion is drawn.  
Stage 1 Survey  Q3 Interpretation of responses in context. As shown in 
Table 10, the responses were similar so no conclusion is drawn.  
Stage 1 Survey  Q3 Summary output and implications None. 






Table 19. Summary results for Question 3  
 
Stage 1 Survey Questions 4 and 5 
Question 4.  “Are you, or have you been, an Executive Director  
of another Company?” 
Question 5.  “Are you, or have you been, a non-executive Director  
of another Company?” 
Stage 1 Survey  Q4 & Q5 Question purpose. To capture further information 
about the survey respondent’s background and experience in relation to their role 
as a director. 
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Table 20. Summary results for Question 4 and Question 5 
 
Stage 1 Survey  Q4 & Q5 Interpretation of responses in isolation. The 
responses indicate that just over a half of executive directors are in their first role 
as directors and so, potentially, have a limited set of functional expectations and 
reference points. It should be noted that the main data collection point was the 
Institute of Directors so the survey respondents theoretically have a heightened 
awareness of corporate board functionality versus the general population of all 
directors. Of the non-executive director survey respondents, the vast majority, 
91.7%, had been or still were executive directors. In some respects, it is surprising 
that a number of non-executive directors have not been executive directors. An 
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explanation could be that non-executive directors join family businesses or boards 
of non-commercial organizations such as charities.     
The responses indicate that half of non-executive directors are in their first 
role as non-executive directors so, potentially, have a limited set of functional 
expectations and reference points. It should be noted that they typically have 
experience of the Executive Director role as indicated in Question 4.  
Using a t-tests shown in Appendix 2, there is a significant difference 
between the means of the two groups, Q4 t= -4.1544, degrees of freedom=94 and 
Q5, t= 3.9673, degrees of freedom=94. This supports the valid assumption that 
executives and non-executives may have different extant information relating to 
the contingent environment the corporation operates within.  
Stage 1 Survey  Q4 & Q5 Interpretation of answers in context. In the context 
of this thesis there is a clear imbalance in the experience of executive directors 
versus that of non-executive directors. This is not surprising as it is one the 
supposed key benefits of non-executive directors is to bring wider experience to a 
corporation’s board.  As discussed in Chapter Two, this wider experience is likely 
to bring with it different extant information to the decision-making process.    
Stage 1 Survey  Q4 & Q5 Further questions. The data was considered to be 
relevant for inclusion in Stage 2 research. Further questions and themes include: 
o To what extent do non-executive directors exploit any extant information 
asymmetry 
o How does the existence of an imbalance in board experience and extant 
information help or hinder the functionality and dynamics of the board 
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Stage 1 Survey Question 6 & 7 
Question 6.  Are you a shareholder in this Company? 
Question 7. Are you a member of a pension scheme underwritten or 
supported by this Company? 
Stage 1 Survey  Q6 & Q7 Question purposes. To capture information about any 
conflict of interest or other factor that may influence the survey respondent’s 
responses to the survey questions or their indicated behaviours.  
Stage 1 Survey  Q6 & Q7  Interpretation of answers in isolation. Most 
respondents showed a notable adherence to the corporation through either 
ownership of shares or involvement in a pension scheme supported by the 
corporation, or both. Using a t-test there is a significant difference between the 
means of the two groups, t= 2.1137, degrees of freedom=94. This variance is 
further enhanced by other financial interests in the company’s performance 
relating to pension schemes. Using a t-test there is a significant difference 
between the means of the two groups, t= 3.9869, degrees of freedom=95.  
Stage 1 Survey  Q6 & Q7 Interpretation of answers in context. In general, 
survey respondents indicate that executives and non-executives, as groups, have 
different material outcomes relating to the company’s performance with executive 
directors having significantly more instances of share ownership and pension 
scheme interest. 
Stage 1 Survey  Q6 & Q7 Further questions. None 





Stage 1 Survey  Question 8 & 9 
Stage 1 Survey Q8. Have you ever started your own business (either on your 
own or as a founding member)? 
Stage 1 Survey  Q9. Have you ever voluntarily left a job without another job 
or planned alternative activity? 
Stage 1 Survey   Q8 & Q9 Question purposes 
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This purpose of these questions is to indicate a tolerance or propensity for risk 
taking by the survey respondent. These questions are grouped with questions 10 
& 11.  
Table 22. Summary results for Question 8 and Question 9 
 
Stage 1 Survey   Q8 & Q9 Interpretation of responses in isolation. 
Although distinct, Q8 relating to the survey respondents starting their own 
business was not statistically significant. This may be because of business failure 
or closure, which are the common reasons for businesses not having continued so 
acting as a negative indicator of director performance.  
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Q9 did show a significant statistical difference with non-executive directors being 
more likely to have left a job voluntarily, this indicating a tolerance of financial, 
social, and career risk. Using a t-test there is a significant difference between the 
means of the two groups, t= -2.7596 degrees of freedom=94.  
Stage 1 Survey  Q8 & Q9  Interpretation of responses in context. The 
answers show a distinct and statistically significant difference between executive 
directors and non-executive directors indicating that non-executive directors have 
experienced more financial, social, and career risk than executive directors. This 
could be because they are typically older than executive directors and, therefore, 
could have had more reasons and / or opportunities to take such risks of have had 
such risks put upon them. Also, they could have been through the high risk 
periods of life so are able now to take more risks. This is consistent with general 
research on varying risk tolerance in different stages of life as personal liabilities 
decrease.  
Stage 1 Survey  Q8 & Q9 Summary output and implications. The responses 
indicate a difference between the groups of directors. This could cause conflict in 
decision-making and potentially differing levels of rigour and bias being applied 
during board decision-making processes.    
Stage 1 Survey  Q8 Further questions. The data was considered to be 
relevant for inclusion in Stage 2 qualitative research at the question design level 





5.11  Survey design limitations, errors, and omissions in the 
questionnaire  
In hindsight, the survey design was overly long and would have been 
effective if it had concentrated on the behaviours of board directors and 
corporation rather than the characteristics of the survey respondents which proved 
to be off limited variation. Table 7 illustrates the block of questions from 9 – 25 that 
could have been omitted. If repeated as an exercise, the survey could be 
condensed to roughly half the questions with this added focus. 
5.12  Chapter conclusion 
This research has demonstrated that, broadly, executive directors and non-
executive directors are similar at a personal level with the exception, relevant in 
this context, of their extant information which, in the case of non-executive 
directors, may be more diverse due to their broader professional experience.  
However, this research has demonstrated that complex information 
asymmetries exist between executive and non-executive directors, and that these 
information asymmetries appear deep-rooted and systemic. As such, these 
information asymmetries are not likely to be mitigated through typical corporate 
governance control frameworks. Moreover, the research results seem to 
indicate that information asymmetries could increase during the decision-
making process contrary to the intentions of corporate governance 
frameworks. This is because the conditions of the decision-making accommodate 
sub-optimal decision-making processes, particularly by non-executive directors, 
which increases the risk for the corporation. Non-executive directors have less 
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information, less access, less time to process the information, fewer routes to 
better information, and fewer options to explore other information than executive 
directors. As well as sub-optimal decision-making, the risk of increased executive 
agency would also seem to be an implication of this research.  
 
5.13  Transition to Stage 2 qualitative research  
Stage 2 research in the next chapter picks up, thematically, at the point 
where Stage 1 establishes information asymmetries and behavioural, functional, 




CHAPTER SIX - STAGE 2 QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 
 
6.1  Summary statement on contribution to knowledge 
Following on from the quantitative research in this thesis, this research 
stage develops a nuanced understanding of specific conditions in which complex 
information asymmetries exist, are sustained, and develop within corporate board 
decision-making processes. In particular, the research demonstrates that: 
o despite a lack of formal demarcation, commercial corporate governance 
decision-making is chiefly the realm of executive directors and seems 
particularly susceptible to complex information asymmetries and hence 
increased corporate risk, 
o the type of information available to individual decision-makers is impactful 
in the decision-making process with non-executive directors at an 
institutionalised and structural disadvantage - this is particularly the case 
with emergent purpose information.  
 
6.2  Chapter introduction and summary results  
The start point for this thesis is the acceptance that decision-making is the 
primary function of corporate boards because, without decisions, limited action or 
no action would be taken by the corporation’s board.  
In previous chapters this thesis established a generalised explanatory 
framework for the decision process used within corporate boards. In doing so, two 
typologies for the main characteristics were introduced. The first typology related 
to the type of corporate governance being undertaken. This typology distinguished 
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between technical corporate governance, (actions ensuring that the corporation is 
compliant with the requirements of predominantly externally defined control 
frameworks), and commercial corporate governance, (pursuing competitive 
advantages and commercially beneficial outcomes within the confines of 
predominantly internally defined control frameworks). The second typology 
introduced three distinguishable types of information used by directors in their 
decision-making, these being; “pre-determined purpose information” where an 
establish and regularised process is used to produced information in recognisable 
formats, “emergent purpose information” where information is produced in 
response to new events that require board consideration and / or action, and 
“extant information” where directors already have information that is potentially 
relevant to a decision or topic process before the board for consideration. The 
interaction of these typologies is shown in Figure 8.  
As a consequence of the typology characteristics and conditions in actions, this 
thesis argues that:  
o the most quality assured decisions relate to technical corporate governance 
actions using predetermined purpose information. This is because the 
scope for deviation from a near rational decision process is limited by a 
combination of the dominance of external control frameworks, the effective 
quality assurance process used for assembling the information, and the 
ability of all directors to more fully participate in the decision-making 
process leading to the selection of preferences that are in line with the 
corporation’s preferences as objectively assessed.  
o as decisions become more commercial in nature and / or use information 
produced from less quality assured processes, the risk of sub-optimal 
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decision preference selection increases as individuals have different 
information arrays and information qualities  
o with commercial corporate governance in particular, executive directors 
have scope within the decision-making process to use their agency to steer 
the decision process towards the selection of their preferences  
In order to explore these themes, primary research was undertaken using a 
quantitative survey of corporate directors.  As fully discussed in Chapter Nine, 
broadly, the quantitative survey indicated that:  
o Executive directors have more company specific information than non-
executive directors 
o Executive directors have more ways of obtaining company further 
information than non-executive directors 
o Non-executive directors have a wider, non-company, information set than 
executive directors 
o There are more occasions when non-executive directors are unsure about 
the board decisions they make because of the quality of information they 
have available to them 
The Stage 1 quantitative survey outputs support the conditions for the 
hypothesis. In order to explore these conditions and their implications in further 
detail, a second stage of research was carried out using qualitative interviews with 





6.3  Research results and theme development   
The research outputs are shown in detail in the tables in Section 6.6 at the 
end of this chapter.  
In order to develop themes and concepts, the answers were coded using 
words and phrases to highlight common responses given by a number of 
respondents. These themes are shown in Table 23. The themes are also shown in 
the Section 6.6 at the top of each answer table with links down the table to the 
specific comment or answer given in the semi-structured interviews.   
Unlike first stage of the research, although noted as either executive or 
non-executive director in the response summaries, the two populations are treated 
as one. This is because of the commonality in the responses where executive and 
non- executive directors gave similar responses irrespective of the perspective 
taken in the questions asked in the semi-structured interview. Broadly, the 
participants were self-effacing in that it made little difference when discussing a 
subject that was positive or negative to either an executive of non-executive 
director’s role.  
Table 23 shows two blocks of themes. On the left in bold are the primary 
themes. These are summarised in to the key results and conclusions as shown in 
Section 6.6. The secondary themes are supportive of the primary themes as 











The themes are strongly indicative of the specific behaviours in specific 
environments being described in this thesis including:   
Divergence of decision-making process roles and responsibilities. At 
the outset, there is an expectation that not only do executive and non-
executive directors assume different roles in the decision-making 
processes, but that executive directors assume greater responsibilities, 
particularly with commercial corporate governance decision-making.   
Expectation of information asymmetry. There is an expectation that 
information asymmetries exist and that they are structural and systemic. 
Tolerance of inferior information quality. Non-executive directors seem 
to know and accept that their information is of a lower quality than executive 
directors.  
As illustrated in Figure 22, in practice, these overriding themes indicate that 
for technical corporate governance decision-making, external control frameworks 
largely act to retain control of the decision-making process resulting in a balanced 
decision in which corporate requirements deliver corporate preferences. In the 
case of commercial corporate governance, the role of the non-executive director 
could be reduced to that of a pathway to a decision controlled by the executive 
directors. In these decision-making processes, the preferences of the corporation 






Figure 22. Decision-making processes indicated by Stage 2 research 







6.4  Quantitative and qualitative results associations 
The divergence of attitudes, experiences, and behaviours between 
executive and non-executive directors is evident in both the quantitative and 
qualitative stages of this research. As such, this condition is supportive of the 
hypothesis. As discussed in Chapter Nine in relation to the quantitative research, 
this is particularly evident when exploring the corporate board decision-making 
process.  
To recap, the quantitative results, information qualities experienced by the 
two groups start to diverge at the point of provision.  This is demonstrated in Stage 
1 Question 33 shown in Graph 2.  In addition, Stage 1 Question 34 indicates that 
non-executive directors are less able to engage with the information initially 
provided to them and are then less active in improving their information quality 
taking an average of 1.2 actions to improve the information quality as opposed to 
1.8 actions to improve information quality for executive directors.  
Despite their information quality concerns, non-executive directors are still 
prepared to proceed with decision-making as shown in Stage 1 Question 37.  This 
theme is extended into the decision point itself where non-executive directors are 
more likely to report that the corporation will make decisions knowing that the 
information is erroneous and / or insufficient.    






Graph 2. Stage 1 Question 33 graphical representation of results 
 




Graph 4. Stage 1 Question 38 graphical representation of results 
 




As indicated in the responses to Stage 1 Question 36, both groups of 
directors display similar responses to the matter of delaying board decisions 
because of information that is seen to be erroneous and / or insufficient. This 
indicates that expediency and agency are factors as decisions are made despite 
sub-optimal information quality, particularly that held by non-executive directors.  
 
6.5  Issue and limitations 
From the notes taken, key word analysis has been used to identify 
concepts and themes. The semi-structured nature of the interviews means that 
associated and similar words have been used to form these concepts and themes 
and so introduces an element of risk to the accuracy and validity of the output.  
 
6.6  Stage 2 results tables 
The answers given by the respondents were recorded as notes and then, 
where applicable, paraphrased. Where a direct quote is used, this is shown in 
“quotes”. A mix of first person and other narrative positions is used depending on 
the answer and context to aid readability.  An open-coding approach was adopted 
to allow concepts and themes to emerge from the interview notes, (Maylor and 
Blackmon, 2005). Where answers were prompted, these relate to the previous 
































































6.7  Stage 2 qualitative research conclusions 
Building on the output of Stage 1, Stage 2 has expanded the themes by 
obtaining a nuanced explanation of director behaviours and operating conditions 
which is consistent with the output of Stage 1 in relation to: 
o Differences in the information quality that executive directors and non-
executive directors utilise when making decisions with non-executive 
directors having inferior information quality 
o A lack of adequate means or processes for non-executive directors to 
compensate for their inferior information quality which results in inferior 
decisions being made by the board. 
o Suboptimal outputs are structural and institutionalised. Stage 2 extended 
these research outputs by exploring the hypothesised information types, 
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(predetermined purpose information, emergent purpose information, and 
extant information), to establish indications of an institutionalised difference 
between executive and non-executive directors in their utilisation of these 
information types. Furthermore, Stage 2 explored the hypothesised 
governance types (technical corporate governance and commercial 
corporate governance), to establish indications of an institutionalised 
difference between executive and non-executive directors in their roles in 
relation to these governance types.  
In summary, the two research stages combined demonstrate a complex 
information asymmetry between executive and non-executive directors which 
results in suboptimal decision-making resulting in greater risks being taken by the 
corporation. The causes of these conditions appear to be institutionalised by 
external and internal control frameworks including specific corporate governance 





CHAPTER SEVEN – QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE 
RESEARCH CONCLUSIONS 
 
7.1 Summary conclusion in relation to the hypothesis 
This thesis extends the understanding of corporate governance as it presents 
an empirical evidence base for: 
o Structuralised, institutionalised, and systemic information asymmetries 
amongst actors within boards of directors with an information quality 
advantage being held by executive directors, 
o two distinct groups of actors on corporate boards with two distinct decision-
making process qualities resulting in greater risk for the corporation, 
o adverse corporate governance outcomes being largely unmitigated by 
external control frameworks in relation to commercial corporate 
governance.  
This empirical evidence base is described using two newly developed and 
inter-related typologies of distinct and impactful features of corporate governance 
which extend the understanding of the topic these being:  
o a differentiation between two types of corporate governance - commercial 
corporate governance and technical corporate governance 
o a differentiation between three types of information used by decision-
makers these being “pre-determined purpose information”, “emergent 




Figure 23. Summary of processes of commercial corporate 




This thesis describes how the type of governance being undertaken and the 
information type being utilised by the board of directors exacerbates information 
asymmetries and increases risks, (although these adverse outcomes are not 
exclusive to conditions where these typologies are in effect). The core conditions 
and processes at work reaffirm the widely researched existence of executive 
agency as the “what” of corporate governance, particularly commercial corporate 
governance. The hypothesis is demonstrated by isolating “pinch-points” of 
information asymmetries which give them their complexity. This thesis chapter 
leads to a level where the “how” can be theorised, particularly in relation to 
commercial corporate governance. Table 7 in Chapter Nine summarises the 
variance in information quality across information quality categories and 
dimensions (Floridis, 2013). The themes explored in Stage 2 qualitative findings 
illustrate the divergence of information quality and the specific conditions that lead 
to the complex information asymmetry. 
 
7.2  Chapter introduction 
As described in Chapter Five - Decision-making of this thesis, the primary 
function of corporate governance is decision-making. Although this primary 
function is often clouded, and occasionally sidelined, by multiple additional roles 
and functions that have emerged since the elevation in public, regulator, and 
practitioner awareness of corporate governance in the 1990s, active and process-
driven decision-making remains the most relevant output based definition of the 
role of boards of directors. This is because most often shareholders employ 
boards of directors to take actions on their behalf that, at a minimum, deliver a 
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near-term economic surplus from the resources allocated to the corporation by 
shareholders, and, ideally, also create sustainable competitive advantages for the 
corporation to best protect anticipated future economic surpluses in the mid-term 
and beyond. These actions are defined in this thesis as “commercial corporate 
governance”. At the same time, boards of directors are employed to protect the 
corporation from the risks of failing to comply with the requirements of the various 
largely external control frameworks that society stipulates. Boards of directors 
achieve this through actions defined in this thesis as technical corporate 
governance actions. By being compliant with external control frameworks, the 
corporation both minimises many of its risks and, at the same time, operates in a 
way the society accepts as balancing the needs of a broad range of stakeholders.   
As stated in Chapter One - Thesis Foundation, this thesis has not sought to 
assess or define any relationship between decision-making by corporate boards of 
directors and corporate outcomes, particularly where these outcomes lead to 
commercial successes or failures. This topic has been covered widely in previous 
research and has, on balance, led to inconclusive results. In general, this 
inconclusiveness is derived from a broad, seemingly unstable, and not fully 
defined set of variable factors and conditions that indicate that cause-and-effect is 
unlikely to ever be fully established. In this regard, corporate decision-making 
quality falls into line with other decision-making undertaken in complex socio-
economic environments where establishing some level of conditional correlation is 
the realistic aspiration of researchers and practitioners in these fields.  
Instead of seeking cause-and-effect, this thesis has explored some of the 
conditions that can reliably indicate an outcome of relevance to the corporation - 
that of increased risk and specific conditions that led to the increased risk. Risk is 
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typically defined as the probability of a situation resulting in a negative outcome, 
i.e. it is a calculated valuation of risk based on a set of factors. At the outset, the 
set of factors to include in a calculation of risk is, in itself, a challenge in the 
context of corporate governance. As discussed in previous chapters, who and how 
any set of factors is defined is variable, conditional, and open to legitimate and 
illegitimate manipulation by the actors. For technical corporate governance 
decision-making, the risk of illegitimate manipulation would seem to be less of an 
issue because the set of factors used in a risk calculation is typically more tightly 
defined by external control frameworks imposed on the corporation. In addition, 
the likelihood of overt reference points with which to triangulate risk calculation 
factors and values would typically be both greater and more easily matched to a 
specific risk and decision. For commercial corporate governance, this is less likely 
to be the case as control frameworks are internally defined. In addition, by their 
very nature, actions being taken to create, deliver, and sustain commercial 
advantages are often new to the corporation and / or the market. Consequently, 
there is less overt triangulation which introduces greater latitude for the actors to 
argue down the impact of risk calculations on their decision preferences and to 
distance their actions from any adverse outcomes.          
As explored in this thesis, it is argued that, in the context of decision-
making by boards of directors, defining risk as a calculated negative value is a dry 
and simplistic definition, and one that leaves the users of risk valuations in an 
exposed position. This is because risk valuations that boards of directors are 
asked to use and make decisions with, (most notably when used for commercial 
corporate governance decision-making), are calculated using, in essence, reverse 
engineered future event descriptions such as market forecasts and product 
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development plans. Not only does this process create conditions in which 
calculated risk valuations are inherently flawed because of the variability and 
completeness of the inputs, it also creates conditions that expose the board of 
directors to biases held by those who compile the factors and formulae for a 
specific risk calculation. In addition, the conditions for agency being exercised by 
dominant participants, most notably executive directors, who typically control the 
decision-making process including the inclusion or exclusion of unfavoured 
decision preferences. When reviewed years later, it is not credible that 
participants, let alone an external observer, could accurately describe all but the 
simplest and most technically focused decision-making processes that a board of 
directors undertook. This is particularly the case when reviewing commercial 
corporate governance because the latitude enjoyed by dominant participants is 
much greater and the limiting control frameworks being largely internally defined. 
As a consequence, researchers and corporate governance participants are faced 
with a choice of whether to accept that the complex conditionality of corporate 
board decision-making is such that attempts to explain it and then improve it are 
practically impossible or, ignore the challenge, or focus on a specific condition that 
could lead to a credible explanation of the influence of a defined factor in decision-
making quality and its potential impact on outcomes. This thesis has done the 
latter by demonstrating the difference between the behaviours and resources of 
two distinct groups, executive directors and non-executive directors, in relation to 
factors that are highly likely to be directly influential on their actions within the 




7.3  Core questions remain 
This thesis starts with the simple assumption that when decision-making is 
a collective action and responsibility, as it is with corporate board decision-making, 
the better the information used in that decision-making, the better the decision-
making process. This is because information, as described in Chapter Two, is the 
primary resource used by decision-makers. As a consequence, conditions that 
create and / or support processes that improve information quality, leading to, in 
aggregate, better outcomes for the corporation. This is the intention of corporate 
governance frameworks. However, this thesis establishes that the quality of 
information used in corporate board decision-making is diminished because of 
conditions in the decision-making process that demonstrably lead to one sub-
group of directors, non-executive directors, having lower quality information than 
another group of directors, executive directors. A complex information 
asymmetries exists where asymmetries exists across a range of information 
quality measures including completeness, timeliness, and comprehension. There 
is no apparent intention, condition, or mechanism in the decision-making process 
to compensate for inferior information being held by non-executive directors with 
superior information quality being held by executive directors. Therefore, the 
overall quality of information held and used by a board of directors is reduced. 
This results in conditions that would seem to increase three types of inter-related 
outcomes: 
1. The first outcome is that the corporation as a whole takes greater risks when 
making decisions as some of the participants are unable to evaluate risks as 
well as others. The risk evaluation would particularly seem to apply to non-
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executive directors ability to access and understand emergent purpose 
information in specific decision-making and to apply their extant information in 
general.     
2. The second outcome is that non-executive directors are exposed to increased 
risks of adverse outcomes in the event that decisions they are a party to go 
wrong to the extent that the corporation is put at risk and their role in decision-
making is examined. Non-executive directors are also at increased risk of their 
market value as a director being reduced as their inferior information becomes 
known to other participants. 
3. The third outcome would seem to be the risk of executive directors being able 
to exercise their agency in the decision-making process by exploiting an 
information asymmetry to over-value risks for preferences they personally do 
not favour and to under-value risks for preferences they do favour.  
 
The characteristics of information quality of particular note in this thesis 
relate to timeliness, scope, and accessibility. As described in detail in Chapter Six, 
when compared to executive directors, non-executive directors reported that they 
were less well provided for with information for decision-making in the first 
instance, and also less able to rectify the situation when they perceived their 
information to be of inferior quality because of information completeness and 
comprehension. In addition, non-executive directors were more prone to tolerate 
this situation in the expectation that executive directors would act to rectify the 
impact of the short-comings experienced by non-executive directors.         
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Having established that information asymmetries exist and that, logically 
the result is increased risk for the corporation and individual directors, the most 
obvious question to ask is how could this information asymmetry be reduced or 
eradicated. Levelling the playing field to reduce the information asymmetry could 
be achieved by attempting to reduce the information held by those who currently 
have better quality information. This may even out risk across the board of 
directors and act to maintain the value of non-executive directors in comparison to 
executive directors. However, this would not seem to benefit the corporation as it 
would increase risk overall. Consequently, the over-riding aim of any actions to 
reduce information asymmetry must be to improve information help by boards of 
directors overall. This topic is picked up in Chapter Nine.  
 
7.4  Specific focus and roles where none are supposed to 
exist 
At this point fundamental questions that relate to wisdom of prevailing 
corporate governance frameworks are asked. The first question relates to the very 
purpose of non-executive directors of corporations. As explored in both stages of 
the research for this thesis, the purpose of non-executive directors has become 
characterised to the point of specialisation in technical corporate governance 
functions. As reactions to high profile failings in corporate governance and ever 
increasing depth and breadth of external control frameworks, non-executive 
directors have become the de facto guardians of the interests and needs of 
societal “stakeholders” in the broadest sense. However, in law and through an 
ethical lens, this is the role of all directors equally. Technical corporate governance 
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aside, non-executive directors are intended to contribute to all board decision-
making by exploiting their supposedly diverse experiences, knowledge, and 
relationships to improve decision-making and therefore the outcomes for the 
corporation. As confirmed in Stage 2 research, this does not seem to be 
happening in practice and therefore undermines the argument for the role of non-
executive directors. 
If the role of the non-executive is, in practice, a specialised role with a focus 
on specific technical aspects of corporate governance, a secondary question 
arises this being to what extent are non-executive directors marginalised in 
relation to commercial corporate governance actions with inferior information 
quality being a manifestation of this condition? Is corporate governance now at a 
stage in its evolution that, in practice, is it out of step with the legal basis of 
collective responsibility? Functionally, do boards of directors operate as two 
groups and / or on two levels? Are commercial corporate governance functions 
carried out by executive directors and rubber stamped by the whole board whilst 
technical corporate governance activities are overseen by non-executive directors 
and accepted as a requirement for doing business by executive directors? At the 
extremes, is commercial corporate governance decision-making hampered by the 
involvement of non-executive directors who may restrict option selection? Whilst 
answering these questions is beyond the scope of the research undertaken for 
this thesis, they are naturally asked in this context as are questions of board 
structure in relation to the influence of groups and sub-groups.  
 
7.5  Next stages 
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Executive agency, and its great facilitator information asymmetry, appear alive and 
well despite forty years of overt attempts to control them through formalised 
corporate governance control frameworks. Moving on from the “what”, the next 





CHAPTER EIGHT - THEORY BUILDING 
HOW EXECUTIVE AGENCY WORKS IN PRACTICE 
 
8.1  Chapter introduction 
This thesis has explored two closely related underlying themes both of 
which have been constant features of management research for decades – 
agency (Bergh, 2019) and information asymmetry (Akerlof, 1970). This thesis has 
contributed to the theory and literature of corporate governance by linking these 
two features through the actions of directors within the “black box” so making the 
box a little less black. 
As discussed in Chapter Three, it is argued in this thesis that agency and 
counter-agency have become so ubiquitous as themes that researchers have 
passed over the opportunities to develop more detailed and functionally oriented 
explanations of the conditions that agency exists within, and of the processes 
where agency may have been assumed to be the cause of poor outcomes. In 
short, the research community seems wedded to simplistic explanations of agency 
that seek to pit cartoon character archetypes against each other. In the red corner 
we have the “coin-operated CEO” and their minions. This CEO archetype only 
acts in the way specified by the corporation’s shareholders and only when 
rewarded to do so within their formal compensation scheme. Squaring-up to the 
coin-operated CEO, in the blue corner we have the “all-seeing-eyed shareholder”. 
This shareholder archetype is surrounded by an arsenal of monitoring 
mechanisms intended to ensure the CEO performs in a way that the CEO’s formal 
compensation scheme specifies. Neither of these archetypes is credible on a 
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human or organizational level. CEOs of corporations are very unlikely to be 
entirely coin-operated. Typically CEOs would need to have demonstrated a far 
wider range of personal motivations and behavioural influences in order to have 
successfully moved up through the ranks of professional management on their 
way to becoming a senior corporate manager, director, and then CEO. 
Shareholders cannot be all-seeing. They are reliant on the patchy, lagging 
indicators of director outputs, the monitoring mechanisms shareholders have at 
their disposal would rely on the openness of the CEO, directors and other 
executives under their surveillance. This would be ineffective as a monitoring 
mechanism since those being monitored would simply find another forum in which 
to exploit their agency. 
 In addition to the unrealistic archetypes clogging up the debate, there is 
the acceptance that some agency is good and is, therefore, if not outright 
encouraged, at least tolerated. In order to not fall behind, CEOs are required to 
use their agency to be entrepreneurial, progressive, and innovative, if not 
personally, then at least as a supporter, facilitator, and armourer of those within 
their corporation who are. Indeed, the idea that a corporation’s competitive 
advantage can be created and then sustained without significant agency at most 
levels within corporations, including at board level, is not credible. Research and 
design, innovation, and commercial development are, in their very souls, 
expressions of agency as an ethos and enduring value creator. If this was not the 
case, then the CEO role would be largely administrative. Equally, there is an 
acceptance that any monitoring shareholders undertake is limited and 
compromised by their lack of real-time information, and a lack of depth and 
breadth of what they can see, hear, and otherwise sense whilst executive actions 
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are being carried out. Consequently, executive agency happens to some extent, 
as does shareholder monitoring. The operating conditions under which agency 
and monitoring happen have not been adequately explored in the literature 
therefore, at this point, this thesis builds a theory that attempts to explain in 
greater detail how agency and monitoring may take place and so highlights the 
conditions of risk that could occur.     
This thesis establishes a view and evidence base for the practice of 
corporate governance as having two distinct areas of focus which result in 
operationally, culturally, and behaviourally different processes – these being 
commercial corporate governance and technical corporate governance. Theory 
building picks up this distinction.  
 
8.2  Action and inaction 
One of the great challenges in studying corporate governance, particularly 
in relation to commercial corporate governance, is being able to reliably look back 
at decisions and ask why a particular action was not taken even when it seems 
obvious in hindsight. An example of this outcome is the commentary on the 
demise of Carillon plc where hapless former directors blinked like rabbits in the 
headlights when confronted with questions about why they had not seen the now 
obvious and fundamental risks to the business - and then not acted accordingly. 
This is the staple diet of writers, presenters, and commentators on corporate 
governance failure.  
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Where full or partial corporate failure is deemed to have its roots in 
corporate governance failure, analysts often struggle to piece together a reliable 
forensic account of what happened to the extent that the action / inaction-to-
outcome association is weak and questionable. This is particularly the case with 
commercial corporate governance. Analysts and researchers are often left 
attempting to reverse engineer multiple mechanisms with complex processes, 
varying timelines, actions spread across internal and external operations, and with 
an often unstable roll-call of reluctant actors. Moreover, the narratives of these 
factors and conditions will, in many cases, be poorly recorded if at all. As noted in 
Chapter Two, very little of the nuance and colour of boardroom debate is required 
by law to be recorded, even less for what goes on outside the boardroom. In short, 
we are often left guessing, assuming, or implying what happened or at least what 
was intended to happen. Particularly, in the case of inaction relating to commercial 
corporate governance, analysts and researchers will conclude that the actors were 
either incompetent or were using their agency to pursue another agenda which 
was not the best course of action now obvious to those blessed with hindsight. 
The theory building in this chapter attempts to provide a way of looking at 
conditions for inaction as well as action whilst acknowledging that a full 
explanation for inaction is not possible due to its very nature.     
 
 
8.3  Agency in action within corporate governance 
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This thesis has established an evidence base for theory building that 
attempts to explain a difference between two sets of conditions. The first condition 
is the type of corporate governance, (commercial or technical) and the second 
condition is the type of information used in the decision-making process (pre-
determined purpose information, emergent purpose information, and extant 
information). Figure 8 in Chapter Three illustrates these typologies at the 
theoretical level, their interaction, and highlights the potential for increased risk.  
At this point, theory building focuses on the actions that a CEO, as the 
principal executive actor within the corporation, could take in relation to the 
information used within the decision-making process. References to information 
and agency are done so with a typical decision process as described in Figure 10 
in Chapter Three. In this decision process, the executive directors will have 
decision preferences which may be limited by explicit controls placed on them by 
the corporation stakeholders and then overseen by non-executive directors. 
However, commercial corporate governance, by its nature is very unlikely to be 
fully constrained. Like the information that is thrown off by it, commercial corporate 
governance operates is emergent, incomplete, and undertaken within unstable 
environments. Charting a value-adding course through such environments 
demands agency. 
In these conditions, it is theorised that there are three actions the CEO 
might take to exploit their agency. These actions could be “passive” on the part of 
the CEO in that there is no attempt made to edit or restrict information. The 
actions could be “proactive” on the part of the CEO where the CEO makes an 
effort to edit or restrict the information prior to start of the consideration and 
iteration process. The actions could be “reactive” where the CEO takes action to 
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edit or restrict the information as the information is used by the board. These 
actions are to:  
“admit” information to the decision process that does not support the CEO’s 
decision preference. In an iterative decision process, this action could be passive, 
proactive, or reactive  
“submit” information to the decision process that is all the information the CEO 
has, (submit +), or only the information that supports the CEO’s decision 
preference (submit -). In an iterative decision process this action would be 
generally be proactive or reactive  
“omit” information from the decision process that does not support the CEO’s 
decision preference. In an iterative decision process, this action could be proactive 
or passive. 
It is theorised that when and how a CEO would use admit/submit/omit 
information depends on the type of governance the decision-making relates to and 
the CEOs perception of the risk or reward. Over the tenure of the typical CEO, risk 
and reward are considered to be broadly similar for both the CEO and the 
corporation since their objectives would be aligned through the CEOs contracted 
benefits and any long-term incentive plan. However, it is acknowledged that this is 
conditionally complex, and performance and time dependent towards the end of 
the CEO tenure.  The theorised potential outcome in terms of corporate risk is 




Figure 24. Theorised outcome in terms of corporate risk from admit / 
submit / omit (author’s own model) 
 
In commercial corporate governance decision processes, the control 
frameworks are typically internally set and commercial corporately held rewards 
are the primary purpose of the decision. Figure 25 illustrates the theorised 
interaction of executive agency and rewards using a low-high scale.  
Bottom-left box – low reward / low executive agency 
The CEO would admit non-supporting information since they have limited 
executive agency to prevent it and would gain limited reward in trying to. 
(Examples of these types of commercial corporate governance actions 





Figure 25.  Theorised interaction of executive agency and rewards in 
commercial corporate governance decision processes (author’s own model) 
 
Bottom-right box – high reward / low executive agency 
The CEO would submit only supporting information since they have limited 
executive agency but would gain a significant reward. (Examples of these 
types of commercial corporate governance actions could include; 
extensions of existing contracts that conform to the CEO’s preferences, 
channel and supplier management, extensions or enhanced focus on 




Top-left box – low reward / high executive agency 
The CEO would submit only supporting information since they have 
significant executive agency but would gain a limited reward. (Examples of 
these types of commercial corporate governance actions could include; 
reactions to competitor actions or changes in market conditions that may 
reflect poorly on the CEO, actions that are foundational to longer-term 
ambitions of the CEO, and actions that are needed to clear the way for 
future decision preference selection by the CEO) 
Top-right box – high reward / high executive agency 
The CEO would submit only supporting information since they have 
significant executive agency and reward but would also omit non-supporting 
information, so maximising the chances for the CEO’s decision preference. 
This is the highest risk for the corporation from a governance point of view. 
(Examples of these types of commercial corporate governance actions 
could include; mergers, acquisitions, and divestments championed by the 
CEO, the sale of the corporation, strategic alliances, reactions to 
substantial competitor actions or changes to market conditions that reflect 
poorly on the CEO, reactions to substantial commercial underperformance 
of the business that reflect poorly on the CEO, new product development 
and substantial extensions to product and service offerings, and expansion 
into new markets). 
In technical corporate governance decision processes, the control 
frameworks are typically externally set with, often, corporate risk mitigations as the 
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primary purpose of the decision. Figure 26 illustrates the theorised interaction of 
executive agency and risk using a low-high scale.  
Figure 26.  Theorised interaction of executive agency and risk in technical 
corporate governance decision processes (author’s own model) 
   
Bottom-left box – low risk / low executive agency 
The CEO may admit non-supporting information even if they are exposed to 
limited risk as this could gain political capital and avoids effort and 
resources being spent on low reward executive activity. (Examples of these 
types of technical corporate governance actions could include; generic 
275 
 
health and safety management and generic environmental legislation 
compliance).   
Bottom-right box – high risk / low executive agency 
The CEO would submit all information as they have since they would be 
exposed to high risk under any circumstances and would gain political 
capital and reduced personal risk by being proactively overt. (Examples of 
these types of technical corporate governance actions could include 
pension fund deficit management and highly regulated commercial and 
safety related activities). 
Top-left box – low risk / high executive agency 
The CEO may admit non-supporting information even if they are exposed to 
limited risk as this gains political capital. (Examples of these types of 
technical corporate governance actions could include the activities of board 
committees and higher level human resource management) 
Top-left box – low risk / high executive agency 
The CEO may admit non-supporting information even if they are exposed to 
limited risk as this gains political capital. (Examples of these types of 
technical corporate governance actions could include the activities of board 
committees and higher level human resource management) 
Top right box – high risk / high executive agency 
The CEO would submit all information as they have since they would be 
exposed to high risk under any circumstances and would gain political 
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capital and reduced personal risk by being proactively overt. (Examples of 
these types of technical corporate governance actions could include; 
investor community and shareholder engagement, external stakeholder 
engagement, statutory regulator engagement). 
 
8.4  The escalation of corporate risk through the use of 
agency in commercial corporate governance 
Furthermore it is theorised that when a commercial corporate governance 
decision is being undertaken a series of formal and informal iterations take place, 
including within the board room. As this happens, the executive director uses a 
submit and / or omit gateway to tailor the emergent purpose information to best 
suit their arguments for adopting their decision preference. In this way, illustrated 
in the theoretical model shown in Figure 27, the influence of any contradictory 
extant information held by non-executive directors is diminished. At the same time, 
the contradictory preference decision information held by the corporation is 
omitted wherever possible. By the end of the process, the emergent purpose 
information is formed around the executive’s preference whilst balancing 






Figure 27. The development of emergent purpose information through 
iterations leading to increased corporate risk (author’s own model) 
    
  
 
In the decision iteration process described in Figure 27, it is theorised that 
additional dynamics could be influential and may include:  
Confirmation bias.  As the emergent purpose information is tailored 
to suit the arguments, the non-executive directors would be presented with 
information that appealed to any specific concern they may have 
expressed. Once met by confirming information, the non-executive director 
may simple stop searching for contradictory information. 
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Concentration of the decision-making process on fewer and fewer 
information points.  As the emergent purpose information is tailored, 
the decision process may become simplified to the point where it misses 
out new influences and risks.  
Greater resource dependency.   If the decision processes the 
corporation employ work in the short-term, an even greater resource 
dependency is created around the CEO and other executive directors as 
they are seen to be the only people capable of delivering the information 
required in when making successful commercial corporate governance 
decisions. This is an illusion because highly tailored information would only 
give one answer for the board to select.  
 
8.5  Chapter summary  
In summary, this chapter has explored a new theory of how agency works 
in practice. (This theory does not question the existence of agency which the 
literature, common sense, as well as our own experience tells us is real). Instead 
theory development in this thesis has been undertaken because existing literature 
on agency is viewed as simplistic in that it treats agency as a social condition 
rather than an active process consciously used and abused by practitioners. 
Consequently, the existing literature on agency is of limited use to corporate 
governance practitioners and regulators in respectively maintaining working 
conditions and designing control frameworks that simultaneously exploit the 
positive aspects of agency, (such as innovation and entrepreneurialism), whilst 
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mitigating the seemingly inherent risks of agency (such as self over-rewarding, 
recklessness, and moral hazard).  
In summary, the proposed theory of agency in practice describes how, 
when making commercial corporate governance decisions, executive directors use 
an information gateway to exercise their agency through an “admit” / “submit” / 
“omit” process as described in Figure 25. This process may include a series of 
iterations with formal and informal stages where the information is further tailored 
to the specific decision being made. This is described in Figure 27. 
The outcome is an evolving, complex information asymmetry where 
widening gaps exist in the information held by executive and non-executive 
directors in relation to specific commercial corporate governance decisions. The 
complexity is derived from the features of the categories of information quality 
discussed in Chapter Two - Information, but also from the corporation’s cultural 
attitudes towards the provision and consumption of information. 
In conditions of high-executive agency and high reward, a “meta-
asymmetry” exists in that executives and non-executives directors will have not 
only have different information about a decision but, because of the “omit” option,  
the fundamental properties of information will only be understood by the executive 
directors.   
Along with other further research suggested by this thesis, the next chapter 




CHAPTER NINE - DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS, AND 
REFLECTIONS 
 
9.1  Chapter introduction 
This chapter begins with a summary of the research conclusions and how 
these differ and add to previous work in order to highlight this thesis’ contributions 
to theory and practice. This chapter then goes on to cover a number of sections 
including limitations, further research, initial thoughts on new corporate 
governance control frameworks, and an academic and practitioner engagement 
strategy. This chapter concludes with some reflective sections which cover the 
thesis content in the context of very recent events and developments in corporate 
governance and other relevant subjects.    
 
9.2  Summary research conclusions 
A fuller explanation of the research results is given in Chapter Seven which 
includes a figurative explanation of the research results in Figure 12. The following 
section is a top level consolidation.  
This thesis demonstrates the hypothesis that where two main conditions 
exist, (relating to corporate governance type and information type), 
increasingly impactful information asymmetries benefit executive directors 
and create conditions of greater risk for the corporation.  In the process 
of demonstrating this, this thesis has also established the following in relation to 
boardroom conditions and behaviours:  
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9.2.1  Many existing corporate governance control frameworks 
have limited impact. At the top level, this thesis concludes that 
corporate governance control frameworks have limited impact where it 
counts to shareholders. This is because commercial corporate governance 
is controlled by executive directors which facilitates positive and negative 
executive agency. (This is not the case for technical corporate governance 
which is largely well controlled within the UK).     
9.2.2  Structuralised, institutionalised, and systemic 
information asymmetries exist.  Because of the lack of effective 
control frameworks, complex information asymmetries exist. Not only do 
information asymmetries exists, but they seem to flourish as non-executive 
directors are unable to effectively keep-up with information flows as they 
relate to commercial corporate governance decision-making. These 
information asymmetries are built-in to the commercial corporate 
governance decision-making process. There is an in-group and out-group 
of decision-makers despite there being one corporate board.  
9.2.3  Adverse corporate governance outcomes are largely 
unmitigated by control frameworks.  In relation to commercial 
corporate governance particularly, risk for the corporation is increased as 
the control frameworks that are assumed to be effective in containing 
executive agency, and in bringing wider decision-making perspectives and 
skills to the decision-making process do not seem to be effective in meeting 
their objectives.   
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9.2.4  In-group / out-group / sub-groups openly exist. Despite 
the letter and the spirit of the control frameworks, the research 
demonstrated that executive directors and non-executive directors, in 
practice, openly adopted distinct roles and groups in corporate boards and 
in their decision-making processes. It is noted that the research undertaken 
for this thesis did not identify any obvious socially shared rewards for non-
executive directors in this outcome. It may be that non-executive directors 
gain a personal reward, a theme that is included in the further research 
section of this chapter.      
 
9.3  Contributions to theory and practice 
In demonstrating the conditions and behaviours described in section 9.2, 
the following contributions to theory and practice can be ascribed to this thesis.  
9.3.1  Extended understanding of the actions inside the “black 
box”. In relation to commercial corporate governance particularly, this 
thesis provides a new empirical evidence base that demonstrates diverse 
behaviours within an environment that is typically poorly researched. 
9.3.2  Development of a new, nuanced typology of corporate 
governance.  In the literature, corporate governance is widely treated 
as one type of action. This thesis developed a typology of two distinct forms 
of corporate governance with distinct decision-making processes. This 
allows for a more nuanced explanation of the conditions decisions are 
made within.  
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9.3.3  Development of a new typology of information used in 
corporate decision- making. Information quality and information are 
poorly defined within the literature despite being conceptually accepted. 
This thesis has provided a useable and effective distinction between “pre-
determined information”, “emergent purpose information”, and “extent 
purpose information”.   
9.3.4  Theory development of executive agency in action.   As 
more fully described in Chapter Eight - Theory building, this thesis has 
provided a conceptual basis for the development of a new theory of how 
and why executive agency is facilitated and developed within corporate 
governance decision-making. With a particular focus on commercial 
corporate governance, the theory explores how executives tailor emergent 
purpose information towards their decision preferences to exclude other 
information and preferences.  
 
9.4  Closing the gaps in the literature  
Figure 28 summarises the main gaps in the literature in relation to the 










9.5   Quality of research findings review 
Using Maylor and Blackmon’s (2005) quality of research findings 
framework, the thesis research is validated as follows. 
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9.5.1  Validity. The research results reflect and build upon other 
research on known conditions and phenomenon in this context so is 
considered to be valid.  
9.5.2  Generalisability. The research findings are applicable to a 
broad range of corporations beyond those whose directors contributed to 
the research as the survey respondent’s corporations were largely typical 
and were the survey respondents.  
9.5.3  Reliability. The method used in the research combined two 
proven research methods so are considered repeatable.   
9.5.4   Credibility. Combining the criteria above with the research 
foundation, the research is considered credible.     
 
9.6   Limitations  
This thesis aims to provide new and actionable research about a topic of 
theoretical, social, and commercial value. Broadly, it is intended that this aim is 
met by providing a new framework to prompt thinking on better corporate board 
decision-making, leading to a reduction in the risk borne by corporations. There 
are factors that will limit these aims and outputs.  
The first limitation is that this thesis is based on research that includes self-
reported data. As recognised in the previous points raised in relation to market 
value and confidentiality, there are, potentially, a number of negative outcomes for 
participants that report the existence of information asymmetries. Whilst the 
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research design mitigates this factor to a significant extent, these factors 
nevertheless remain present. 
Another limitation is that, despite the delivery of the thesis aims, change to 
the legal and control frameworks that apply to corporate boards is unlikely to 
change as a result of this research. This is because the history of control 
framework development is one of reaction to significant events, particularly failures 
in corporate governance. Absent a timely and disastrous event, this research may 
have limited initial impact. That does not mean no attempt will be made to gain 
traction for the ideas and outputs obtained. 
Another limitation is that the research is focused on the governance of UK 
corporations with unitary boards. As a result, the research conclusions are only 
directly applicable to similar corporations and conditions, although generalised 
conclusions are still thought to be valid in relation to culturally similar corporations.  
This issue is picked up in the next section on further research.  
 
9.7  Further research – section introduction 
This thesis has established an empirical evidence base to demonstrate that 
corporate governance, (particularly commercial corporate governance), in the UK 
is deficient in the way its core function - that of decision-making - works in 
practice. The reasons for this are inter-related factors of executive agency and its 
enabler of complex information asymmetries. Where corporate governance control 
frameworks are internally set, these complex information asymmetries appear to 
be structuralised, institutionalised, and systemic. In addition, these information 
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asymmetries do not appear to be mitigated by other actions by the corporation 
and so lead to inferior information being used in decision-making, and 
consequently greater risk. From this point, this thesis has presented a theory of 
how agency is enacted by executive directors in relation to the information quality 
used by corporate decision-makers, particularly in commercial corporate 
governance decision processes. This theory puts forward the concept of a 
“gateway” under the control of executive directors through which the executive 
director “admits”, “submits” or “omits” emergent purpose information. This theory 
includes a process of formal and informal iteration in which emergent purpose 
information is tailored by executive directors to suit their decision preference and 
to nullify extant information held by non-executive directors.  
 
9.8  Stage 1 research in other cultures  
Following on from the limitations noted previously in this chapter, this thesis 
used a quantitative survey in the first stage of the research to establish behaviours 
and differences between two groups of actors within the “black box”, and the 
potential impacts of these differing actions. Further research could be undertaken 
using the same or similar research methods in other cultures, value systems, and 
corporate operating conditions. Such research could provide useful research on 
comparative corporate risk for investors and practitioners.    
 
9.9  Further general research on information quality  
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In this thesis, Floridi (2013) has been used as a reference point when 
discussing and defining information quality. It is also established in Chapter Two 
that information quality in general is not well defined within the control frameworks 
instead leaving it up to users to adopt the generalised fit-for-purpose approach. In 
technical corporate governance, this is much less of an issue as the purpose of 
the specific corporate governance being undertaken defines the scope of the 
information and, in turn, the information’s quality and quality assurance processes. 
This results in information used in technical corporate governance as likely 
possessing the "intrinsic qualities" of “accuracy”, “objectivity” and “believability” as 
described by Floridi (2013).  
This opens up the debate about conditions and processes for defining the 
scope and quality of information used in commercial corporate governance as well 
as the associated quality assurance processes. Information used in this context is 
barely mentioned in the indexes and contents list of books and articles on 
corporate governance let alone researched.  
There is an opportunity to undertake research to help more fully define the 
intrinsic qualities of information used in commercial corporate governance. This 
could be researched from the bottom-up by ascertaining the functional, practical 
usefulness of detailed aspects of information quality and quality assurance for 
each user. Alternatively, this could be researched from the top-down taking a 
cultural viewpoint. The relationship and interplay between emergent purpose and 
extant information would need to be considered also.     
 
9.10  Further research to build on Stage 2 research  
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Stage 2 built up an evidence base of common themes that related to the 
Stage 1 research. Theme building reached saturation point after ten semi-
structured interviews demonstrating the commonality of the conditions being 
described indicating that more-of-the-same would add little to the evidence base. 
However, in support of the theory building, it is considered worthwhile to attempt to 
further explore the themes of information asymmetry in commercial corporate 
governance decision-making. Four options to do this are considered here:  
1. Identifying further reliable proxies for corporations as alternative research 
subjects. Given the conditions and control frameworks that apply to corporate 
governance, this is not considered to be a credible option.  
2. Direct observation of corporate board meetings and pre-meeting preparation. 
This is considered impractical in this context as the research is focused on 
emergent purpose information quality utilised in commercial corporate 
governance decision-making. This would require the researchers to be on 
“standby” waiting for the right research conditions to occur.  
3. Identifying further reliable proxies for corporate director behaviours. The Stage 
1 research has already identified the impactful proxy behaviours so this option 
may yield limited additional research output. 
4. Comparison recollection of instances of specific instances of commercial 
corporate governance decision-making. This is a potentially impactful area of 
research to extend the research undertaken for this thesis. Executive and non-
executive directors could be interviewed to give in-depth descriptions of the 
same decision-making processes. This could build an ethnographically focused 
account of events by exploring group behaviours and the psychological impact 
of being positioned on either side of an information asymmetry in this context. 
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(This is in contrast to the typical post-event analysis in this context which seeks 
to provide risk valuations).  
 
9.11  Research in to the rewards for non-executive directors 
of information asymmetry 
As previously discussed, the research undertaken for this thesis did not 
identify any obvious socially shared rewards for non-executive directors in this 
outcome. It may be that non-executive directors gain a personal reward. Research 
into what rewards, if any, non-executive directors get out of tolerating information 
asymmetries could be undertaken using qualitative methods to explore themes in 
greater detail. In general, the topic of non-executive directors may need a rethink 
from a research perspective relating to the role, purpose, and benefit, (Hsu and 
Wu, 2014; Hemphill and Laurence, 2014).  
 
9.12  Researching the theory of agency in practice  
This thesis has proposed a new theory that seeks to explain the conditions 
and actions of executive director agency – essentially moving on from the “what” 
of agency to the “how” of agency in practice. This new theory has two general pre-
conditions. The first pre-condition is that the decision-making relates to 
commercial corporate governance with internal control frameworks and the use of 
emergent purpose information. The second pre-condition is that the executive 
directors are broadly “entrepreneurial” so will seek higher commercial rewards. As 
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described in full in Chapter Eight, this theory of agency in practice is that, 
depending in the level of executive agency and the reward available, executive 
directors to variously admit, submit, or omit information to the decision-making 
process. The highest potential risk to the corporate is where the board is reliant on 
emergent purpose information to make commercial corporate governance 
decisions, where the rewards are high. Under these conditions, information 
asymmetries could be pronounced as executive directors tailor information to 
maximise the chances of their decision preference being selected. As previously 
noted in this thesis, this is not necessarily a bad outcome as the higher rewards 
will accrue initially to the corporation which is a fundamental objective of 
employing executive directors in the first place. Four options to research this 
theory are considered here:  
1. Identifying further reliable proxies for corporations as alternative research 
subjects. Given the conditions and control frameworks that apply to corporate 
governance, this is not considered to be a credible option.  
2. Direct observation of emergent purpose information development and use. 
This is considered impractical in this context as the researcher would require 
close access to a range of actors in the process of putting together emergent 
purpose information.  
3. Identifying further reliable proxies for corporate director behaviours. Given the 
conditions and control frameworks that apply to corporate governance, this is 
not considered to be a credible option.  
4. Reverse engineer the information used in well documented commercial 
corporate governance events that took place over time and would therefore 
incorporate iterations of emergent purpose information. This may involve 
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looking at corporate events such as the demise of a corporation, a merger, 
acquisition or sale, or a major strategic change. The narrative could be 
followed internally and externally and the development of the emergent 
purpose information compared to an expected standard in relation to its 
optimum information quality. Aspects such a confirmation bias and satisficing 
would be part of the research scope.  
 
9.13  Beneficiaries of further research 
It is anticipated that there would be four potential groups of beneficiaries from 
this further research, these being:   
1. Practitioners. Practitioners could improve their internal control systems to 
reduce the conditions and negative aspects of agency and information 
asymmetry where emergent purpose information is prominent and executive 
agency is high.  
2. Stakeholders. Many stakeholders are reliant on lagging indicators for 
commercial corporate governance events due to the lack of mandated access 
to the process and the “black box”, which could be legitimate as argued in this 
thesis. Whilst this is not easily fixed, stakeholders, including shareholders 
could mandate decision processes that actively mitigate the inherent issues of 
agency and information asymmetry in commercial corporate governance 
process.  
3. Regulators. Regulators could benefit from the provision of an in practice 
explanation of agency to provide guidance for the design of new corporate 
governance control frameworks  
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4. Researchers. Researchers could benefit from the provision of an in practice 
explanation of agency in this context to support other existing and new theories 
of corporate governance.  
 
9.14  New corporate governance control frameworks - initial 
thoughts 
It would seem that the arch-challenge of corporate governance is the 
sustained delivery of performance enhancing commercial corporate governance, 
over and above the diligent and effective execution of technical corporate 
governance. This is the case since the core purpose of the corporation is to return 
more in total to its shareholders than they invest when adjusted for inflation, risk, 
lost opportunity, and flexibility. In a well ordered society, technical corporate 
governance should be a given, effectively and efficiently being administered in the 
background. Instead, the past decades have seen technical corporate governance 
take centre stage, often by default. Now, in the UK, the situation corporate 
governance finds itself in is one in which technical corporate governance occupies 
the full bandwidth of regulators and the media.   
In order to move corporate governance substantially forward, this thesis 
argues that the commercial corporate governance should regain supremacy over 
technical corporate governance. This is not to argue for a return to a permissive 
regime of less stringent external control frameworks. The UK has well proven 
technical corporate governance frameworks that do act to balance the needs of a 
broad range of stakeholders. Many of these are not typically recognised as 
corporate governance frameworks. However, as explored in Chapter Two, 
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legislation that protects consumers, employees, minority shareholders, the 
environment, creditors and debtors, HMRC amongst many others, engenders, 
within most corporations, a culture where, most of the time, directors know how to 
make board decisions as directors and citizens. By and large, in technical 
corporate governance, directors exhibit self-restraint and social responsibility. 
These external control frameworks are not the challenge from either a research or 
corporate performance viewpoint. 
The challenge are the internal control frameworks that improve commercial 
corporate governance giving rise to conditions that result in demonstrably 
improved commercial performance. Historically, such challenges have been 
harder to address as these frameworks shape the expectations of the outputs of 
directors, particularly non-executive directors, in ways that they have avoided 
before, i.e. evidence based, methodically built, sustained commercial success. 
This is the objective of corporate governance in theory and practice. Such success 
pays for everything else. In this regard, a nagging question needs to be addressed 
- why are the corporate governance control frameworks in the UK so reserved and 
unambitious about its purpose and scope? The answer may lie in the lack of an 
obvious home for oversight. It may lie in the successful activities of vested 
interests, including executive directors, in distancing themselves and their output 
from scrutiny. It may lie in the powerful argument that the outputs of control 
frameworks that result in good commercial corporate governance, (competitive 
advantages), are self-nullifying. 
Some initial suggestions for improved commercial corporate governance 
conditions, are given here with the aim of improving the commercial corporate 




Board chairperson as “chief decision process officer”. The very star-warsy 
“CDPO” would see their role as supporting the board of directors in making the 
best decisions possible by ensuring a quality assured process. This is similar, 
along with the suggestion below to the role and scope of company secretary 
developed by Kakabadse et al., (2016).     
An information secretariat. Very large corporations may look to adopt an 
independent information secretariat that reports via the company secretary to the 
chairperson. The aim of such a secretariat would be to give emergent purpose 
information the same intrinsic quality as predetermined purpose information. The 
information secretariat would act as a resource for the board to oversee the timely 
provision of emergent purpose information and act as a contact point for non-
executive directors who feel they need to augment their information array during 
iterations of the decision process. 
Retrospective reviews of emergent purpose information quality. Corporations 
should look to systematically review their commercial corporate governance 
decisions to learn from the processes to improve quality assurance. In many ways 
this is particularly important when things go well as poor quality decision 
processes get forgotten when, coincidentally, a good outcome is achieved.    
 
9.15  Engagement – section summary 
 In the preface to this thesis, three groups were identified as being potential 
beneficiaries of this research these being practitioners, owners and investors, and 
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regulators. The following chapter section explores potential routes to engaging 
with these potential beneficiaries along with an academic and wider audience.    
 
9.16  Practitioner engagement  
In many respects engagement routes for practitioners could reflect the 
research findings in that different routes may suit executive and non-executive 
directors. 
Executive directors could be approached through direct routes to 
corporations, via professional membership and training / certification bodies such 
as the Institute of Directors and the ICSA, and via business schools. 
Non-executive directors could be approached through professional 
membership and training / certification bodies also and via non-executive director 
specific organizations such as the FT Non-executive Director Programme.  
For both executive and non-executive directors, the purpose of the 
approach would be to assist their corporation in improving decision-making 
through better information quality.      
 
9.17  Owner and investor engagement 
Owner and investor engagement could be achieved through approaches to 
organizations such as The Investment Association who represent institutional 
investors. The purpose of the approach would be to raise awareness of the risk of 
297 
 
poor quality information within corporations in order for the owners / investors to 
pressure the corporations they are invested in to improve information quality 
particularly during take-overs and major corporate strategy change when 
emergent purpose information is the dominant information type.     
 
9.18   Regulator engagement  
At this time, there are multiple routes to engage with regulators including 
governmental reviews into corporate governance. It is noted that the potential 
implications of the end-result development of the research could be a substantial 
change to current corporate governance control framework. This chapter includes 
some initial thoughts in 13.6 - New corporate governance control frameworks. If 
fully developed, recommendations based on this thesis and further research could 
move towards a significantly more intensive decision process for commercial 
corporate governance along with commensurately higher expectations of non-
executive directors. This may be problematic for regulators who tend to be 
reactionary and passive as noted in the early chapters of this thesis.  
 
9.19  Academic audience engagement 
It is intended that papers are developed from this thesis to disseminate the 
research on information and corporate governance typologies, and information 
quality. In addition, engagement on the new theory of agency will be sort via 




9.20   Wider audience engagement – major project 
leadership 
 Another potential audience for this research is the major projects and 
programmes community. Major projects and programmes are often led by project 
boards with a similar composition to corporations. As a project deviates from plan, 
which is often the case, information quality is exposed to similar dynamics to those 
experienced in corporations. Quality assurance deteriorates, emergent purpose 
grows in use as deviations increase or operating conditions change around the 
project. Institutions such as the Major Projects Association could be approached 
as could business schools which provide tailored courses for programme 
management.  
 
9.21  Reflections 
Whilst writing this thesis, corporate governance has been through the mill 
yet again. The period 2015 – 2019 has seen high profile events and adverse 
outcomes at BHS plc and Carillion plc exemplify short-comings in both the control 
frameworks intended to specify what corporate governance encompasses, and the 
practical and effective application of these control frameworks. In many ways, this 
situation was predictable because the UK adopts, essentially, a hope and trust 
based system that allows agents and principals the leeway to operate outside the 
letter and spirit of the control frameworks, if not the law. In late 2018, Patisserie 
Valerie, a highly regulated public company unravelled and then fell into 
administration after suffering multiple governance failures even with the direct 
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oversight of highly experienced directors. At the time of writing, the gap between 
the assumed failure and the actual failure opens up in front of those now charged 
with the resurrected corporation’s governance (Guardian, 2019). In addition, the 
reactive process of the development of UK control frameworks means that threats 
and risks often outpace those whose role it is to ensure that control frameworks 
are fit for purpose in the contemporary contingent environment. This situation is 
often exacerbated by the inter-related nature of the control frameworks that 
straddle the corporation and its stakeholders. (An example of which are the control 
frameworks that governed the pension funds associated with BHS plc).  
An obvious question to ask here is do these conditions imply that the UK 
will always be exposed to the risk of corporate governance failures, both 
systemically within corporations and culturally derived from wider society? It is 
argued that the answer lies in recognising that corporate governance covers two 
distinct roles, these being technical corporate governance and commercial 
corporate governance. Overall, the UK is good, indeed recognised at being world 
class, at many aspects of technical corporate governance. This reflects the long-
term evolution of both the social conditions of the country, of the complex markets 
UK businesses are exposed to, and of corporations that are authorised to be 
formed and operate within it. This is where stakeholders have their say on how 
corporations are controlled at the technical level. Moreover, it reflects the broad 
and deep needs of investors in the UK for capital growth, dividend returns, and 
security. But even here, technical corporate governance fails and does so in ways 
that seem baffling to onlookers. In 2018, Conviviality plc, a listed UK drinks 
distributor and retailer once valued by the markets at £ 750 million, was sunk by a 
tax bill that seems to have gone unnoticed until its payment was imminent (FT, 
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2018).  Multiple technical corporate governance failures at Carillion plc have been 
catalogued, aside from the commercial corporate governance failures which 
brought the corporation to its knees. At least with technical corporate governance 
it is possible to specify the conditions that are to be either avoided or encouraged 
to reduce risk and improve outcomes. Each time a Carillion of sufficient scale and 
impact occurs, a forensic analysis details the conditions that allowed it or at least 
failed to stop it.  
Despite challenges, the UK is good at this bit. (The proof is in the UK’s 
long-standing ability to retain domestic investment, attract foreign investment, and 
to act as a capital portal and custodian of assets held overseas). Herein lurks the 
ongoing risk to UK stakeholders – a risk that starts out as culturally born but often 
becomes systemically empowered. A corporate governance failure occurs. 
Journalists get excited. Politicians smell a vote or two. Lawyers, consultants, and 
auditors are engaged. Parliamentary committees are convened and the show 
begins. Naturally, the focus is on what can be more easily seen – the accounts, 
the audits, the assorted other documentation that proves or disproves that the 
corporation was compliant. This means that the focus is on technical corporate 
governance rather than on all aspects of corporate governance. The regulators, 
often the people whose oversight and timely enforcement functions failed are 
reanimated. The control framework that was deemed to be inadequate or 
defective is enhanced. Over time, the swell of awareness subsides and the normal 
operations are resumed. As far as technical corporate governance is concerned 
this is a positive outcome as the control frameworks, in general, are improved and 
strengthened. As far as overall corporate governance is concerned, this is a poor 
outcome. However, stakeholder and media demand for action aimed at avoiding a 
301 
 
repeat of the headline event is met. People get paid. Sub-industries are created - 
such as the “GDPR” compliance consultancies. After a stressful few months, 
regulators and professional bodies have their positions cemented. All seems well 
until the next time.  
However, the fundamental purpose of the corporation - to make a surplus 
for shareholders – is still left to market forces, commercial endeavours, and the 
self-control of the agents of the shareholders, mainly the executive directors. As 
discussed at the outset, the primary action of the board of directors is decision-
making. The greatest latitude, and hence scope to take actions that result in both 
good and bad outcomes, given to the board of directors is where commercial 
corporate governance decisions are made. These are rarely examined by 
regulators and other enforcers of control frameworks when a corporation fails 
because the control frameworks are largely internal to the corporation, and hence 
self-regulated, assuming they are legal. Commercial failure, whether it is acute 
and sudden or mild and accumulated, is the topic of countless academic research 
projects and practitioner books and articles. Often wrapped up and placed under 
the under banner of “strategy”, commercial actions have an enduring fascination 
and popularity. Regulators, however, have typically shied away from directly or 
indirectly intervening in this area of corporate governance. They would argue that 
it is not possible to tell entrepreneurs how to be entrepreneurial. Clearly, if they did 
the same for all businesses, then the effect would be largely self-cancelling. They 
would also argue that the market decides who is ultimately successful through the 
attraction of capital and customers, and then more capital and then more 
customers. They would point to the general failure of command economies and 
the inefficient use of tax payer’s money through protectionism, monopolies, state 
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owned enterprises, and strategic sector government investment. These conditions 
suit free-enterprise practitioners who have been in the ascendency in the UK and 
more widely since the 1970s and particularly during the period since the growth of 
societal awareness of corporate governance around 1990. 
In general, it is uncommon to argue against the ascendant narrative of 
seemingly well-regulated free-enterprise. To do so involves taking an opposite 
view which is hard to defend given the typically suboptimal outcomes of command 
economies. This suits boards of directors and, in particularly, executive directors. 
As a board, they are protected from external people telling them how to undertake 
commercial corporate governance functions. Moreover, in many instances, 
executive directors are protected from non-executive directors getting too close to 
the action also.  
From the dominating focus on technical corporate governance to the 
influence of a free-market worldview, the result is that commercial corporate 
governance is largely unregulated and, therefore, free from direct forms of quality 
control. This is a problem as most corporations who under-perform or fail do so 
because their boards of directors undertake poor commercial corporate 
governance actions and not because they are the victims of technical corporate 
governance failures. In short, stakeholders seem to be poorly served by the way 
the UK corporate governance framework has evolved and is managed. UK 
stakeholders are, in effect, lulled into a false sense of security. They are 
misdirected by collective efforts of regulators and boards of directors into seeing 
strong and effective control frameworks without always appreciating that these 
control frameworks are not intended to the be applied where it really counts. That 
is not to argue that these control frameworks are not essential but that they will not 
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result in the commercial outcomes investors want and society needs obtained 
through tax receipts, jobs, goods, and services.     
These conditions may be at the heart of the conundrum concerning the lack 
of evidence to associate particular board structures, sizes and compositions with 
commercial outcomes. It may well be that any positive influences such factors do 
provide are not able to be exerted in the largely unregulated conditions and 
processes that prevail over commercial corporate governance functions.  
There are challenges to improving this situation. One challenge, already 
mentioned, relates to the difficulties in starting and sustaining an open and 
balanced discussion about any control framework that seems to impinge on free 
market processes and the ethos that promotes them. A second challenge is the 
lack of obvious incentive or benefit to the practitioner. The idea of more regulation, 
particularly in areas where, intuitively, regulation would seem counterproductive, is 
not likely to gain many supporters. At a time when business people are implored to 
be innovative, when global champions are created, at great speed, through 
disruption, which is assumed to be a positive thing for society, and where being 
outside the ideas economy is consigning a business to the slow lane, restricting 
commercial corporate governance latitude would appear to increase risk. 
Consequently, the is no argument for reigning in the influence of the free-market 
ethos or for creating control frameworks that restrict outcomes. There is, however, 
a strong argument, as demonstrated by the research in this thesis, for improving 
the processes of decision-making which is the central role of corporate 
governance in practice. As demonstrated, better decision-making processes can 
reduce risk by improving the quality of information used by the board of directors 
with information being the core input. In general, the less risk, (in terms of 
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frequency and impacts), the corporation is exposed to, the better the outcomes. 
Alternatively, for the same level of risk as it was previously exposed to, a 
corporation that had made systemic improvements to it decision-making 
processes could attempt to obtain greater rewards than before it made the 
improvements. Whether through reduced risk or by securing greater rewards, or 
both, there would be incentives for board of directors to subject themselves to 
more stringent control frameworks, albeit internally regulated ones. This would 
seem to be particularly the case where commercial corporate governance is being 
undertaken using emergent purpose information and extant information as here 
the rewards are most easily won or lost.   
 
9.22  Final thoughts 
In 2019, the “industry” of corporate governance, encompassing 
practitioners, regulators, and legislators, could fairly be described as having a 
crisis of both confidence and identity. Confidence has waned as technical 
corporate governance failures keep occurring, despite the continuous ratcheting of 
the control frameworks. Whilst a clear identity has never been fully formed as 
positive commercial outcomes have not been clearly associated with specific 
features of a corporation’s governance. The result is fuzzy thinking and dialogue 
that seems to repeat itself or, in some cases, states the obvious. An example of 
this is the recent launch of the “Wates Corporate Governance Principles for Large 
Private Companies”, herein the “Wates principles”, (Financial Reporting Council, 
2018). A well respected and very experienced corporate director, James Wates, 
was asked by the government to develop principles to improve transparency and 
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accountability in corporate governance. According to the Financial Reporting 
Council, who have taken on the role of publishing the principles, the request was 
in response to issues highlighted in HM Government’s 2016 Green Paper and the 
BEIS Select Committee’s report of April 2017. The Wates principles are intended 
to guide corporations covered by them, and any others who care to adopt them, 
towards a higher level of reporting than that required by the impending changes to 
the legal framework on reporting. Four things to note.  
Firstly, the FRC champions the launch of the Wates principles on its website 
with three quotations. The first quotation, shown below, is from James Wates.  
“Good business well done is good for society. Private companies are a 
significant contributor to the UK economy, providing tax revenue and 
employing millions of people. They have a significant impact on 
people’s lives, and it is important they are well-governed and 
transparent about how they operate. 
“These principles will provide a flexible tool for companies of all sizes, 
not just those captured by the new legislative reporting requirement, to 
understand good practice in corporate governance and, crucially, adopt 
that good practice widely. The principles are about fundamental 
aspects of business leadership and performance.” 
This quotation states that the UK’s private companies have significant 
positive impact on society, pay taxes, and employ millions of people. And yet they 
still need guidance on how to be well-governed. The quote goes on to describe 
the new legal framework on reporting as having “captured” corporations who had 
previously not had to report on as many of the their corporate processes. The term 
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captured may reflect a cultural position. The second quotation is from the then 
Business Minister, Andrew Griffiths MP. 
“The vast majority of our largest companies get their responsible 
business practices right and help contribute to our deserved reputation 
around the world as one of the best places to work, invest and do 
business. 
 “This Government-backed consultation was launched as part of our 
corporate governance reforms and its results will help to improve how 
large companies are run, strengthening our robust business 
environment.” 
This quotation states that the vast majority of the UK’s largest corporation 
are doing a fine job already as far as corporate governance is concerned, and if 
their behaviours are extended to the next tier of corporations by size, some 16,000 
corporations according to HM Government’s estimation, then all will be well. This 
is assumptive and is at partly at odds with the statement made by James Wates. 
The final quotation is from the FRC’s Paul George, Executive Director, 
Corporate Governance and Reporting Division. 
"These principles pave the way for more clarity of purpose and positive 
corporate behaviours amongst this significant sector of the business 
community. This work has the potential to help restore trust in business 
and contribute to long-term sustainable growth in the UK economy. It is 
therefore important that you respond to the consultation and help in the 
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finalisation of the principles. The FRC is pleased to be working with 
James as part of the Coalition and in providing the secretariat.”  
This quotation is seemingly at odds with the previous two quotations. In the 
first part, it implies that the purpose of the Wates principles is, broadly, to tackle 
and change delinquent behaviours. The second part of the quotation implies that 
trust in “business” requires restoration, despite the statements made by James 
Wates and the government minister. The quotation goes on to position the role of 
the FRC as central to the process of facilitating actions that will change 
behaviours, restore trust, and go on to deliver sustainable growth. These general 
aims have been those of the FRC for many years and yet the statement is made 
without irony. In addition, no acknowledgement is made of the distinction is made 
between technical and commercial outcomes.     
The second point to note is that the Wates principles are run of the mill to the 
point of being anodyne. There is nothing objectionable or challenging. The 
intended outcomes are general with sufficient leeway to allow any corporation to 
manage the impact to suit them. Like other codes, the Waters principles 
occasionally repeat requirements of the legal framework, but in a watered down 
way. As example of this is in the third principle on “Responsibilities” which starts 
with the phrase “A board should have a clear understanding of its 
accountability….”. This is a standing legal requirement that sits with each and 
every director.   
The third point to note is that this is another voluntary code for corporations 
to adopt under a “comply or explain” regime. If they choose not to adopt the Wates 
principles, non-adopting corporations are supposed to adopt a comparable set of 
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principles on corporate governance. The easiest route is to add in a few boiler 
plate statements about what is already done. This is already accepted as the most 
probable outcome as HM Government expects the entire exercise to be cursory as 
demonstrated by the assumed trivial financial costs of compliance. 
Section 124.  
The research concluded that the average costs in the first year 
(including familiarisation and implementation costs: creating the 
corporate governance statement, sign-off and publication) for unquoted 
PIEs would be £951 per company. This was based on survey 
responses indicating that the reporting requirement would take up five 
hours of ‘director time’, twenty hours of ‘professional time’ and one hour 
of ‘administrative’ time, and applying appropriate wages taken from 
official statistics. The annual costs after the first year per company is 
estimated to be £455, based on two hours of ‘director time’, 6.5 hours 
of ‘professional time’ and eight hours of ‘administrative cost’. The 
difference between the two figures (£951 and £455) can thus 
reasonably be interpreted as the familiarisation costs per business. 
The fourth point to note is that the Wates principles don’t seem to address 
the core issue of governance failure as assessed by HM Government.   
Section 145. 
The proposed measures give significant freedom to affected companies 
in terms of how to comply with the requirements. They do not require 
businesses to engage with stakeholders in specific ways; they only 
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require companies to report on the practices they have in place. As set 
out above, companies will be able to cover everything in the Strategic 
Report and then ‘just’ reference this fact in the Directors’ Report, rather 
than actually having to split the reporting into three distinct elements. 
 
In March 2019, following a review led by Sir John Kingman, HM Government 
announced that the Financial Reporting Council would be scrapped and replaced 
with a stronger “Audit, Reporting and Governance Authority”.  
“We need a new audit regulator with a clear and precise sense of 
purpose and I am pleased that the government shares that vision” 
Sir John Kingman, March 2019. 
The focus remains firmly on technical corporate governance - but someone 









































































Stage 1 Quantitative Survey Stata T-Test significant results 
 
Strong results outlined in blue correspond to blue shaded boxes in 
main text. Clear results outlined in orange correspond to orange 
shaded boxes in main text. 
 







 Pr(T < t) = 0.0000         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000          Pr(T > t) = 1.0000
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =       94
    diff = mean(Executiv) - mean(Non-exec)                        t =  -5.5156
                                                                              
    diff             -.6666667    .1208685               -.9066539   -.4266795
                                                                              
combined        96      1.4375    .0691624    .6776507    1.300195    1.574805
                                                                              
Non-exec        48    1.770833    .1083384    .7505908    1.552884    1.988782
Executiv        48    1.104167    .0535908    .3712878    .9963559    1.211977
                                                                              
   Group       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Two-sample t test with equal variances
. ttest Q2, by(Directortype)
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Question 4  Table A2. T-test for mean value of director’s experience as 
an executive director of another company. 
 
Table A3. T-test for mean value of director’s experience as a non-executive 




 Pr(T < t) = 0.0000         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0001          Pr(T > t) = 1.0000
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =       94
    diff = mean(Executiv) - mean(Non-exec)                        t =  -4.1544
                                                                              
    diff             -.3541667    .0852506               -.5234336   -.1848997
                                                                              
combined        96      .71875    .0461289    .4519694    .6271725    .8103275
                                                                              
Non-exec        48    .8958333    .0445583    .3087093    .8061935    .9854732
Executiv        48    .5416667    .0726788    .5035336    .3954557    .6878776
                                                                              
   Group       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Two-sample t test with equal variances
. ttest Q4, by(Directortype)
 Pr(T < t) = 0.0001         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0001          Pr(T > t) = 0.9999
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =       94
    diff = mean(Executiv) - mean(Non-exec)                        t =  -3.9673
                                                                              
    diff             -.3541667     .089272               -.5314183    -.176915
                                                                              
combined        96    .3229167    .0479738    .4700457    .2276766    .4181568
                                                                              
Non-exec        48          .5    .0729325    .5052912    .3532787    .6467213
Executiv        48    .1458333    .0514815     .356674     .042266    .2494007
                                                                              
   Group       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Two-sample t test with equal variances




Question 6  Table A4. T-test for mean value of directors being 
shareholders in the Corporation they are a Director of.  
 
 
Question 7  Table A5. T-test for mean value of directors being a 
member of a pension scheme underwritten or supported by this Corporation.  
 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.9814         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0372          Pr(T > t) = 0.0186
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =       94
    diff = mean(Executiv) - mean(Non-exec)                        t =   2.1137
                                                                              
    diff              .2083333    .0985639                .0126325    .4040342
                                                                              
combined        96    .6041667    .0501733     .491596    .5045601    .7037733
                                                                              
Non-exec        48          .5    .0729325    .5052912    .3532787    .6467213
Executiv        48    .7083333       .0663    .4593396     .574955    .8417117
                                                                              
   Group       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Two-sample t test with equal variances
. ttest Q6a, by(Directortype)
 Pr(T < t) = 0.9999         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0001          Pr(T > t) = 0.0001
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =       94
    diff = mean(Executiv) - mean(Non-exec)                        t =   3.9869
                                                                              
    diff                  .375    .0940573                 .188247     .561753
                                                                              
combined        96    .4166667    .0505814    .4955946    .3162499    .5170835
                                                                              
Non-exec        48    .2291667    .0613066    .4247444    .1058338    .3524996
Executiv        48    .6041667    .0713322     .494204    .4606648    .7476685
                                                                              
   Group       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Two-sample t test with equal variances




Question 9  Table A6. T-test for mean value – “Have you ever 
voluntarily left a job without another job or planned alternative activity?” 
 
Question 26  Table A7. T-test for mean value for “Please indicate 
your membership of any formal Board Committees (tick more than one if 
applicable)?” “Remuneration committee” 
 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.0035         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0070          Pr(T > t) = 0.9965
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =       94
    diff = mean(Executiv) - mean(Non-exec)                        t =  -2.7596
                                                                              
    diff             -.2708333    .0981413               -.4656953   -.0759714
                                                                              
combined        96    .5729167    .0507505    .4972512    .4721642    .6736691
                                                                              
Non-exec        48    .7083333       .0663    .4593396     .574955    .8417117
Executiv        48       .4375    .0723605     .501328    .2919295    .5830705
                                                                              
   Group       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Two-sample t test with equal variances
. ttest Q9, by(Directortype)
 Pr(T < t) = 0.0143         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0285          Pr(T > t) = 0.9857
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =       94
    diff = mean(Executiv) - mean(Non-exec)                        t =  -2.2243
                                                                              
    diff             -.1666667     .074931                -.315444   -.0178894
                                                                              
combined        96    .1666667     .038236    .3746343    .0907587    .2425746
                                                                              
Non-exec        48         .25    .0631614     .437595    .1229357    .3770643
Executiv        48    .0833333     .040315    .2793102    .0022301    .1644366
                                                                              
   Group       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Two-sample t test with equal variances
. ttest Q26a, by(Directortype)
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Table A8. T-test for mean value for Question 26 “Audit committee” 
 





 Pr(T < t) = 0.0061         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0122          Pr(T > t) = 0.9939
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =       94
    diff = mean(Executiv) - mean(Non-exec)                        t =  -2.5552
                                                                              
    diff             -.2291667    .0896848                -.407238   -.0510954
                                                                              
combined        96      .28125    .0461289    .4519694    .1896725    .3728275
                                                                              
Non-exec        48    .3958333    .0713322     .494204    .2523315    .5393352
Executiv        48    .1666667    .0543607    .3766218    .0573071    .2760262
                                                                              
   Group       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Two-sample t test with equal variances
. ttest Q26b, by(Directortype)
 Pr(T < t) = 0.9945         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0111          Pr(T > t) = 0.0055
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =       94
    diff = mean(Executiv) - mean(Non-exec)                        t =   2.5912
                                                                              
    diff                 .1875    .0723605                .0438266    .3311734
                                                                              
combined        96      .15625    .0372525    .3649982    .0822945    .2302055
                                                                              
Non-exec        48       .0625    .0353083     .244623   -.0085311    .1335311
Executiv        48         .25    .0631614     .437595    .1229357    .3770643
                                                                              
   Group       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Two-sample t test with equal variances
. ttest Q26e, by(Directortype)
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Question 28  Table A10. T-test for mean value for “Do you feel that 
the Board Meeting agenda is distributed to you in good time for you to sufficiently 
review it?” “Sometimes” 
 
Question 33  Table A11. T-test for mean value for “If applicable - 
when initially received by you, is the Board Pack sufficiently detailed to allow you 
to participate in Board Meetings in an appropriately informed way?” “Yes – always” 
 
 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.0004         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0009          Pr(T > t) = 0.9996
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =       94
    diff = mean(Executiv) - mean(Non-exec)                        t =  -3.4457
                                                                              
    diff             -.2291667    .0665086                -.361221   -.0971123
                                                                              
combined        96    .1354167    .0351057    .3439642     .065723    .2051103
                                                                              
Non-exec        48         .25    .0631614     .437595    .1229357    .3770643
Executiv        48    .0208333    .0208333    .1443376   -.0210779    .0627446
                                                                              
   Group       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Two-sample t test with equal variances
. ttest Q28c, by(Directortype)
 Pr(T < t) = 0.9949         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0102          Pr(T > t) = 0.0051
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =       94
    diff = mean(Executiv) - mean(Non-exec)                        t =   2.6223
                                                                              
    diff              .2291667    .0873902                .0556514    .4026819
                                                                              
combined        96    .2604167    .0450263    .4411657    .1710282    .3498051
                                                                              
Non-exec        48    .1458333    .0514815     .356674     .042266    .2494007
Executiv        48        .375    .0706166    .4892461    .2329378    .5170622
                                                                              
   Group       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Two-sample t test with equal variances
. ttest Q33a, by(Directortype)
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Table A12. T-test for mean value for Question 33 “Sometimes” 
 
 
Question 34  Table A13. T-test for mean value for “If applicable - 
prior to the Board Meeting, if you have concerns or questions about the content of 
the Board Pack, or there is insufficient information, omissions or errors, do you? 
(You may tick more than one answer) “Ask that the Board Pack is rectified before 
the Board Meeting”  
 
 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.0079         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0159          Pr(T > t) = 0.9921
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =       94
    diff = mean(Executiv) - mean(Non-exec)                        t =  -2.4563
                                                                              
    diff                -.1875    .0763351               -.3390652   -.0359348
                                                                              
combined        96    .1770833    .0391656    .3837431    .0993298    .2548369
                                                                              
Non-exec        48    .2708333     .064821    .4490929    .1404304    .4012363
Executiv        48    .0833333     .040315    .2793102    .0022301    .1644366
                                                                              
   Group       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Two-sample t test with equal variances
. ttest Q33c, by(Directortype)
 Pr(T < t) = 0.9861         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0277          Pr(T > t) = 0.0139
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =       94
    diff = mean(Executiv) - mean(Non-exec)                        t =   2.2361
                                                                              
    diff              .2083333    .0931695                .0233431    .3933236
                                                                              
combined        96       .3125    .0475554    .4659456    .2180907    .4069093
                                                                              
Non-exec        48    .2083333    .0592382    .4104141    .0891615    .3275052
Executiv        48    .4166667    .0719124    .4982238    .2719976    .5613358
                                                                              
   Group       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Two-sample t test with equal variances
. ttest Q34a, by(Directortype)
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Table A14. T-test for mean value for Question 34 “Ask for additional information 
separate to the Board Pack before the Board Meeting” 
 
Question 37  Table A15. T-test for mean value for When decisions 
are made at Board Meetings, do you personally feel that you have sufficient 




 Pr(T < t) = 0.9989         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0023          Pr(T > t) = 0.0011
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =       94
    diff = mean(Executiv) - mean(Non-exec)                        t =   3.1364
                                                                              
    diff                   .25    .0797084                .0917371    .4082629
                                                                              
combined        96    .2083333    .0416667    .4082483    .1256145    .2910521
                                                                              
Non-exec        48    .0833333     .040315    .2793102    .0022301    .1644366
Executiv        48    .3333333    .0687614    .4763931    .1950032    .4716635
                                                                              
   Group       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Two-sample t test with equal variances
. ttest Q34c, by(Directortype)
 Pr(T < t) = 0.9973         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0055          Pr(T > t) = 0.0027
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =       94
    diff = mean(Executiv) - mean(Non-exec)                        t =   2.8419
                                                                              
    diff                   .25    .0879694                .0753346    .4246654
                                                                              
combined        96    .2708333    .0455935     .446723    .1803188    .3613478
                                                                              
Non-exec        48    .1458333    .0514815     .356674     .042266    .2494007
Executiv        48    .3958333    .0713322     .494204    .2523315    .5393352
                                                                              
   Group       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Two-sample t test with equal variances
. ttest Q37a, by(Directortype)
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Table A16. T-test for mean value for Question 37 “Sometimes” 
 
Question 38  Table A17. T-test for mean value for Do you feel that 






 Pr(T < t) = 0.0061         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0122          Pr(T > t) = 0.9939
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =       94
    diff = mean(Executiv) - mean(Non-exec)                        t =  -2.5552
                                                                              
    diff             -.2291667    .0896848                -.407238   -.0510954
                                                                              
combined        96      .28125    .0461289    .4519694    .1896725    .3728275
                                                                              
Non-exec        48    .3958333    .0713322     .494204    .2523315    .5393352
Executiv        48    .1666667    .0543607    .3766218    .0573071    .2760262
                                                                              
   Group       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Two-sample t test with equal variances
. ttest Q37c, by(Directortype)
 Pr(T < t) = 0.0329         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0658          Pr(T > t) = 0.9671
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =       94
    diff = mean(Executiv) - mean(Non-exec)                        t =  -1.8612
                                                                              
    diff                -.1875    .1007416               -.3875247    .0125247
                                                                              
combined        96    .4479167    .0510198    .4998903    .3466295    .5492039
                                                                              
Non-exec        48    .5416667    .0726788    .5035336    .3954557    .6878776
Executiv        48    .3541667    .0697614    .4833211    .2138248    .4945085
                                                                              
   Group       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Two-sample t test with equal variances
. ttest Q38c, by(Directortype)
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Table A18. T-test for mean value for Question 38 “Not often” 
 




 Pr(T < t) = 0.9749         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0502          Pr(T > t) = 0.0251
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =       94
    diff = mean(Executiv) - mean(Non-exec)                        t =   1.9842
                                                                              
    diff                 .1875    .0944981               -.0001282    .3751282
                                                                              
combined        96    .3229167    .0479738    .4700457    .2276766    .4181568
                                                                              
Non-exec        48    .2291667    .0613066    .4247444    .1058338    .3524996
Executiv        48    .4166667    .0719124    .4982238    .2719976    .5613358
                                                                              
   Group       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Two-sample t test with equal variances
. ttest Q38d, by(Directortype)
 Pr(T < t) = 0.9674         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0652          Pr(T > t) = 0.0326
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =       94
    diff = mean(Executiv) - mean(Non-exec)                        t =   1.8659
                                                                              
    diff                  .125    .0669928               -.0080157    .2580157
                                                                              
combined        96        .125     .033931     .332455    .0576384    .1923616
                                                                              
Non-exec        48       .0625    .0353083     .244623   -.0085311    .1335311
Executiv        48       .1875    .0569329    .3944428    .0729658    .3020342
                                                                              
   Group       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Two-sample t test with equal variances
. ttest Q38e, by(Directortype)
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Question 39  Table A20. T-test for mean value for Away from 
Board Meetings, do you have access to executive Directors of the Company for 
dialogue and information exchange? “Yes planned” 
 
Question 40  Table A21. T-test for mean value for “Do you have 
access to senior managers for dialogue and information exchange?” “Yes - ad hoc 
/ on request” 
 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.9998         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0004          Pr(T > t) = 0.0002
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =       94
    diff = mean(Executiv) - mean(Non-exec)                        t =   3.6800
                                                                              
    diff              .3541667     .096241                .1630778    .5452555
                                                                              
combined        96      .46875    .0511986     .501642    .3671079    .5703921
                                                                              
Non-exec        48    .2916667       .0663    .4593396    .1582883     .425045
Executiv        48    .6458333    .0697614    .4833211    .5054915    .7861752
                                                                              
   Group       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Two-sample t test with equal variances
. ttest Q40a, by(Directortype)
 Pr(T < t) = 0.0329         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0658          Pr(T > t) = 0.9671
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =       94
    diff = mean(Executiv) - mean(Non-exec)                        t =  -1.8612
                                                                              
    diff                -.1875    .1007416               -.3875247    .0125247
                                                                              
combined        96    .4479167    .0510198    .4998903    .3466295    .5492039
                                                                              
Non-exec        48    .5416667    .0726788    .5035336    .3954557    .6878776
Executiv        48    .3541667    .0697614    .4833211    .2138248    .4945085
                                                                              
   Group       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Two-sample t test with equal variances
. ttest Q40b, by(Directortype)
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Question 41  Table A22. T-test for mean value for Do you have 
access to the Company's current management accounts and / or other financial 
records such as bank statements? “Yes planned” 
 




 Pr(T < t) = 0.9999         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0001          Pr(T > t) = 0.0001
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =       94
    diff = mean(Executiv) - mean(Non-exec)                        t =   3.9869
                                                                              
    diff                  .375    .0940573                 .188247     .561753
                                                                              
combined        96    .4166667    .0505814    .4955946    .3162499    .5170835
                                                                              
Non-exec        48    .2291667    .0613066    .4247444    .1058338    .3524996
Executiv        48    .6041667    .0713322     .494204    .4606648    .7476685
                                                                              
   Group       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Two-sample t test with equal variances
. ttest Q41a, by(Directortype)
 Pr(T < t) = 0.0009         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0019          Pr(T > t) = 0.9991
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =       94
    diff = mean(Executiv) - mean(Non-exec)                        t =  -3.1965
                                                                              
    diff                -.3125    .0977642               -.5066132   -.1183868
                                                                              
combined        96      .53125    .0511986     .501642    .4296079    .6328921
                                                                              
Non-exec        48       .6875    .0676102    .4684174    .5514858    .8235142
Executiv        48        .375    .0706166    .4892461    .2329378    .5170622
                                                                              
   Group       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Two-sample t test with equal variances
. ttest Q41b, by(Directortype)
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Question 42  Table A24. T-test for mean value for “Do you have 
access to the Board Committee's minutes and reports?” “Yes planned” 
 
Table A25. T-test for mean value for Question 42 “No” 
 
  
 Pr(T < t) = 0.9895         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0210          Pr(T > t) = 0.0105
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =       94
    diff = mean(Executiv) - mean(Non-exec)                        t =   2.3472
                                                                              
    diff                 .1875     .079882                .0288924    .3461076
                                                                              
combined        96    .8020833     .040878    .4005205    .7209303    .8832363
                                                                              
Non-exec        48    .7083333       .0663    .4593396     .574955    .8417117
Executiv        48    .8958333    .0445583    .3087093    .8061935    .9854732
                                                                              
   Group       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Two-sample t test with equal variances
. ttest Q42a, by(Directortype)
 Pr(T < t) = 0.0400         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0799          Pr(T > t) = 0.9600
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =       94
    diff = mean(Executiv) - mean(Non-exec)                        t =  -1.7701
                                                                              
    diff                -.0625    .0353083               -.1326054    .0076054
                                                                              
combined        96      .03125    .0178513     .174906   -.0041892    .0666892
                                                                              
Non-exec        48       .0625    .0353083     .244623   -.0085311    .1335311
Executiv        48           0           0           0           0           0
                                                                              
   Group       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Two-sample t test with equal variances




Stage 1 lower impact results  
 
Stage 1 Survey Question 1 (Administration question relating to the respondents 
acceptance of the survey conditions and their understanding of the research 
information sheet). 
 “I understand the survey and agree to take part.” Yes / No 
Stage 1 Survey  Question 10 & 11 
Stage 1 Survey  Q10. Have you ever participated in higher risk sports - for 
example rock climbing or skydiving? 
Stage 1 Survey  Q11. Have you ever undertaken activities that require 
special or higher premium insurance? 
Stage 1 Survey  Q10 & Q11 Question purpose. This purpose of these 
questions is to indicate a tolerance or propensity for physical and personal risk 
taking by the survey respondent. This question is grouped with questions 8 & 9. 
Stage 1 Survey  Q10 & Q11 Interpretation of responses in isolation. No 
significant differences were shown in the responses.   
Stage 1 Survey  Q10 & Q11 Interpretation of responses in context. None 
Stage 1 Survey  Q10 & Q11 Summary output and implications. None 
Stage 1 Survey  Q10 & Q11 Further questions. None 
Summary result of risk tolerance questions. 
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The combination of the risk tolerance questions (Q8, Q9, Q10 and Q11) are 
notable and of boarder-line significant. The combined answers show a statistical 
difference with non-executive directors being more likely to take risks. Using a t-
test there is a difference between the means of the two groups, t= -1.8504, 
degrees of freedom=94. However, this is could be age related and is not 
developed as a theme. 
 





Stage 1 Survey  Question 12 
Stage 1 Survey  Q12. Are you Female or Male? 
Stage 1 Survey  Q12 Question purpose. To capture additional information 
about the survey respondent.  
Stage 1 Survey  Q12 Interpretation of answers in isolation. The survey 
responses were broadly in line with the make-up of the population of all directors 
so no interpretation is given in isolation. 
Stage 1 Survey  Q12 Interpretation of answers in context. The survey 
responses were broadly in line with the make-up of the population of all directors 
so no interpretation is given in this context. 
Stage 1 Survey  Q12 Summary output and implications and further 
questions. None 




Stage 1 Survey  Question 13 
In which country or territory is the Company's operational head office 
based? (where the Company's executive Board operate). 
Table 16. Summary results for Question 13 
 
Stage 1 Survey  Q13 Question purpose. To capture information about the 
prevailing corporate governance culture and regulatory frameworks that the survey 
respondent performs their role within.  
Stage 1 Survey  Q13 Interpretation of answers in isolation and in 





Stage 1 Survey  Q13 Summary output and implications and further 
questions. None 
Stage 1 Survey  Question 14 
How long has the Company been in business in total (including in forms 
other than its current state)? 
Table 17. Summary results for Question 16 
 
Stage 1 Survey  Q14 Question purpose. To capture background 
information about the corporation the survey response relates to. 
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Stage 1 Survey  Q14 Interpretation of answers in isolation or context. 
Although there is a notable difference in the survey responses relating to the lower 
age bands of the corporations, these are not statistically significant as shown in 
the t-test statistical analysis. .    
Stage 1 Survey  Q14 Summary output and implications and further 
questions. No specific interpretation is drawn either in isolation or context so no 
further specific questions are derived. 
 
Stage 1 Survey  Question 15 
About ownership. Predominantly, is the Company? 
Stage 1 Survey Q15 Question purpose. To capture information about the 
prevailing corporate governance culture and regulatory frameworks that the survey 
respondent performs their role within.  
Stage 1 Survey Q15 Interpretation of answers in isolation. There are 
some substantial differences between the ownership structures when comparing 
executive directors and non-executive directors with the former more likely to be 
involved with businesses that are directly controlled by directors who are also 
shareholders, (or close associates which would include family owned 
corporations). This may indicate that there is a significant closeness and 
immersion where executive directors are concerned. The other major variance in 
the responses is that non-executive directors are more likely to be involved in 




Table 18. Summary results for Question 15 
 
Stage 1 Survey Q15 Interpretation of answers in context. In the context 
of this thesis, it is not possible to imply any significance as the control frameworks, 
particularly the external ones, are uniform as the corporations are all UK based 
with one exception, (see Question 13).    
Stage 1 Survey Q15 Summary output and implications and further 
questions. None 
Stage 1 Survey Question 16 
If the Company has publically available listed shares, on which exchange 
are these traded? 
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Stage 1 Survey Q16 Question purpose. To capture information about the 
prevailing corporate governance culture and control frameworks that the survey 
respondents perform their roles within.  
Stage 1 Survey Q16 Interpretation of answers in isolation and in 
context. The survey respondents were well distributed so no interpretation is 
given in this context. 
Stage 1 Survey Q16 Summary output and implications and further 
questions. None 
Note. There is a minor data inconsistency in the responses to Question 16 in that 
more survey respondents indicated that the company in question was on a public 
exchange than indicated were public companies in total in Question 15. 




Stage 1 Survey Question 17 
Does the company operate mainly in one country (c. 70% plus of its 
business). 
Stage 1 Survey Q17 Question purpose. To capture information about the 
prevailing corporate governance culture and control frameworks that the survey 
respondent performs their role within, and to highlight any complexity and conflicts 
that may exist due to operating in diverse markets.  




Stage 1 Survey Q17 Interpretation of answers in isolation and in 
context. The survey respondents showed similar distributions so no interpretation 
is given in isolation or in context. 
Stage 1 Survey Q17 Summary output and implications and further 
questions. None 
 
Stage 1 Survey Question 18 
Typically, how many directors are there on the Board? 




Stage 1 Survey Q18 Question purpose. In conjunction with Q19 and Q 20, 
to capture information about the size and balance of the board of directors the 
survey respondent is referring to in their responses. 
Stage 1 Survey Q18 Interpretation of answers in isolation and in 
context. The survey respondents showed similar distributions so no interpretation 
is given in isolation or in context. 
Stage 1 Survey Q18 Summary output and implications and further 
questions. None 
Stage 1 Survey Question 19 
How many executive directors are there? Include the Chairperson if their 
role at the Company occupies 20% or more of their typical working time. 




Stage 1 Survey Q19 Question purpose. In conjunction with Q18 and Q 20, 
to capture information about the size and balance of the board of directors the 
survey respondent is referring to in their responses. 
Stage 1 Survey Q19 Interpretation of answers in isolation and in 
context. The survey respondents showed similar distributions so no interpretation 
is given in isolation or in context. 
Stage 1 Survey Q19 Summary output and implications and further 
questions. None 
Stage 1 Survey Question 20 
How many non-executive directors are there? Include the Chairperson at the 
company if their role occupies less than 20% of their typical working time. 
Q20 Question purpose. In conjunction with Q18 and Q 19, to capture 
information about the size and balance of the Board of Directors the survey 
respondent is referring to in their responses. 
Stage 1 Survey Q20 Interpretation of answers in isolation and in 
context. The survey respondents showed similar distributions so no interpretation 
is given in isolation or in context. 









Table 23. Summary results for Question 20 
 
 
Stage 1 Survey Question 21 & 22 
Are Board meetings held in your first language or a language you are fully 
fluent in? 
Are Board Meetings held in the main language of the country where the 
Company's operational Head Office is? 
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Stage 1 Survey Q21 & Q22 Question purpose. To assess whether there 
were any potential communication barriers within the board of directors.  
Stage 1 Survey Q21 & Q22 Interpretation of answers in isolation and in 
context. The survey respondents showed similar distributions so no interpretation 
is given in isolation or in context. 
Stage 1 Survey Q21 & Q22 Summary output and implications and 
further questions. Respondents reported very few limits or barriers to information 
flow due to language issues so no further questions. 




Stage 1 Survey Question 23 
Typically, how many Board Meetings are there per year? 
Stage 1 Survey Q23 Question purpose. In conjunction with Q 24, to 
assess the number of times the corporation’s directors meet and interact each 
year.  
Stage 1 Survey Q23 Interpretation of answers in isolation. Executive 
directors reported that they were on boards that are more active when measured 
by the number of Board meetings per annum. This may be related to the answers 
given in Question 15 relating to company ownership. In general, the more often a 
group meet, the more cohesive it is, as discussed in Chapter Two.  
Stage 1 Survey Q23 Interpretation of answers in context. The more 
cohesive a group is, the less likely the development of sub-cultures and in-group / 
out-group behaviours, as discussed in Chapter Two. These conditions may lead to 
information asymmetries as participants seek to increase the power of the group 
they associate with. 










Table 25. Summary results for Question 23 
 
 
Stage 1 Survey Question 24 
Typically, including Board Meetings, how many times does the Board meet 
informally and formally per year? 
Stage 1 Survey Q24 Question purpose. In conjunction with Q 23, to 
assess the number of times Directors meet and interact each year.  
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Stage 1 Survey Q24 Interpretation of answers in isolation. In line with the 
responses to Question 23 relating to board meetings, executive directors reported 
that they were on Boards that are more active when measured by the number of 
other meetings per annum. In general, the more often a group meet, the more 
cohesive it is, as discussed in Chapter Two.  
Table 26. Summary results for Question 24 
 
Stage 1 Survey Q24 Interpretation of answers in context. This is 
particularly an issue in the context of this thesis given the conditions that allow for 
the development of sub-cultures and in-group / out-group behaviours, as 
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discussed in Chapter Two. Combined with the responses for Question 23, these 
conditions may lead to information asymmetries and the selection of decision 
preferences that reflect in-group and personal agency by Executive Directors.  
Further insight is given in relation to the survey responses to Question 26 on the 
membership of Board committees.  
Stage 1 Survey Q24 Summary output and implications and further 
questions. The data was considered to be relevant for inclusion in Stage 2 
qualitative research, as a potential discussion prompter within the semi-structured 
interview. 
 
Stage 1 Survey Question25 
How long in advance is the Board Meeting calendar set? 
Stage 1 Survey Q25 Question purpose. In conjunction with Q27 and Q28, 
to assess the level of planning, pro-activeness, and structure there is to Board 
activities and management.  
Stage 1 Survey Q25 Interpretation of answers in isolation and in 
context. The survey respondents were well distributed so no interpretation is 
given in this context. 
Stage 1 Survey Q25 Summary output and implications and further 
questions. None 
 





Stage 1 Survey Question 27  
Is an agenda provided in advance of the Board Meeting? 
 
Stage 1 Survey Q27 Question purpose. In conjunction with Q25 and Q 28, 
to assess the level of planning, pro-activity and structure there is to Board 
activities and Board management.  
Stage 1 Survey Q27 Interpretation of answers in isolation and in 
context. The survey responses show that directors received an agenda in 
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advance of the board meeting although for non-executive directors, this is not 
always the case in a small number of responses.  
Table 29. Summary results for Question 27 
 
Stage 1 Survey Q27 Summary output and implications. None 




Stage 1 Survey Question 29 and Question 30 
Stage 1 Survey Q29. Is this Director role as a? 
Is this role the Company Board Chairperson? 
Stage 1 Survey Q29 & Q30 Question purpose. To assess the survey 
respondent’s role within the board, and in respect of their responses to the 
questionnaire. 




Stage 1 Survey Q29 & Q30 Summary output and implications and 
further questions. None 
Table 31. Summary results for Question 29 and Question 30 
 
Stage 1 Survey Question 31 
Is there a structured set of Board papers - a "Board Pack" - issued for each 
Board Meeting? 
Stage 1 Survey Q31 Question purpose. To assess the level of best 
practice in relation to the distribution of information to the board.  
Stage 1 Survey Q31 Interpretation of answers in isolation. Overall, most 
survey respondents reported that a structured set of board papers is provided but 
with a difference in the incidents. These survey responses may reflect a different 
interpretation of the term “structured” where some survey respondents may be 
seeking or assuming a higher level of structure experienced on other boards. This 
could be an a response of non-executive directors who typically have more 
external experience and therefore reference points through membership of other 
boards and roles.   
Stage 1 Survey Q31 Interpretation of answers in context. This question 
reflects a second incidence of a potential information asymmetry between 
executive directors and non-executive directors which again may favour executive 
directors, as is, potentially, the case in Stage 1 Survey Question 28.  
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Stage 1 Survey Q31 Summary output and implications. The reported 
information asymmetry could be regarded as being systemic as it emanates from 
a corporate governance administration process, that of assembling and 
distributing the Board pack.  
Stage 1 Survey Q31 Further questions. The data was considered to be 
relevant for inclusion in Stage 2 research as a discussion prompter.  
 





Stage 1 Survey Question 32 
If applicable - how is the Board Pack distributed to you? 
Stage 1 Survey Q32 Question purpose. To assess the level of access the 
survey respondent has to the information provided to the Board.  
Stage 1 Survey Q32 Interpretation of answers in isolation. They medium 
used for information provision may well be influential in the way that information is 
processed by the receiver. Executive directors report having access to both hard 
and electronic versions of the Board Pack giving executive directors potentially a 
greater ability to use the information.   




Stage 1 Survey Q32 Interpretation of answers in context. This could 
indicate a third point of information asymmetry between Executive Directors and 
Non-executive Directors again in the favour of Executive Directors.   
Stage 1 Survey Q32 Summary output and implications. Overall, the 
responses to this question further enhance the indications of information 
asymmetry and the structural bias in favour of executive directors.  
Stage 1 Survey Q32 Further questions. The data was considered to be 
relevant for inclusion in Stage 2 research as a discussion prompter if required.  
Stage 1 Survey Question 35 
If you answered "No" to the question relating to the provision of a "Board 
Pack", is any other information provided to you before Board Meetings? 
(You may tick more than one answer as required) 
Stage 1 Survey Q35 Question purpose. To capture information in the 
event that no Board pack is provided to the Directors 
Stage 1 Survey Q35 Interpretation of answers in isolation and in 
context. None 
Stage 1 Survey Q35 Summary output and implications and further 
questions. None 






Stage 1 Survey Question 36 
Are Board decisions ever deferred or significantly delayed because of 
insufficient information? 
Stage 1 Survey Q36 Question purpose. In conjunction with Q 37 and Q 38, 
to assess the prevalence of events that are indicators of sub-optimal decision 
making processes where information quality is a cause or contributory factor.  
Stage 1 Survey Q36 Interpretation of answers in isolation and in 
context. Both sets of respondents appear to be able and / or willing to take 
decisions with the information they have and not to delay decisions regularly.   
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Table 37 Summary results for Question 36 
 
Stage 1 Survey Q36 Summary output and implications and further 
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